Celebrated for his work in the philosophy of education and acknowledged as a leading proponent of American pragmatism, John Dewey might have had more of a reputation for his philosophy of logic had Bertrand Russell not so fervidly attacked him on the subject. This book analyzes the debate between Russell and Dewey that followed the 1938 publication of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, and argues that, despite Russell's early resistance, Dewey's logic is surprisingly relevant to recent developments in philosophy and cognitive science. Since Dewey's logic focuses on natural language in everyday experience, it poses a challenge to Russell's formal syntactic conception of logic. Tom Burke demonstrates that Russell misunderstood crucial aspects of Dewey's theory - his ideas on propositions, judgments, inquiry, situations, and warranted assertibility - and contends that logic today has progressed beyond Russell and is approaching Dewey's broader perspective. Burke relates Dewey's logic to issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and psychology, computer science, and formal semantics.
Is a genuine logic of scientific discovery possible? In the essays collected here, Hintikka not only defends an affirmative answer; he also outlines such a logic. It is the logic of questions and answers. Thus inquiry in the sense of knowledge-seeking becomes inquiry in the sense of interrogation. Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies. Questions to Nature, of course, must include observations and experiments. Hintikka shows, in fact, how the logic of experimental inquiry can be understood from the interrogative vantage point. Other important topics examined include induction (in a forgotten sense that has nevertheless played a role in science), explanation, the incommensurability of theories, theory-ladenness of observations, and identifiability.
LOGIC THE THEORY OF INQUIRY By JOHN DEWEY NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1938, BY HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, INC. January, 1939 BINDER Y0ci. 1950 I d Jt PRINTED IN THE-XmiTEILSTATES OF AMERICA UM. V 981500 4, t PREFACE NJHIS BOOK is a development of ideas regarding the nature of logical theory that were first presented, some forty years ago, in Studies in Logical Theory that were somewhat expanded in Essays in Experimental Logic and were briefly summarized with special reference to education in Ho w We Think While basic ideas remain the same, there has naturally been considerable modi fication during the intervening years. While connection with the problematic is unchanged, express identification of reflective thought with objective inquiry makes possible, I think, a mode of statement less open to misapprehension than were the previous ones. The present work is marked in particular by application of the earlier ideas to interpretation of the forms and formal relations that constitute the standard material of logical tradition. This in terpretation has at the same rime involved a detailed development, critical and constructive, of the general standpoint and its under lying ideas. In this connection, attention is called particularly to the principle of the continuum of inquiry, a principle whose importance, as far as I am aware, only Peirce had previously noted. Application of this principle enables an empirical account to be given of logical forms, whose necessity traditional empiricism overlooked or denied while at the same time it proves that the interpretation of them as a priori is unnecessary. The connection of the principle with generalization in its two forms which aresystematically distinguished through out the work and with the probability coefficient of all existential generalizations is, I suppose, sufficiently indicated in the chapters devoted to these topics. The basic conception of inquiry as de termination of an indeterminate situation not only enables the vexed topic of the relation of judgment and propositions to obtain an ob jective solution, but, in connection with the conjugate relation of observed and conceptual material, enables a coherent account of the different propositional forms to be given. The word Pragmatism does not, I think, occur in the ext. iii IV PREFACE Perhaps the word lends itself to misconception. At all events, so much misunderstanding and relatively futile controversy have gathered about the word that it seemed advisable to avoid its use. But in the proper interpretation of pragmatic, namely the func tion of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of proposi tions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations, the text that follows is thoroughly pragmatic. In the present state of logic, the absence of any attempt at sym bolic formulation will doubtless cause serious objection in the minds of many readers. This absence is not due to any aversion to such formulation. On the contrary, I am convinced that acceptance of the general principles set forth will enable a more complete and con sistent set of symbolizations than now exists to be made. The ab sence of symbolization is due, first, to a point mentioned in the text, the need for development of a general theory of language in which form and matter are not separated and, secondly, to the fact that an adequate set of symbols depends upon prior institution of valid ideas of the conceptions and relations that are symbolized. With out fulfilment of this condition, formal symbolization will as so often happens at present merely perpetuate existing mistakes while strengthening them by seeming to give them scientific stand ing. Readers not particularly conversant with contemporary logical discussions may find portions of the text too technical, especially perhaps in Part III...
