Bank failures, like illness and taxes, are almost a certainty at some time in the future. What is less certain is their cost to and adverse implications for macroeconomies. Past failures have frequently been resolved at very high cost to society. However, the cost could be reduced through having a well-developed, credible and widely publicized plan ready to put into action by policymakers. If no such plan is ready when a large bank approaches insolvency, political pressures are likely to influence the response of regulators.Minimizing immediate, short-run costs are likely to outweigh minimizing further out, longer-run and longer-lasting costs, even if these delayed costs promise to be substantially greater. Stated differently, today will win out over tomorrow and politics will trump economics. How best to prevent such unfavorable outcomes is the major theme of this volume. The articles presented review past insolvency resolutions, draw lessons from these resolutions, discuss impediments to efficient resolutions ? including cross-country, cross-regulator, and institutional challenges ? and recommend how to move forward.
"Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven analyze the role of institutions in resolving systemic banking crises for a broad sample of countries. Banking crises are fiscally costly, especially when policies like substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantees on financial institutions' liabilities, and forbearance from prudential regulations are used. Higher fiscal outlays do not, however, accelerate the recovery from a crisis. Better institutions--less corruption, improved law and order, legal system, and bureaucracy--do. The authors find these results to be relatively robust to estimation techniques, including controlling for the effects of a poor institutional environment on the likelihood of financial crisis and the size of fiscal costs. Their results suggest that countries should use strict policies to resolve a crisis and use the crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also help avoid future systemic crises. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study financial crisis resolution"--World Bank web site.
This book explores the potential and problems of bank safety and efficiency arising from the rapidly growing area of cross-border banking in the form of branches or subsidiaries with primarily only national prudential regulation. There are likely to be differences in the treatment of the same bank operating in different countries or of different banks from different home countries operating in the same country with respect to deposit insurance provisions, declaration of insolvency, resolution of insolvencies, and lender of last resort protection. The book identifies these protection problems and discusses possible solutions, such as greater cross-border cooperation, harmonization and organizations. The contributors to this book include experts from different countries and from a wide range of affiliations, including academia, regulators, practitioners, and international organizations. Sample Chapter(s). Chapter 1: Cross-Border Banking Regulation OCo A WayForward: The European Case (68 KB). Contents: Special Addresses: Cross-Border Banking Regulation OCo A Way Forward: The European Case (Stefan Ingves); Remarks before the Conference on International Financial Instability (Sheila C Bair); Benign Financial Conditions, Asset Management, and Political Risks: Trying to Make Sense of Our Times (Raghuram G Rajan); International Financial Instability: Cross-Border Banking and National Regulation Chicago OCo Dinner Remarks (Jean Pierre Sabourin); Landscape of International Banking and Financial Crises: Current State of Cross-Border Banking (Dirk Schoenmaker & Christiaan van Laecke); Actual and Near-Miss Cross-Border Crises (Carl-Johan Lindgren); A Review of Financial Stability Reports (Sander Oosterloo, Jakob de Haan, & Richard Jong-A-Pin); Discussion of Landscape of International Banking and Financial Crises (Luc Laeven); Causes and Conditions for Cross-Border Instability Transmission and Threats to Stability: Cross-Border Contagion Links and Banking Problems in the Nordic Countries (Bent Vale); Currency Crises, (Hidden) Linkages, and Volume (Max Bruche, Jon Danielsson & Gabriele Galati); What Do We Know about the Performance and Risk of Hedge Funds? (Triphon Phumiwasana, Tong Li, James R Barth & Glenn Yago); Remarks on Causes and Conditions of Financial Instability Panel (Garry Schinasi); Prudential Supervision: Home Country versus Cross-Border Negative Externalities in Large Banking Organization Failures and How to Avoid Them (Robert A Eisenbeis); Conflicts between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors (Richard J Herring); Cross-Border Nonbank Risks and Regulatory Cooperation (Paul Wright); Challenges in Cross-Border Supervision and Regulation (Eric Rosengren); Government Safety Net: Bagehot and Coase Meet the Single European Market (V tor Gaspar); Banking in a Changing World: Issues and Questions in the Resolution of Cross-Border Banks (Michael Krimminger); International Banks, Cross-Border Guarantees, and Regulation (Andrew Powell & Giovanni Majnoni); Deposit Insurance, Bank Resolution, and Lender of Last Resort OCo Putting the Pieces Together (Thorsten Beck); Insolvency Resolution: Cross-Border Resolution of Banking Crises (Rosa Mar a Lastra); Bridge Banks and Too Big to Fail: Systemic Risk Exemption (David G Mayes); Prompt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for an International Banking Standard? (Mar a J Nieto & Larry D Wall); Insolvency Resolution: Key Issues Raised by the Papers (Peter G Brierley); Cross-Border Crisis Prevention: Public and Private Strategies: Supervisory Arrangements, LOLR, and Crisis Management in a Single European Banking Market (Arnoud W A Boot); Regulation and Crisis Prevention in the Evolving Global Market (David S Hoelscher & David C Parker); Derivatives Governance and Financial Stability (David Mengle); Cross-Border Crisis Prevention: Public and Private Strategies (Gerard Caprio, Jr.); Where to from Here: Policy Panel: Cross-Border Banking: Where to from Here? (Mutsuo Hatano); Remarks on Deposit Insurance Policy (Andrey Melnikov); The Importance of Planning for Large Bank Insolvencies (Arthur J Murton); Where to from Here: Policy Panel (Guy Saint-Pierre); Some Private-Sector Thoughts on Home/Host-Country Supervisory Issues (Lawrence R Uhlick). Readership: Academics and upper-level undergraduate or graduate students in the areas of financial institutions, banking, financial regulation, or international financial markets; financial regulators, policy-makers, and consultants."
