This book investigates the way in which tax systems affect economic efficiency and the distribution of welfare. It examines within a unified framework questions that are usually treated in different areas of the literature: institutional economics, positive economics, normative economics, and political economics. It adheres to the rigorous standards of pure theory while paying careful attention to the policy relevance of the arguments. Tax systems are viewed as information extracting devices that generate sets of equilibria of complex geometry. A tax reform methodology is proposed that sheds light on optimal taxes. Social conflicts in the determination of taxes are shown to have effects on social cohesion.
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics presents a unified conceptual framework for analyzing taxation--the first to be systematically developed in several decades. An original treatment of the subject rather than a textbook synthesis, the book contains new analysis that generates novel results, including some that overturn long-standing conventional wisdom. This fresh approach should change thinking, research, and teaching for decades to come. Building on the work of James Mirrlees, Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, and subsequent researchers, and in the spirit of classics by A. C. Pigou, William Vickrey, and Richard Musgrave, this book steps back from particular lines of inquiry to consider the field as a whole, including the relationships among different fiscal instruments. Louis Kaplow puts forward a framework that makes it possible to rigorously examine both distributive and distortionary effects of particular policies despite their complex interactions with others. To do so, various reforms--ranging from commodity or estate and gift taxation to regulation and public goods provision--are combined with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income tax. The resulting distribution-neutral reform package holds much constant while leaving in play the distinctive effects of the policy instrument under consideration. By applying this common methodology to disparate subjects, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics produces significant cross-fertilization and yields solutions to previously intractable problems.
This book was prepared mainly for specialists on the assumption that it would provide the background to an important neglected field of discussion in public finance. Since it was first published in 1958, the theory of public goods and its implications for public policy have become incorporated in the main body of the economic analysis of public finance in the literature. A glance at the footnotes of some of the standard textbooks on public finance indicates that this assembly of articles has not been in vain. Probably the most influential part of this collection has been the papers concerned with the theory of public expenditure, which contains two closely related elements. The first is as a part of welfare economics: under what conditions can Pareto optimality be achieved in an economic system in which some goods supplied are indivisible? The other strand of thought is concerned with the positive theory of the public sector: how can economic analysis be used in order to explain how the size and composition of the budget is actually determined?
Frank Ramsey's classic paper "A contribution to the theory of taxation" gave rise to the modern theory of optimal taxation. This paper traces the literature that grew out of Ramsey's 1927 paper and assesses which of its key insights has proven robust. Though the path breaking work of Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees showed that Ramsey's results could be generalized in some important ways, other work showed that the domain of applicability of Ramsey's original insights may be more limited: changes in assumptions about the set of feasible taxes (not allowing certain taxes, or allowing a progressive income tax or non-linear commodity taxes), and in particular about the taxation of pure rents, incorporating more explicitly distributional considerations, and/or recognizing the important ways in which our economy differs from the competitive model underlying Ramsey's analysis all change the optimal structure of commodity taxation in important ways.
The land value tax is the focus of this Policy Focus Report, Assessing the Theory and Practice of Land Value Taxation. A concept dating back to Henry George, the land value tax is a variant of the property tax that imposes a higher tax rate on land than on improvements, or taxes only the land value. Many other types of changes in property tax policy, such as assessment freezes or limitations, have undesirable side effects, including unequal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and distortion of economic incentives. The land value tax can enhance both the fairness and the efficiency of property tax collection, with few undesirable effects; land is effectively in fixed supply, so an increase in the tax rate on land value will raise revenue without distorting the incentives for owners to invest in and use their land. A land value tax has also been seen as a way to combat urban sprawl by encouraging density and infill development. Authors Richard F. Dye and Richard W. England examine the experience of those who have implemented the land value tax -- more than 30 countries around the world, and in the United States, several municipalities dating back to 1913, when the Pennsylvania legislature permitted Pittsburgh and Scranton to tax land values at a higher rate than building values. A 1951 statute gave smaller Pennsylvania cities the same option to enact a two-rate property tax, a variation of the land value tax. About 15 communities currently use this type of tax program, while others tried and rescinded it. Hawaii also has experience with two-rate taxation, and Virginia and Connecticut have authorized municipalities to choose a two-rate property tax. The land value tax has been subjected to studies comparing jurisdictions with and without it, and to legal challenges. A land value tax also raises administrative issues, particularly in the area of property tax assessments. Land value taxation is an attractive alternative to the traditional property tax, especially to much more problematic types of property tax measures such as assessment limitations, the authors conclude. A land value tax is best implemented if local officials use best assessing practices to keep land and improvement values up to date; phase in dual tax rates over several years; and include a tax credit feature in those communities where land-rich but income-poor citizens might suffer from land value taxation.
This paper, which is based upon the author's Ph. D dissertation for the Economics Dept., Univ. of Chicago, integrates the theory of illegal behavior into the economic analysis of regulation, developing implications for both the measurement of regulatory stringency and the determination of the economic effects of regulation. The discussion shows that measures of regulatory stringency must consider the level of law enforcement resources in addition to the statutory provisions in regulations. A more important conclusion is that an analysis of regulation that ignores the prospect of illegal behavior incorrectly analyzes the economic effects of changes in the statutory provisions of regulations. Empirical results from the study of state taxation of liquor suggest replacing the traditional analysis by the proposed alternative analysis that emphasizes the importance of tax evasion.
