Chapter 24: "Is this my destiny?"--Chapter 25: "secesh wives with their own little slaves"--Chapter 26: "Do stop digging at this old canal" -- Chapter 27: Lieutenant General's Wife -- Chapter 28: "I did not want to go to the theater" -- Chapter 29: "the sunlight of his loyal love
In this book, David Work examines Lincoln's policy of appointing political generals to build a national coalition to fight and win the Civil War. Work follows the careers of sixteen generals through the war to assess their contributions and to ascertain how Lincoln assessed them as commander-in-chief. Eight of the generals began the war as Republicans and eight as Democrats. Some commanded armies, some regiments. Among them were some of the most famous generals of the Union--such as Francis P. Blair Jr., John A. Dix, John A. Logan, James S. Wadsworth--and others whose importance has been obscured by more dramatic personalities. As the war proceeded, the value of the political generals became a matter of serious dispute. Could politicians make the shift from a political campaign to a military one? Could they be trusted to fight? Could they avoid destructive jealousies and the temptations of corruption? And with several of the generals being Irish or German immigrants, what effect would ethnic prejudices have on their success or failure? Work finds that Lincoln's policy was ultimately successful, as these generals provided effective political support and made important contributions in military administration and on the battlefield. Although several of them proved to be poor commanders, others were effective in exercising influence on military administration and recruitment, slavery policy, and national politics.
This manuscript is the first biography of Joseph Holt, the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General during the Civil War. Leonard argues that Holt has been portrayed as more or less a caricature of himself, flatly represented as the brutal prosecutor of Lincoln's assassins and the judge who allowed Mary Surratt to be hanged despite knowing her sentence had been reduced. Leonard contends that the southern view of Holt became the predominant way we see him, in large part because the memory perpetrated by the Lost Cause defined Holt as ruthless toward Southerners and the South. But Leonard argues that there is much more to Holt than what sympathizers with the Lost Cause came to think of him, and she tells his story here, from his early life in Kentucky to his wartime life as a member of Lincoln's administration to his postwar life as the prosecutor of Lincoln's assassins. Perhaps most important, Leonard will look at the erasure of Holt from American memory and investigate how such a significant figure has come to be so widely misunderstood.
From the moment the battle ended, Gettysburg was hailed as one of the greatest triumphs of the Union army. Celebrations erupted across the North as a grateful people cheered the victory. But Gabor Boritt turns our attention away from the rejoicing millions to the dark mood of the White House--where Lincoln cried in frustration as General Meade let the largest Confederate army escape safely into Virginia. Such unexpected portraits abound in Lincoln's Generals, as a team of distinguished historians probes beyond the popular anecdotes and conventional wisdom to offer a fascinating look at Lincoln's relationship with his commanders. In Lincoln's Generals, Boritt and his fellow contributors examine the interaction between the president and five key generals: McClellan, Hooker, Meade, Sherman, and Grant. In each chapter, the authors provide new insight into this mixed bag of officers and the president's tireless efforts to work with them. Even Lincoln's choice of generals was not as ill-starred as we think, writes Pulitzer Prize-winner Mark E. Neely, Jr.: compared to most Victorian-era heads of state, he had a fine record of selecting commanders (for example, the contemporary British gave us such bywords for incompetence as "the charge of the Light Brigade," while Napoleon III managed to lose the entire French army). But the president's relationship with his generals was never easy. In these pages, Stephen Sears underscores McClellan's perverse obstinancy as Lincoln tried everything to drive him ahead. Neely sheds new light on the president's relationship with Hooker, arguing that he was wrong to push the general to attack at Chancellorsville. Boritt writes about Lincoln's prickly relationship with the victor of Gettysburg, "old snapping turtle" George Meade. Michael Fellman reveals the political stress between the White House and William T. Sherman, a staunch conservative who did not want blacks in his army but who was crucial to the war effort. And John Y. Simon looks past the legendary camaraderie between Lincoln and Grant to reveal the tensions in their relationship. Perhaps no other episode has been more pivotal in the nation's history than the Civil War--and yet so much of these massive events turned on a few distinctive personalities. Lincoln's Generals is a brilliant portrait that takes us inside the individual relationships that shaped the course of our most costly war.
Unmissable biography of General Ulysses S. Grant, edited and arranged by Roy Meredith, drawing mostly on material from General Grant’s personal memoirs, and richly illustrated throughout with more than 300 illustrations. “GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT, like Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, Porter, Farragut, and a few others, was one of that small but excellent school of military and naval officers who made up the hard core of the Army and Navy during the Civil War. Their firm, practical grasp of their calling set them distinctly apart from the wire-pullers, glory-seekers, incompetents, and self-seeking political generals, who, having little or no military talent, resorted to cupidity, bluff, and undercover politics to further their personal ambitions. “Charles Anderson Dana, Assistant Secretary of War in Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet, took particular notice of this when he visited General Grant’s headquarters sometime after the Battle of Shiloh. He mentioned the names of three remarkable men, whose lack of guile and of jealousy and whose devotion to duty above personal ambition made a great impression on his mind. Grant, Sherman, and McPherson, “in their unpretending simplicity,” he wrote, “were alike as three peas” “In contrast to today’s popular conception of General Grant as soldier and President is the simple fact that General Grant was indeed one of America’s greatest soldiers; a punctilious gentleman of scrupulous honesty and quiet and profound ability.”
