Read and Download eBook Full
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2017-10-26
Total Pages: 935
ISBN-13: 1107135346
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAn international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004-01-12
Total Pages: 378
ISBN-13: 1139449168
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2004-03-28
Total Pages: 262
ISBN-13: 0691119252
DOWNLOAD EBOOKGovernments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
Published: 2012
Total Pages: 471
ISBN-13: 9814374598
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRobust Mechanism Design: the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs.
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
Published: 2007-12-31
Total Pages: 402
ISBN-13: 1599046385
DOWNLOAD EBOOKOffers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Petyon Young
Publisher: Elsevier
Published: 2014-10-01
Total Pages: 1025
ISBN-13: 0444537678
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. - Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior - Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory - Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: Fredrik Nils Andersson
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2011-06-28
Total Pages: 249
ISBN-13: 1461509173
DOWNLOAD EBOOKExperimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, And Decision Making is based on research presented at the 20th Arne Ryde Symposium on Experimental Economics, held on November 9-11 at Lund University. The volume is divided into two parts. In Part I, interviews with prominent researchers in the field, all invited speakers at the Symposium, are presented. Those interviewed are Peter Bohm, Catherine Eckel, Werner Güth, John Hey, Daniel Kahneman, Alvin Roth, Vernon Smith, and Martin Weber. The interviews address important questions about basic experimental methods and the interpretation of results. In addition, these researchers answer questions relating to their specific fields and to their contributions at the Symposium. They are also asked to single out the most important findings in the field. Part II contains selected contributions from the conference. Topics covered include attitudes towards risk and inequality; pitfalls in experimental economics; analysis of trading-period duration; robustness in learning; video experiments on decision making and fairness; sequential prisoners' dilemmas; and collusion in auctions.
Author: Maarten Janssen
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 344
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.
Author: Ignacio Esponda
Publisher:
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 176
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2021-04-13
Total Pages: 419
ISBN-13: 0691218951
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAn invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
