Why Do Bank-Dependent Firms Bear Interest-Rate Risk?
Why Do Bank-Dependent Firms Bear Interest-Rate Risk?

Author: Divya Kirti

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-01-19

Total Pages: 56

ISBN-13: 1475569742

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I document that floating-rate loans from banks (particularly important for bank-dependent firms) drive most variation in firms' exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks lend to firms at floating rates because they themselves have floating-rate liabilities, supporting this with three key findings. Banks with more floating-rate liabilities, first, make more floating-rate loans, second, hold more floating-rate securities, and third, quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. My results establish an important link between intermediaries' funding structure and the types of contracts used by non-financial firms. They also highlight a role for banks in the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy.

Why Do Bank-Dependent Firms Bear Interest-Rate Risk?
Why Do Bank-Dependent Firms Bear Interest-Rate Risk?

Author: Divya Kirti

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-01-18

Total Pages: 56

ISBN-13: 1475568975

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I document that floating-rate loans from banks (particularly important for bank-dependent firms) drive most variation in firms' exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks lend to firms at floating rates because they themselves have floating-rate liabilities, supporting this with three key findings. Banks with more floating-rate liabilities, first, make more floating-rate loans, second, hold more floating-rate securities, and third, quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. My results establish an important link between intermediaries' funding structure and the types of contracts used by non-financial firms. They also highlight a role for banks in the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy.

When Gambling for Resurrection is Too Risky
When Gambling for Resurrection is Too Risky

Author: Divya Kirti

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-08-07

Total Pages: 59

ISBN-13: 1484314395

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Rather than taking on more risk, US insurers hit hard by the crisis pulled back from risk taking, relative to insurers not hit as hard by the crisis. Capital requirements alone do not explain this risk reduction: insurers hit hard reduced risk within assets with identical regulatory treatment. State level US insurance regulation makes it unlikely this risk reduction was driven by moral suasion. Other financial institutions also reduce risk after large shocks: the same approach applied to banks yields similar results. My results suggest that, at least in some circumstances, franchise value can dominate, making gambling for resurrection too risky.

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel
Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2013-06-06

Total Pages: 41

ISBN-13: 1484381130

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We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on the internal ratings of U.S. banks on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (as measured by the risk rating of the bank’s loan portfolio) is negatively associated with increases in short-term policy interest rates. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods when banks’ capital erodes, such as episodes of financial and economic distress. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of monetary policy in financial stability and suggest that monetary policy has a bearing on the riskiness of banks and financial stability more generally.

Bank Lending in the Knowledge Economy
Bank Lending in the Knowledge Economy

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-11-07

Total Pages: 45

ISBN-13: 1484324897

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We study bank portfolio allocations during the transition of the real sector to a knowledge economy in which firms use less tangible capital and invest more in intangible assets. We show that, as firms shift toward intangible assets that have lower collateral values, banks reallocate their portfolios away from commercial loans toward other assets, primarily residential real estate loans and liquid assets. This effect is more pronounced for large and less well capitalized banks and is robust to controlling for real estate loan demand. Our results suggest that increased firm investment in intangible assets can explain up to 20% of bank portfolio reallocation from commercial to residential lending over the last four decades.

The Risks of Financial Institutions
The Risks of Financial Institutions

Author: Mark Carey

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2007-11-01

Total Pages: 669

ISBN-13: 0226092984

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Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events—such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode—has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risks affecting financial institutions and explores a variety of methods to help institutions and regulators more accurately measure and forecast risk. The contributors--from academic institutions, regulatory organizations, and banking--bring a wide range of perspectives and experience to the issue. The result is a volume that points a way forward to greater financial stability and better risk management of financial institutions.

Global Financial Stability Report, April 2013
Global Financial Stability Report, April 2013

Author: International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2013-04-17

Total Pages: 160

ISBN-13: 1475589581

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The Global Financial Stability Report examines current risks facing the global financial system and policy actions that may mitigate these. It analyzes the key challenges facing financial and nonfinancial firms as they continue to repair their balance sheets. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at whether sovereign credit default swaps markets are good indicators of sovereign credit risk. Chapter 3 examines unconventional monetary policy in some depth, including the policies pursued by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve.

Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited
Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited

Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2006-12-01

Total Pages: 51

ISBN-13: 1451865570

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This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.