Industrial Organization and International Trade
Author: Yuka Ohno
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 184
ISBN-13:
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Author: Yuka Ohno
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 184
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: 蒋雅婷
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Published: 2023
Total Pages: 0
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Ayșe Ozgür Pehlivan
Publisher:
Published: 2011
Total Pages: 94
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Jai-June Kim
Publisher:
Published: 1990
Total Pages: 262
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Hongsong Zhang
Publisher:
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 151
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Ludovic Panon
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Published: 2020
Total Pages: 202
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Shu Deng
Publisher:
Published: 2014
Total Pages: 179
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThere are three main chapters in the dissertation which fall in the areas of industrial organization and international economics. After the introduction and the literature review, I present two different models that highlight how the degree of substitutability between differentiated products on a market affects a new entrant's entry decisions. I further extend the benchmark model to discuss the implications of the government trade policy on the competition strategies. The last chapter investigates how the bilateral trade flows in various industries between the United States and China respond to Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and a few other key variables. In the second chapter, I extend the Singh and Vivies (1984) model and the Hackner (2000) model by allowing for a multi-product duopoly, a domestic incumbent and a foreign entrant, with asymmetric costs in producing two differentiated products: high- and low-quality. If they engage in Cournot competition, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the foreign entrant will choose to supply both products when two varieties are more heterogeneous. If two varieties are more homogeneous, the foreign entrant tends to supply only one product. After extending the model to consider the tariff imposed on foreign imports, the simulation results suggest that, to increase domestic welfare, the government should allow cost-effective foreign entrants to enter, but keep cost-ineffective ones out of the domestic market. In the third chapter, I provide a thorough analysis of the Bertrand model with a setup that is similar to the Cournot model. When firms compete on prices, the SPNE differs significantly from that of the Cournot model. Depending on the relative marginal cost between two firms, there are circumstances under which the foreign entrant would choose to only enter into the low- or the high-quality market regardless of the degree of substitutability between two varieties. Furthermore, when the domestic government imposes a tariff on the foreign imports, the foreign entrant's entry decision changes with the tariff level. In the last chapter, unlike the existing literature which mainly look at the relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level, I attempt to investigate the short-run and the long-run impact of the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate on the US trade balance at the commodity level using a new methodology, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds Testing approach. As most articles found no short-run and long-run relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level ("aggregation bias"), I argue that different commodities may respond to the exchange rate fluctuations differently. Therefore, this study would offer us a better understanding on which US industries are more vulnerable to the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and which ones are strong players against Chinese competitors. In addition, I further explore other possible contributors to the US trade deficit such as income levels, China FDI inflow, and the US FDI outflow.
Author: YongKyun Cho
Publisher:
Published: 1992
Total Pages: 248
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Xin Zhao
Publisher:
Published: 2017
Total Pages: 115
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis dissertation consists of three studies on trade, industrial organization, and environmental economics. The first study investigates endogenous cartel formation with market entry and firm heterogeneity. We show why large firms do not join a cartel in some industries and choose to compete rather than cooperate with a cartel. We illustrate that, under certain conditions, only firms with intermediate productivity benefit from joining a cartel; and low-productive firms cannot compete efficiently for production quota in the cartel and hence choose to stay out. High-productive firms prefer to stay out because building excess capacity in cartel lowers their profits.
Author: Leslie D. Manns
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 518
ISBN-13:
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