Three Essays on Game Theory and Its Applications
Author: Sunku Hahn
Publisher:
Published: 1998
Total Pages: 184
ISBN-13:
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Author: Sunku Hahn
Publisher:
Published: 1998
Total Pages: 184
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Sunghyun Na
Publisher:
Published: 2005
Total Pages: 57
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: The late John F. Nash
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Published: 1996-01-01
Total Pages: 116
ISBN-13: 9781781956298
DOWNLOAD EBOOK'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.
Author: Doru C. Cojoc
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 188
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Philipp Christoph Wichardt
Publisher:
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 109
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Samuel Häfner
Publisher:
Published: 2014
Total Pages: 125
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publisher:
Published: 1990
Total Pages: 256
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Maria Kozlovskaya
Publisher:
Published: 2016
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Elham Nikram
Publisher:
Published: 2016
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Xinyu Fan
Publisher:
Published: 2018
Total Pages: 209
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe dissertation consists of three essays on the formation of organizational structures and cultural practices. In many cases, the implementation of desirable institutions cannot be relied on the good hearts of the individuals in power. Game theoretical analysis thus deepens our understanding of whether benevolence can be achieved out of the most extreme cases of self-interest, and more importantly, how. The first chapter studies the inevitable path towards centralization after power struggles. Power struggles are modeled as iterative coalition formation in which players use their power to form alliances, eliminate others, and split resources, when formal commitment is impossible. Players can strategically give away power, i.e., burn power to invite new alliances or buy off key members to survive. The stability of a power structure relies on the existence of a vested interested group that has regime changing abilities, but chooses not to do so because the weak outsiders cede power to the strong insiders to deter regime changes. We show the Iron Law of Oligarchy holds that regardless of the immediate directions of power shifts, power often ends up more concentrated to a few elite members. The model explains the reproduction of a ruling minority over and over again after various regime changes. The second chapter (joint work with Feng Yang) discusses how a mid-tier officer strategically promotes his subordinates to build up reputation when the big boss is watching him. We show that promotion can be a signaling tool for the superior officer, where he can strategically postpone promoting the subordinate to shift blame and enhance his own reputation. Furthermore, with top-down personnel control, the promoter has extra incentives to shirk, knowing that information manipulation is always an option in the future. The third chapter (joint work with Lingwei Wu) explores the economic origins of gender-biased social norms, in the context of foot-binding, a painful custom that persisted in historical China. We present a unified theory to explain the key stylized facts about foot-binding, and investigates its historical dynamics driven by a gender-asymmetric mobility system in historical China (the Civil Examination System, Keju).