Through the use of logic, simulation, and empirical data, Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr develop and demonstrate a nuanced and more appropriate conceptualization of explanation in international relations and foreign policy in Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics. They demonstrate that a concern with the logical underpinnings of research raises a series of theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological issues that must be addressed if theory and research design are to meet the challenges of cumulation in the study of international relations (or any area of social science). The authors argue for understanding the critical, yet subtle, interplay of the elements with a research triad composed of theory, logic, and method.
This illustrated work searches for the answers to such questions as whether standard methodological recommendations help or hinder the reliability of inquiry. It uses techniques and concepts drawn from formal learning theory, topology and the theory of computability.
A new translation of the final work of French philosopher Jean Cavaillès. In this short, dense essay, Jean Cavaillès evaluates philosophical efforts to determine the origin—logical or ontological—of scientific thought, arguing that, rather than seeking to found science in original intentional acts, a priori meanings, or foundational logical relations, any adequate theory must involve a history of the concept. Cavaillès insists on a historical epistemology that is conceptual rather than phenomenological, and a logic that is dialectical rather than transcendental. His famous call (cited by Foucault) to abandon "a philosophy of consciousness" for "a philosophy of the concept" was crucial in displacing the focus of philosophical enquiry from aprioristic foundations toward structural historical shifts in the conceptual fabric. This new translation of Cavaillès's final work, written in 1942 during his imprisonment for Resistance activities, presents an opportunity to reencounter an original and lucid thinker. Cavaillès's subtle adjudication between positivistic claims that science has no need of philosophy, and philosophers' obstinate disregard for actual scientific events, speaks to a dilemma that remains pertinent for us today. His affirmation of the authority of scientific thinking combined with his commitment to conceptual creation yields a radical defense of the freedom of thought and the possibility of the new.
A general formal theory of causal reasoning as a logical study of causal models, reasoning, and inference. In this book, Alexander Bochman presents a general formal theory of causal reasoning as a logical study of causal models, reasoning, and inference, basing it on a supposition that causal reasoning is not a competitor of logical reasoning but its complement for situations lacking logically sufficient data or knowledge. Bochman also explores the relationship of this theory with the popular structural equation approach to causality proposed by Judea Pearl and explores several applications ranging from artificial intelligence to legal theory, including abduction, counterfactuals, actual and proximate causality, dynamic causal models, and reasoning about action and change in artificial intelligence. As logical preparation, before introducing causal concepts, Bochman describes an alternative, situation-based semantics for classical logic that provides a better understanding of what can be captured by purely logical means. He then presents another prerequisite, outlining those parts of a general theory of nonmonotonic reasoning that are relevant to his own theory. These two components provide a logical background for the main, two-tier formalism of the causal calculus that serves as the formal basis of his theory. He presents the main causal formalism of the book as a natural generalization of classical logic that allows for causal reasoning. This provides a formal background for subsequent chapters. Finally, Bochman presents a generalization of causal reasoning to dynamic domains.
Heralded as "the crowning work of a great career," Logic: The Theory of Inquiry was widely reviewed. To Evander Bradley McGilvary, the work assured Dewey "a place among the world's great logicians." William Gruen thought "No treatise on logic ever written has had as direct and vital an impact on social life as Dewey's will have." Paul Weiss called it "the source and inspiration of a new and powerful movement." Irwin Edman said of it, "Most philosophers write postscripts; Dewey has made a program. His Logic is a new charter for liberal intelligence." Ernest Nagel called the Logic an impressive work. Its unique virtue is to bring fresh illumination to its subject by stressing the roles logical principles and concepts have in achieving the objectives of scientific inquiry."
Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.