The financial crises that began unexpectedly in Southeast Asia in 1997 spread rapidly around the globe, causing banks to fail, stock markets to plummet, and other newsmaking disruptions. Gup and his contributors examine these failures and crises in the main arenas where they occurred—Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, Argentina—and provide some important answers to the critical questions these frightening events raised. The result is a readable, easily grasped study of issues relating to bank failure and the effectiveness of bank regulation, and important reading for academics and practitioners alike. In July 1997 Thailand devalued its currency. This one event sparked financial crises that spread with astonishing speed from Southeast Asia around the world to Russia. Even in the United States and South America the impact was felt. Southeast Asia had been considered a model—in fact a miracle—of economic growth. No one foresaw the crises that soon occurred there, and the severity and contagion of these crises raised questions globally: What happened? Why? And what can we do about it? Gup and his contributors offer some answers to these critical questions. Gup and his panel finally conclude that government actions were at the root of these crises. Banks were pawns in the hands of governments, and banks helped fuel the booms that ultimately burst, booms supported by investments from other countries around the world, not incidentally. Gup goes on to lay out other provocative questions, among them: How effective are bank regulations? And how do we resolve failed and insolvent banks? The result is an important contribution to the literature in banking, finance, investment, and the role government plays in these activities—a book not only for academics but for practitioners and informed laymen as well.
Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven analyze the role of institutions in resolving systemic banking crises for a broad sample of countries. Banking crises are fiscally costly, especially when policies like substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantees on financial institutions' liabilities, and forbearance from prudential regulations are used. Higher fiscal outlays do not, however, accelerate the recovery from a crisis. Better institutions - less corruption, improved law and order, legal system, and bureaucracy - do. The authors find these results to be relatively robust to estimation techniques, including controlling for the effects of a poor institutional environment on the likelihood of financial crisis and the size of fiscal costs. Their results suggest that countries should use strict policies to resolve a crisis and use the crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also help avoid future systemic crises.This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study financial crisis resolution.
Financial Crisis Management and Bank Resolution provides an analysis of the responses to the recent crisis that has beset the international financial markets taking a top down approach looking at the mechanisms to manage a financial crisis, to the practicalities of dealing with the resolution of a bank experiencing distress. This work is an interdisciplinary analysis of the law and policy surrounding crisis management and bank resolution. It comprises contributions from a team of leading experts in the field that have been carefully selected from across the globe. These experts are drawn from the law, central banks, government, financial services and academia. This edited collection will provide a new and important contribution to the subject at a crucial time in the debate around banking resolution and crisis management regimes, and help to plug the gap in our knowledge and understanding of the law of bank resolution and restructuring.
In the past forty years, two financial crises in the United States have threatened economic stability worldwide. Through miraculous good luck, seven individuals directed the resolution of the crises. Four comprise the quartet that resolved the second crisis, and three directed the resolution of the first crisis. The Quartet and Large Systemic Financial Crises tells the story of both. The time between crises has shortened, and the magnitude of the crises has grown. The seeds of the next crisis are already discernable, borne of view that "big banks" caused the most recent crisis. In fact, the cause was bipartisan government policy imposed over decades on the financial system to allocate capital for political purposes in unstable ways. That phenomenon is poised to accelerate in the near future unless something is done to stop it. The Quartet and Large Systemic Financial Crises describes how to forestall the inevitable disaster that would follow.
This relatively simple model attempts to capture and integrate four widely held views about financial crises. [1] Interconnectedness among financial institutions (banks) can play a major role in precipitating systemic financial crises. [2] Lack of information about the quality of bank portfolios also plays a role in precipitating systemic crises. [3] Financial crises, particularly systemic ones, are often followed by severe, lengthy recessions. [4] Loss of confidence in the financial system is partly responsible for the length and severity of these recessions. In the model, banks make decisions about initiating and liquidating risky loans. Interconnectedness among their asset portfolios can obscure information about these portfolios, causing them to make inefficient decisions about liquidation, and about retention of the managers who assess credit risk. These decisions can increase the depth of recessions, and they can produce systemic financial crises. They can also reduce the effectiveness of future bank risk assessment, increasing the probability of lengthy, severe recessions. The government, acting in the interest of current and future depositors, may wish to increase the transparency of bank portfolios by limiting interconnectedness. The optimal degree of regulation, which may depend on depositors’ degree of risk aversion, may not eliminate financial crises.
