Our data show that nearly all firms borrow for the first time in their life from a single bank, but soon afterwards some of them start borrowing from additional banks. Duration analysis shows that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single relationship with multiple relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. It also shows that this substitution is more likely to occur for firms with more growth opportunities and for firms with poor performance. The analysis of the ex post effects of the initiation of multiple relationships, in turn, shows that firms with higher levels of investment prior to the initiation of multiple relationships increase their investment even further when they start to borrow from multiple banks, and that firms with poor prior performance continue to perform poorly afterwards. These results suggest that concerns with hold-up costs, together with an unwillingness by the incumbent bank to increase its exposure to a firm because of its past poor performance, are the key reasons for these firms to initiate an additional relationship this early in their life.
In this paper we investigate the matching process between banks and large borrowers that switch from single to multiple bank lending relationships in the corporate loan market. Using a unique dataset on all large credit exposures (about 214,000) of all Israeli commercial banks in the period between 2005 and 2015, we highlight the systemic externalities of micro-prudential regulation. We find, inter alia, that regulatory limits on credit exposures aimed at limiting an individual bank's concentration risk lead large borrowers to turn to multiple lending. This increases the level of asset commonality among banks, and the systemic risk arising from this indirect contagion channel. We find that large borrowers are more likely to establish a new lending relationship with big banks and with the banks that are familiar with the borrower's business profile, whether through existing loans to a group of borrowers to which the borrower belongs, or through acquaintance with the industry in which the borrower operates. Furthermore, we find that borrowers tend to establish a new lending relationship with banks whose asset portfolio is correlated with that of their original lender. This result may possibly be related to the tendency of banks to become more similar in their credit portfolios in order to benefit from a "too many to fail" implicit guarantee.
This paper studies the impact of bank mergers on firm-bank lending relationships using detailed loan contract data from Belgium. We argue that in order to accurately gauge the heterogeneous impacts of mergers, the analysis must distinguish borrowers not only by their relationship with the acquiring versus the target bank in a merger and by firm size, but also by whether they have single versus multiple-bank relationships. For single-relationship borrowers, it is necessary to go beyond the usual comparison of relationship continuation and discontinuation to analyze the three alternatives of staying, dropping, and switching. For multiple-relationship borrowers, relationship intensity also plays a role.
August 2001 Large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to informationally opaque small firms. Bank distress does not appear to affect small business lending, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks. Consolidation of the banking industry is shifting assets into larger institutions that often operate in many nations. Large international financial institutions are geared toward serving large wholesale customers. How does this affect the banking system's ability to lend to informationally opaque small businesses? Berger, Klapper, and Udell test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms, using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. They also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus borrowing from several banks. Their results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms, especially if small businesses are delinquent in repaying their loans. Bank distress resulting from lax prudential supervision and regulation appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, despite raising borrowing costs and destroying some of the benefits of exclusive lending relationships. This paper--a product of Finance, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study small and medium size firm financing. The authors may be contacted at [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected].
The second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention. In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; “non-price competition” and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. Praise for the first edition: "The book is a major contribution to the literature on the theory of banking and intermediation. It brings together and synthesizes a broad range of material in an accessible way. I recommend it to all serious scholars and students of the subject. The authors are to be congratulated on a superb achievement."—Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania "This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the microeconomics of banking. It gives an impressive synthesis of an enormous body of research developed over the last twenty years. It is clearly written and apleasure to read. What I found particularly useful is the great effort that Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet have taken to systematically integrate the theory of financial intermediation into classical microeconomics and finance theory. This book is likely to become essential reading for all graduate students in economics, business, and finance."—Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia University Graduate School of Business "The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey of microeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to be both rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking and finance."—Mathias Dewatripont, Professor of Economics, ECARES, Universit
This paper reviews the recent literature on relationship lending. First, the effect of relationship lending on firm value is examined in the context of the event studies investigating the impact of announcement of bank loans on stocks of the borrowing firms. Second, the effects on funds availability, loan rates, and collateral requirements are appraised. Third, the evidence on the impact of the length of the relationship, multiple bank relationships, and distance from the lender are assessed. Fourth, the effect of bank consolidation on relationship banking and the role of de novo banks are discussed. Finally, the effects of deregulation and technology on community banks are examined. The evidence indicates that relationships increase funds availability and reduce loan rates. The evidence on the direction and magnitude of the length of relationships is mixed and multiple relationships reduce the value of any single borrower lender relationship. Small banks can maintain the advantages of relationship banking in spite of technological changes.
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.
This book covers recent advances in efficiency evaluations, most notably Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) methods. It introduces the underlying theories, shows how to make the relevant calculations and discusses applications. The aim is to make the reader aware of the pros and cons of the different methods and to show how to use these methods in both standard and non-standard cases. Several software packages have been developed to solve some of the most common DEA and SFA models. This book relies on R, a free, open source software environment for statistical computing and graphics. This enables the reader to solve not only standard problems, but also many other problem variants. Using R, one can focus on understanding the context and developing a good model. One is not restricted to predefined model variants and to a one-size-fits-all approach. To facilitate the use of R, the authors have developed an R package called Benchmarking, which implements the main methods within both DEA and SFA. The book uses mathematical formulations of models and assumptions, but it de-emphasizes the formal proofs - in part by placing them in appendices -- or by referring to the original sources. Moreover, the book emphasizes the usage of the theories and the interpretations of the mathematical formulations. It includes a series of small examples, graphical illustrations, simple extensions and questions to think about. Also, it combines the formal models with less formal economic and organizational thinking. Last but not least it discusses some larger applications with significant practical impacts, including the design of benchmarking-based regulations of energy companies in different European countries, and the development of merger control programs for competition authorities.
