Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis presents a modern and thorough exposition of the fundamental mathematical formalism used to study optimal control theory, i.e., continuous time dynamic economic processes, and to interpret dynamic economic behavior. The style of presentation, with its continual emphasis on the economic interpretation of mathematics and models, distinguishes it from several other excellent texts on the subject. This approach is aided dramatically by introducing the dynamic envelope theorem and the method of comparative dynamics early in the exposition. Accordingly, motivated and economically revealing proofs of the transversality conditions come about by use of the dynamic envelope theorem. Furthermore, such sequencing of the material naturally leads to the development of the primal-dual method of comparative dynamics and dynamic duality theory, two modern approaches used to tease out the empirical content of optimal control models. The stylistic approach ultimately draws attention to the empirical richness of optimal control theory, a feature missing in virtually all other textbooks of this type.
Perfect competition provides the model of a frictionless economy, in which price-setting economic agents behave independently of each other, abandoning to the market the coordination of their individual decisions. The implications of this model are extensively presented in the traditional price theory textbooks. Imperfect competition is the paradigm that develops as soon as economic agents interact in a conscious manner, which is the rule when competition takes place amongst a restricted number of agents. In this system, agents act strategically, taking into account the impact of their decisions on competitors' behaviour and on the price mechanism. Such situations commonly arise when firms differentiate their products, erect strategic entry barriers, or exploit the imperfect information of their customers about the price or characteristics of their product. This book explores the theoretical richness of these economic contexts, using some basic tools of game theory. Designed as an ancillary text for graduate students, it not only summarizes the historic contributions made by economic theorists such as Cournot and Edgeworth, but also makes accessible many of the most recent developments in the same field.
The economy is examined by the authors as a complex interactive system. The emphasis is on the direct interaction between agents rather than on the indirect and autonomous interaction through the market mechanism. Contributions from economists and physicists emphasise the consequences for aggregate behaviour of the interaction between agents with limited rationality. Models of financial markets which exhibit many of the stylised facts of empirical markets such as bubbles, herd behaviour and long memory are presented. This includes contributions on bargaining, buyer-seller relations, the evolution of economic networks and several aspects of macro-economic behaviour. This book will be of interest to all those interested in the foundations of collective social and economic behaviour and in particular, to those concerned with the dynamics of market behaviour and recent applications of physics to economics.
Prior to liberalization, there was little scope for predatory behaviour in the aviation market. However, following deregulation, new entrants sought to compete with entrenched incumbents. Low-cost carriers (LCCs) gained significant market share, which in turn provoked many different kinds of defensive response. Having put pressure on established carriers, low-cost airlines are themselves feeling the pressure of competition from new operators. While it is normal and natural for airlines to react to competition - modifying their services, the ways in which they offer them and their prices - when does aggressive commercial behaviour go too far and become predation? This book considers what exactly is meant by 'predation' in the aviation environment, and explores the strategies LCCs adopt in order to gain market share, as well as the strategies of the established airlines in response to competition from new entrants to the market. It also addresses the key question of what competition policy should do to ensure intensive competition. Competition versus Predation in Aviation Markets brings together contributions from around the world, from airlines, government agencies, leading academics and consultants, providing a wealth of perspectives on a business practice crucial to airline survival.
Economic growth of a country depends on its industries. The focus of modern growth theory is basically macroeconomics, although neoclassical models use competitive markets and the optimization behavior of households and firms in general equilibrium framework. The emphasis here is on industry growth, where the microfoundations of industry are analyzed in terms of economic efficiency. The various linkages which link firm growth with the industry growth are discerned here under various market structures both competitive and monopolistic. The role of information in facilitating market signals and allowing the adoption of new processes has been especially emphasized in this volume. Many issues of market failure and the suboptimality of competitive equilibria are due to incomplete and imperfect information structures and we need a comprehensive theory of information structures underlying the process of industry growth and its dynamics. This book will be of interest to economists studying economic and industry growth and innovation.
This book is the first attempt to provide a comprehensive volume on the topic of energy geography. The book reviews research on energy geography, contain~ original refereed articles on energy and provides a chapter on future research directions in this subfield of geography. The book provides an overview of the research activity underway, and highlights the role of geographers and regional scientists in the study of energy topics. A diverse group of scholars contribute to the manuscript and the chapters show how di fferent research methodologies and approaches are employed in investigating a range of relevant energy problems. This book is intended for upper-level undergraduate students and graduate students in geography, regional science and related disciplines. It will also be useful to professional geographers who would like to know more about the energy geography subfield. Furthermore, the chapters will be interesting to applied geographers and energy policymakers who can see the value of the spatial perspective in addressing energy problems.
Volume 2 uses the economic and legal concepts/theories of Volume 1 to (1) analyze the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) assess related positions of scholars and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officials. Its analysis of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for determining whether they manifest specific anticompetitive intent, would lessen competition, or are rendered lawful by the efficiencies they would generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts’ traditional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Guidelines and the European Commission (EC) Guidelines, and the various non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have increasingly been using, (3) argues that, although the 2010 U.S. Guidelines and DOJ/FTC officials discuss market definition as if it matters, those Guidelines actually reject market-oriented approaches, and (4) reviews the relevant U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of conglomerate mergers (1) shows that they can perform the same legitimate and competition-increasing functions as horizontal mergers and can yield illegitimate profits and lessen competition by increasing contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation barriers to investment, (2) analyzes the determinants of all these effects, and (3) assesses limit-price theory, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of vertical conduct (1) examines the legitimate functions of each type of such conduct, (2) delineates the conditions under which each manifests specific anticompetitive intent and/or lessens competition, and (3) assesses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its analysis of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. law only when they manifest specific anticompetitive intent while they violate E.U. law either for this reason or because they lessen competition, (2) discusses the meaning of an “ancillary restraint” and demonstrates that whether a joint-venture agreement would be illegal if it imposed no restraints and whether any restraints imposed are ancillary can be determined only through case-by-case analysis, (3) explains why scholars and officials overestimate the economic efficiency of R&D joint ventures, and (4) discusses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. The study’s Conclusion (1) reviews how its analyses justify its innovative conceptual systems and (2) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust law as written and as applied.
