A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.
A primary requirement in achieving strategic aims in Iraq is the reestablishment of a functional health care system. Currently, there is no agreed solution among the stake-holder agencies regarding strategic health policy in support of this objective. Health care is a component of basic human needs and should be accessible, affordable, and effective. Following combat operations and phasing into stabilization operations, basic health care infrastructure and systems have often been either disrupted or degraded altogether. To address this situation, the U.S. Government requires a coordinated interagency approach to formulate a strategic health care plan. Incorporating all relevant players into this endeavor will promote sound organizational design, unity of effort, and a culture favorable to synchronization. This paper contains specific recommendations and advocates a renewed effort toward addressing them. The primary constructs under review are U.S. Government organization, leadership, and culture as they relate to a strategic healthcare policy. This approach will reduce redundant efforts, conserve resources and augment the legitimacy of the new Government of Iraq while supporting U.S. national strategic aims.
Ending the U.S. war in Iraq required redeploying 100,000 military and civilian personnel; handing off responsibility for 431 activities to the Iraqi government, U.S. embassy, USCENTCOM, or other U.S. government entities; and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book examines the planning and execution of this transition.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. A large-scale assistance program has been undertaken by the U.S. in Iraq since mid-¿03. By Spring '09, over $49 billion had been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. In June '09, A significant number of reconstruction activities, especially those involving construction of roads, sanitation, electric power, oil production, and other infrastructure, are completed or near completion. Most large-scale infrastructure programs are no longer funded. However, many small-scale, targeted community-level infrastructure efforts are funded. The key emphases of the aid program are the training of Iraqi forces and programs assisting the development of Iraqi governing capacities and supporting the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Illustrations.