The 1982 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. The introduction of the term "operational art" three years later was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. Identifiably separate levels of war defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms and was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries, the close orchestration of all instruments of national power becomes even more important, which cripples the current conception of campaigns and operations. The authors propose that responsibility for campaign design should "actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war."
The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling.
There was a time when the world had no need for operational art, a time when sovereigns led their armies in the field and where the yoking of war to politics was their personal undertaking. It was the sovereign who chose whether or not to fight, where to fight, how long to fight, and it was they who were constantly balancing opportunities and threats, risks and returns, costs and benefits. In the era of “strategies of a single point,” the connections between tactics and statecraft were immediate and intimate. As modern states emerged, their economic and social organization enabled them to deploy and sustain armies of ever increasing size. Big armies needed more space, and the theater of operations grew along with them. This increasingly removed the actions of those armies from the direct scrutiny of the sovereign, and the connection between war and politics became unacceptably stretched.The idea of the campaign was expanded to redress this widening gap, and it gained a geographic meaning in addition to its traditional temporal one. The campaign became the pursuit of the war's objectives by an independent commander acting beyond the immediate scrutiny of his sovereign. The framework provided by the campaign objectives, geographic boundaries, resources, and other guidance provided by the sovereign determined the freedom of action available to the campaign commander. Within those freedoms, he was able to sequence battles as he thought necessary in order to achieve the objectives that had been provided to him. Most likely a number of tactical action sequences connected by a unifying idea, i.e., “operations,” each directed at somehow setting the conditions for the next step, would be necessary. The cascading hierarchy of objectives—political, strategic, campaign, operational, and tactical—reconnected tactical action to the political purposes of the war.These thoughts had emerged by the late-19th century and were further developed and adorned as the experience of total war grew through World Wars I and II. Although they had been a part of U.S. doctrine until after World War I, they disappeared for awhile, and it was not until the 1982 version of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 that these ideas were reintroduced, although in a different form. Rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of war”— assumed responsibility for campaign planning. This reduced political leadership to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widening the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, producing “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”The political leadership of a country cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians should be involved in the minute-to-minute conduct of war; as Clausewitz reminds us, political considerations are “influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.” As war continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as enemies seek ways to exploit democracy's vulnerabilities, closing the gap between politics and the conduct of war is becoming ever more important.It is time we returned what we now call campaign design to the political and strategic leadership of the country and returned operational art to its original venue, where it was overwhelmingly concerned with tactics.
Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. An intermediate link between strategy and tactics has always existed, but a distinct concept that encompasses a systematic and deliberate plan of campaign for major operations is a mere two hundred years old. Based on country specific case-studies, this book describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. The point of departure is the campaigns of 'the God of War', Napoleon Bonaparte. The book then proceeds with chapters on the evolution of operational art in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union / Russia, the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and China. The final chapter deals with the future of operational art in irregular warfare. Theory is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational warfare, and its importance cannot be overstated; however, to be useful, theory and its accompanying vocabulary must be combined with a proper examination of historical trends and practical experience. The present volume attempts to achieve that combination. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.
Preface -- Introduction -- The time before -- The expansion of war and the birth of operational art -- Operational art in Germany -- Operational art gets a name : Tukhachevskiy and deep attacks -- The British school : bloodless war and "strategic paralysis"--Operational art : the next steps -- Conclusion : operational art is not the whole of warfare -- only a discretionary part of it.
Analyzes the cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces throughout American history While traditionally, Americans view expensive military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty, they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of hostilities. In Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, a stellar team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout American history. These two factors form the basic American “liberty dilemma,” the vexed relationship between the nation and its military apparatuses from the founding of the first colonies through to present times. With the termination of large-scale operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the United States military once again faces a significant drawdown in standing force structure and capabilities. The political and military debate currently raging around how best to affect this force reduction continues to lack a proper historical perspective. This volume aspires to inform this dialogue. Not a traditional military history, Drawdown analyzes cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces.
One of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics synthesizes the vast history of strategy's evolution in this consistently engaging and surprising account of how it came to pervade every aspect of life.
Strategy is not a modern invention. It is an essential and enduring feature of human history that is here to stay. In this original essay, Colin S. Gray, world-renowned scholar of strategic thought, discusses the meaning of strategy and its importance for politicians and the military as a means of achieving desired outcomes in complex, uncertain conditions. Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldy asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.
The book aims to provide the reader with a state-of-the-art introduction to classic and modern military theory. The text accounts for the most important theories within the field by developing and analyzing these theories, as well as problematizing both their normative and explanatory aims. While focusing on military theory, the book does not only reflect a single way of relating to knowledge of war and warfare, but furthers learning by introducing contrasting perspectives as well as constantly criticizing the theories. There is a clear need for an introductory text for the entire field of military theory that focuses whole-heartedly on the theories – not on their context or how they are expressed in practice during war. This book covers such questions as how we should understand the changing character of war, the utility of force and how the pursuit of political ends is achieved through military means. It draws upon and illustrates military thought through a wide-ranging number of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to the current war in Afghanistan. This book will be of great interest for students of military theory, strategic studies, security studies and defence studies.
