At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.
The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the fed. gov't. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the U.S. was on a metallic standard of one sort or another. On occasion, there are calls to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report reviews the history of the GS in the U.S. It clarifies the dates during which the GS was used, the type of GS in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the GS and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of the GS. A print on demand oub.