This lively and original book critically re-examines Lloyd George's part, crucial but enigmatic, in the 'lost peace' of Versailles, 1919-1940. In a re-examination of six key episodes 1919-1940, it reviews his protean role at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, his strategy on reparations, his abortive guarantee-treaty to France, and the emergence at the Conference of 'Appeasement'. It then reassesses his controversial visit to Hitler, and his bids to halt World War II after the fall of Poland and France.
The third edition of this acclaimed textbook on peace-making after the First World War advances that the responsibility for the outbreak of a new, even more ruinous, war in 1939 cannot be ascribed entirely to the planet's most powerful men and their meeting in Paris in January 1919 to reassemble a shattered world. Giving a concise overview of the problems and pressures these key figures were facing, Alan Sharp provides a coherent introduction to a highly complex and multi-dimensional topic. This is an ideal resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students taking modules on the Versailles Settlement, European and International History, Modern History, Interwar Europe, The Great War, 20th Century Europe, German History, or Diplomatic History, on either history courses or international relations/politics courses.
This book examines the range and complexity of unionist political identities, ideas and beliefs in the non-English parts of the United Kingdom in the mid-twentieth century. It discusses the careers of eight politicians from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and uncovers the varieties of unionism that held the multi-national UK together. Challenging the idea that Britain was in the process of breaking up, it argues that the Union provided a focus for loyalty in the United Kingdom that contributed to the continuing formation of identities of Britishness.
As we approach the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, students of history will revisit the causes, conduct and aftermath of the war. In each of these, Sir Eyre Crowe played a very significant role. Yet, outside academic and diplomatic circles, his name is little known. An “outsider” in the Foreign Office, he neither attended an English public school nor university. He was born and educated in Germany. Yet he rose because of his unique expertise to be the Permanent Under-Secretary from 1920 until his death in 1925, during which time he worked, not always amicably, with prime ministers and foreign secretaries such as Lloyd George, Curzon, Ramsay Macdonald and Austen Chamberlain. On his death, Stanley Baldwin called him “our ablest public servant.” Eyre Crowe was a participant in events that led to the 1914–1918 war, was one of the main organisers of the blockade of Germany, helped to end the Ruhr crisis of 1923–24, and played a major role in the acceptance of the Dawes Plan at the 1924 London Conference. Shortly before he died, he persuaded a sceptical Cabinet to accept a policy that culminated in the Locarno Pact. Yet, Crowe played a strange role at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Britain’s most knowledgeable expert on Germany, he was marginalised by Lloyd George prior to the signing of the Versailles Treaty, but then played a leading part as Ambassador Plenipotentiary. Crowe’s Memorandum of 1907 had a profound influence upon Foreign Office perceptions of Germany for more than forty years. The “Crowe line” on Germany was opposed by Neville Chamberlain and the British Ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, prior to the Second World War. Crowe had believed that Germany was a great nation, but that Britain had made too many concessions to its government when it needed to stand firm. Foreign Office diplomats were even seen waving copies of the memorandum (by then a published document) in the faces of journalists from the pro-appeasement Times newspaper. This book focuses mainly on the 1907 Memorandum and Crowe’s career after the war, but it provides many insights into the characters, talents and failings of a number of players in this extraordinary period of history.
Most studies of World War II assume that it was, in some way, a triumph for Britain. John Charmley’s important new reappraisal of the immediate origins of the war is based on extensive new work in the Chamberlain papers. It starts from Chamberlain’s belief that even a victorious war would be a disaster—it would destroy the foundations of British power and hand over Europe to Russian domination. Reconstructing Chamberlain’s policy assumptions, Mr. Charmley argues that they were neither naïve nor foolish. While focusing on the prime minister’s personality, he also shows that Chamberlain’s views were shared by many other leading politicians and diplomats. Mr. Charmley thus resurrects a whole school of thought on foreign policy which was forgotten in the wake of Churchill’s triumph. Unlike Churchill, Chamberlain was not prepared to gamble an empire; but events produced, according to Mr. Charmley, indeed a “human tragedy.” Early British reviews of the book have called it “important,” “entertaining and absorbing,” “concise and spirited,” and “provocative.” The Guardian wrote: “Chamberlain hardly emerges a hero from these pages, but at least there is no excuse left for regarding him as no more than a wimp in a wing-collar.”
German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31: the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions. These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany’s ability to pose a military threat to European security. This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world. This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.
Jan Smuts was one of the key figures behind the creation of the League of Nations; Wilson was inspired by his ideas, including the mandates scheme. He pleaded for a magnanimous peace, warning that the treaty of Versailles would lead to another war.
The book investigates the role of popular liberal internationalism as a social movement in Britain using Gramscian and Foucauldian ideas of civil society. It addresses the use of force for peace through an examination of the impact of civil society actors in popular liberal internationalism between the world wars.
This book is a collection of essays by leading scholars of the international history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that aims to explore the dynamics of the way in which diplomacy was conducted before, during and after the First World War. It is a history of the origins, nature and conduct of the so-called ‘new diplomacy,’ a phrase often used by historians of this period but not full understood. Other key themes include changes in the way war as a diplomatic tool was viewed in this period, primarily from the perspective of the British and American governments. This book also contributes to the growing literature on how the Paris Peace Conference and the peace treaties it produced were viewed from outside as well as inside Europe.
The essays in this volume, written by leading historians and a former British foreign secretary, survey the strategy, politics and personalities of British peacemaking in 1919. Many of the intractable problems faced by negotiators are studied in this volume. Neglected issues, including nascent British commercial interests in Central Europe and attitudes towards Russia are covered, along with important reassessments of the viability of the Versailles treaty, reparations, appeasement, and the long-term effects of the settlement. This collection is a compelling and resonant addition to revisionist studies of the 'Peace to End Peace' and essential reading for those interested in international history.