In the first comprehensive biography of President Lincoln's chief war advisor from 1862-1864, a prize-winning historian recreates the life of a man of enormous achievement who bungled his most important mission. Marszalek unearths the seeds of Halleck's fatal wartime indecisiveness in personality traits and health problems.
There was no more remarkable pair in the Civil War than Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan. At only 35 years old, McClellan commanded the Ohio troops early in the war, and won skirmishes for the Union in western Virginia. After the disastrous Union defeat at Bull Run in the summer of 1861, Lincoln sent word for McClellan to come to Washington, and soon elevated him to commander-in-chief of the Union army. But in the late summer and fall of 1861, things took a turn for the worst. Meticulous in his planning and preparations, McClellan began to delay attacking the enemy and developed a penchant for vastly overestimating the Confederate forces he faced. All of this hampered his ability to lead an aggressive force in a fast-moving battlefield environment. Finally losing his patience, Lincoln was famously quoted as saying, "If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time." Lincoln and McClellan takes an in-depth look at this fascinating relationship, from the early days of the Civil War to the 1864 presidential election when McClellan ran against Lincoln on an anti-war platform and lost. Here, award-winning author John C. Waugh weaves a tale of hubris, paranoia, failure, and triumph, illuminating as never before this unique and complicated alliance.
While numerous accounts exist of President Abraham Lincoln's often-troubled dealings with either his cabinet or his generals, Chester G. Hearn's illuminating history provides the first broad synthesis of Lincoln's complex relationship with both groups. As such, it casts new light on much of the behind-the-scenes interplay, intrigue, and sparring between the president and his advisors and military commanders during the most precarious years of the Civil War. Turning first to Lincoln's cabinet, Hearn explains that Lincoln exercised a unique decision-making process: he reached a firm conclusion on an issue, but then he debated it endlessly with his cabinet or generals as if still undecided. To ensure the liveliest discourse, Lincoln appointed as his advisors men with widely differing political motivations. The Republican Lincoln spent four years attempting to bring together his cabinet of former Whigs and Democrats in the spirit of cooperation, but he never completely achieved his purpose. Hearn explores the president's relationship with this cabinet, the problems he encountered selecting it, and the difficulties he experienced attempting to maintain ideological balance while trying to maneuver around those who disagreed with him. Lincoln never broached a subject that did not create some level of dissent within the cabinet, and differences in political philosophy and personal rivalries led to great debate over the running of the administration, the selection of generals, foreign relations and military mobilization, emancipation, freedom of the press, civil rights, and other issues. Still, Hearn asserts, Lincoln's ability to navigate internal scuffles and external turmoil helped to define his presidency. Hearn next demonstrates convincingly that even with these difficulties, Lincoln manipulated his cabinet far more adroitly than he did his generals. Many of Lincoln's top military commanders had political aspirations or agendas of their own, while others were close friends of his intransigent cabinet members. Having assumed the role as de facto army chief, Lincoln took responsibility for the mishandling of battles fought by his generals, some of whom were incompetent and unmanageable politicians. Hearn examines the often-disastrous generalship and its impact on Lincoln and the cabinet, as well as the public, the press, and Congress. Based on over a decade of research, Lincoln, the Cabinet, and the Generals offers both a fresh perspective on and a new interpretation of Lincoln's presidency -- one that reveals the leadership genius as well as the imperfections of America's sixteenth president.
"James M. McPherson’s Tried by War is a perfect primer . . . for anyone who wishes to understand the evolution of the president’s role as commander in chief. Few historians write as well as McPherson, and none evoke the sound of battle with greater clarity." —The New York Times Book Review The Pulitzer Prize–winning author reveals how Lincoln won the Civil War and invented the role of commander in chief as we know it As we celebrate the bicentennial of Lincoln's birth, this study by preeminent, bestselling Civil War historian James M. McPherson provides a rare, fresh take on one of the most enigmatic figures in American history. Tried by War offers a revelatory (and timely) portrait of leadership during the greatest crisis our nation has ever endured. Suspenseful and inspiring, this is the story of how Lincoln, with almost no previous military experience before entering the White House, assumed the powers associated with the role of commander in chief, and through his strategic insight and will to fight changed the course of the war and saved the Union.
"Von Drehle has chosen a critical year ('the most eventful year in American history' and the year Lincoln rose to greatness), done his homework, and written a spirited account."N"Publishers Weekly."