This lively and original book critically re-examines Lloyd George's part, crucial but enigmatic, in the 'lost peace' of Versailles, 1919-1940. In a re-examination of six key episodes 1919-1940, it reviews his protean role at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, his strategy on reparations, his abortive guarantee-treaty to France, and the emergence at the Conference of 'Appeasement'. It then reassesses his controversial visit to Hitler, and his bids to halt World War II after the fall of Poland and France.
This book examines Lloyd George’s attitudes to Germany during the inter-war period and beyond. As Prime Minister until October 1922 and a leading player in the shaping of postwar Europe, Lloyd George maintained an active critical interest in Britain’s European policy almost until his death in 1945. After a brief survey of his role at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the book considers Lloyd George’s policy towards Germany during the rest of his premiership. It then examines his interventions across the remaining inter-war years, concluding with an evaluation of his advocacy of a compromise peace with Hitler during World War Two. In 1941 Churchill likened Lloyd George’s attitude to Germany to that of Marshal Pétain. The evidence in some ways vindicates that comparison. It shows that, after 1918, Lloyd George supported appeasement on most issues involving Germany—even during Hitler’s chancellorship, and even after World War Two began. His belief that Germany had just grievances, his suspicion of French motives, his admiration for Hitler and his growing conviction that Germany had been treated unfairly at Versailles, led him to see her as a long-suffering under-dog. The book also sheds light on the evolution of the appeasement policies of successive British governments throughout the inter-war period; and, by comparing Lloyd George’s views with those of contemporary leaders and opinion-formers, it highlights ideas for alternatives to appeasement as conceived at the time rather than by historians in hindsight.
"A remarkably vivid account of a key moment in Western history: The critical six months in 1940 when Winston Churchill and his cabinet debated whether England should fight Nazi Germany and then decided to "never surrender"."--Amazon.com.
This book focuses on some new issues associated with British appeasement policy in the 1930s. It looks particularly at how the artificial split between international history and military history has led to the over-simplification of the factors involved in formulating the appeasement policy. It argues that, contrary to anti-appeasement mythology, Britain was not left defenceless in 1939, having in fact a highly sophisticated aerial defence system for which Baldwin and Chamberlain have received little credit. Conversely, the disaster of 1940 was not a consequence of the sins of the British appeasers, but the result of a seriously misconceived French strategy, and brilliant German planning. The book further argues that Anglo-Czech relations between 1935 and 1938 showed that both the Foreign Office and anti-appeasers had deep rooted anti-Slav prejudices. However, new Czech research shows a more sympathetic understanding of how, and why, Britain adopted the appeasement policy. Important new Soviet sources are also considered, such as notably the Maisky Diaries (2016), for their relevance to British policy.
Appeasement's reputation as a bankrupt policy stems from the unpredictable catastrophes of the Russo-German Pact in 1939 and the Fall of France in 1940; in fact, it was an honourable, reasonable and sensible response to an appalling and unprecedented threat.
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the international community came together to find a way forward in the aftermath of the First World War. The conference is often judged a failure, as the resulting Treaty of Versailles did not bring long-term peace with Germany. By following the activities of British delegate and wartime Minister of Blockade Lord Robert Cecil, this book examines the struggles and successes of the conference, as delegates from around the world grappled with the economic, political and humanitarian catastrophes overwhelming Europe in 1919. After the Great War describes, for the first time, the significant role of economic warfare at the Peace Conference and in the post-war settlement. Lord Cecil's sometimes difficult partnership with US President Woodrow Wilson forged a new, permanent, international diplomatic organization – the League of Nations – and supplied it with the power to create collective blockades against aggressive states. Leaders of the Allied economic war before the Armistice became, in Paris, leaders of humanitarian-minded international outreach to their former enemies in Germany and Austria. After the Great War promotes a new understanding of these underappreciated internationalists in Paris, many of whom transitioned into leading the League of Nations even before the Peace Conference ended. Often derided as an idealistic fantasy, international peace enforced by economic sanctions appeared a realistic possibility when the Treaty was signed at the end of June 1919.
Challenging the standard narrative of Interwar International History, this account establishes the causal relationship between the global political and economic crises of the period, and offers a radically new look at the role of ideology, racism and the leading liberal powers in the events between the First and Second World Wars.
This book is a collection of essays by leading scholars of the international history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that aims to explore the dynamics of the way in which diplomacy was conducted before, during and after the First World War. It is a history of the origins, nature and conduct of the so-called ‘new diplomacy,’ a phrase often used by historians of this period but not full understood. Other key themes include changes in the way war as a diplomatic tool was viewed in this period, primarily from the perspective of the British and American governments. This book also contributes to the growing literature on how the Paris Peace Conference and the peace treaties it produced were viewed from outside as well as inside Europe.
Even as a country ceases to be a great power, the concept of it as a great power can continue to influence decision making and policy formulation. This book explores how such a process took place in Russia from 1917 through 1920, when the Bolshevik coup of November 1917 led to the creation of two regimes: the Bolshevik "Reds" and the anti-Bolshevik "Whites." As Reds consolidated their one-party dictatorship and nursed global ambitions, Whites struggled to achieve a different vision for the future of Russia. Anatol Shmelev illuminates the White campaign with fresh purpose and through information from the Hoover Institution Archives, exploring how diverse White factions overcame internal tensions to lobby for recognition on the world stage, only to fail—in part because of the West's desire to leave "the Russian question" to Russians alone. In the Wake of Empire examines the personalities, institutions, political culture, and geostrategic concerns that shaped the foreign policy of the anti-Bolshevik governments and attempts to define the White movement through them. Additionally, Shmelev provides a fascinating psychological study of the factors that ultimately doomed the White effort: an irrational and ill-placed faith in the desire of the Allies to help them, and wishful thinking with regard to their own prospects that obscured the reality around them.
June 2016 represents a significant moment in British history. The decision to leave the European Union at the most critical period since its existence could bring unpredictable and far-reaching consequences both for the United Kingdom and the Union itself. June 1940 was also a turning point in British history. On the afternoon of 16 June, a few hours before the French Government opted for the capitulation, Churchill made, on behalf of the British Government, an offer of “indissoluble union.” When a sceptical Churchill put forward to the British Cabinet the text of the declaration drafted by Jean Monnet, Sir Arthur Salter, and Robert Vansittart, he was surprised at the amount of support it received. The Cabinet adopted the document with some minor amendments, and de Gaulle, who saw it as a means of keeping France in the war, telephoned Reynaud with the proposal for an “indissoluble union” with “joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies,” a common citizenship and a single War Cabinet. The proposal, however, never reached the table of the French Government. The spirit of capitulation, embodied in Weygand and Pétain prevailed, and France submitted herself to the German will, for the second time in seventy years. After the Munich crisis, Great Britain had to face the danger of another European war, with the inevitable loss of the Empire, and it was at this point that the country first began to favour the application of the federalist principle to Anglo-French relations. In this conversion to federalism, a fundamental role was played by the Federal Union, the first federalist movement organised on a popular basis. The contribution of Federal Union to the development of the federal idea in Great Britain and Europe was to express and organise the beginning of a new political militancy, and it represented the first step of a historical process: the overcoming of the nation State, the modern political formula which institutionalises the political division of mankind. This study principally examines the first eighteen months of the Federal Union, during which time it was able to raise itself to the attention of the general public, and the political class, as the heir of the League of Nations Union. The research is based on extensive unpublished archival material, found across the globe, from London, Oxford, Brighton, and Edinburgh to Washington, Paris, and Geneva.
