Concentrated Corporate Ownership
Concentrated Corporate Ownership

Author: Randall K. Morck

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2007-12-01

Total Pages: 404

ISBN-13: 0226536823

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Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?

Author: Belen Villalonga

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 47

ISBN-13:

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Using proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms during 1994-2000, we establish that, in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily firms, one must distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms: ownership, control, and management. Specifically, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman with a hired CEO. Control mechanisms including dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings further suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.

Introduction to Business
Introduction to Business

Author: Lawrence J. Gitman

Publisher:

Published: 2024-09-16

Total Pages: 1455

ISBN-13:

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Introduction to Business covers the scope and sequence of most introductory business courses. The book provides detailed explanations in the context of core themes such as customer satisfaction, ethics, entrepreneurship, global business, and managing change. Introduction to Business includes hundreds of current business examples from a range of industries and geographic locations, which feature a variety of individuals. The outcome is a balanced approach to the theory and application of business concepts, with attention to the knowledge and skills necessary for student success in this course and beyond. This is an adaptation of Introduction to Business by OpenStax. You can access the textbook as pdf for free at openstax.org. Minor editorial changes were made to ensure a better ebook reading experience. Textbook content produced by OpenStax is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Corporate Ownership and Control
Corporate Ownership and Control

Author: Brian R. Cheffins

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9780199596393

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Much discussion on corporate governance assumes companies are owned and controlled separately, yet this is not the norm worldwide. This book explores the foundations of separation in UK companies, asking how the company came to prominence and why and how the UK stock market came to be dominated by institutional shareholders.

Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance

Author: Hoang N. Pham

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2022-01-25

Total Pages: 190

ISBN-13: 1000540278

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The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.