There is no consensus on how strongly the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) has stimulated U.S. private fixed investment. Some argue that the business tax provisions spurred investment by cutting the cost of capital. Others see the TCJA primarily as a windfall for shareholders. We find that U.S. business investment since 2017 has grown strongly compared to pre-TCJA forecasts and that the overriding factor driving it has been the strength of expected aggregate demand. Investment has, so far, fallen short of predictions based on the postwar relation with tax cuts. Model simulations and firm-level data suggest that much of this weaker response reflects a lower sensitivity of investment to tax policy changes in the current environment of greater corporate market power. Economic policy uncertainty in 2018 played a relatively small role in dampening investment growth.
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The official account of the advisory panel formed by Presi-dent George W. Bush to identify major problems in the U.S.Federal Tax Code and to recommend options to make the codesimpler, fairer and more conducive to economic growth. Thepanel's report was submitted to U.S. Secretary of the Trea-sury John W. Snow on Nov. 1, 2005. Chaired by Connie MackIII, the panel recommended 2 reform options: the SimplifiedIncome Tax Plan & the Growth & Investment Tax Plan.
SmartStart Your Business Today! How to Start a Business in Colorado is your road map to avoiding operational, legal and financial pitfalls and breaking through the bureaucratic red tape that often entangles new entrepreneurs. This all-in-one resource goes a step beyond other business how-to books to give you a jump-start on planning for your business. It provides you with: Valuable state-specific sample forms and letters on CD-ROM Mailing addresses, telephone numbers and websites for the federal, state, local and private agencies that will help get your business up and running State population statistics, income and consumption rates, major industry trends and overall business incentives to give you a better picture of doing business in Colorado Checklists, sample forms and a complete sample business plan to assist you with numerous startup details State-specific information on issues like choosing a legal form, selecting a business name, obtaining licenses and permits, registering to pay taxes and knowing your employer responsibilities Federal and state options for financing your new venture Resources, cost information, statistics and regulations have all been updated. That, plus a new easier-to-use layout putting all the state-specific information in one block of chapters, make this your must-have guide to getting your business off the ground.
The Tax Foundation's State Business Tax Climate Index enables business leaders, government policymakers, and taxpayers to gauge how their states' tax systems compare. While there are many ways to show how much is collected in taxes by state governments, the Index is designed to show how well states structure their tax systems, and provides a roadmap to improving these structures.
The use of property tax incentives for business by local governments throughout the United States has escalated over the last 50 years. While there is little evidence that these tax incentives are an effective instrument to promote economic development, they cost state and local governments $5 to $10 billion each year in forgone revenue. Three major obstacles can impede the success of property tax incentives as an economic development tool. First, incentives are unlikely to have a significant impact on a firm's profitability since property taxes are a small part of the total costs for most businesses--averaging much less than 1 percent of total costs for the U.S. manufacturing sector. Second, tax breaks are sometimes given to businesses that would have chosen the same location even without the incentives. When this happens, property tax incentives merely deplete the tax base without promoting economic development. Third, widespread use of incentives within a metropolitan area reduces their effectiveness, because when firms can obtain similar tax breaks in most jurisdictions, incentives are less likely to affect business location decisions. This report reviews five types of property tax incentives and examines their characteristics, costs, and effectiveness: property tax abatement programs; tax increment finance; enterprise zones; firm-specific property tax incentives; and property tax exemptions in connection with issuance of industrial development bonds. Alternatives to tax incentives should be considered by policy makers, such as customized job training, labor market intermediaries, and business support services. State and local governments also can pursue a policy of broad-based taxes with low tax rates or adopt split-rate property taxation with lower taxes on buildings than land.State policy makers are in a good position to increase the effectiveness of property tax incentives since they control how local governments use them. For example, states can restrict the use of incentives to certain geographic areas or certain types of facilities; publish information on the use of property tax incentives; conduct studies on their effectiveness; and reduce destructive local tax competition by not reimbursing local governments for revenue they forgo when they award property tax incentives.Local government officials can make wiser use of property tax incentives for business and avoid such incentives when their costs exceed their benefits. Localities should set clear criteria for the types of projects eligible for incentives; limit tax breaks to mobile facilities that export goods or services out of the region; involve tax administrators and other stakeholders in decisions to grant incentives; cooperate on economic development with other jurisdictions in the area; and be clear from the outset that not all businesses that ask for an incentive will receive one.Despite a generally poor record in promoting economic development, property tax incentives continue to be used. The goal is laudable: attracting new businesses to a jurisdiction can increase income or employment, expand the tax base, and revitalize distressed urban areas. In a best case scenario, attracting a large facility can increase worker productivity and draw related firms to the area, creating a positive feedback loop. This report offers recommendations to improve the odds of achieving these economic development goals.
Interest in corporate tax reform that lowers the rate and broadens the base has developed in the past several years. Some discussions by economists in opinion pieces have suggested there is an urgent need to lower the corporate tax rate, but not necessarily to broaden the tax base, an approach that presents some difficulties given current budget pressures. Others see the corporate tax as a potential source of revenue. Arguments for lowering the corporate tax rate include the traditional concerns about economic distortions arising from the corporate tax and newer concerns arising from the increasingly global nature of the economy. Some claims have been made that lowering the corporate tax rate would raise revenue because of the behavioral responses, an effect that is linked to an open economy. Although the corporate tax has generally been viewed as contributing to a more progressive tax system because the burden falls on capital income and thus on higher-income individuals, claims have also been made that the burden falls not on owners of capital, but on labor income. The analysis in this report suggests that many of the concerns expressed about the corporate tax are not supported by empirical evidence. Claims that behavioral responses could cause revenues to rise if rates were cut do not hold up on either a theoretical or an empirical basis. Studies that purport to show a revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate of 30% (a rate lower than the current statutory tax rate) contain econometric errors that lead to biased and inconsistent results; when those problems are corrected the results disappear. Cross-country studies to provide direct evidence showing that the burden of the corporate tax actually falls on labor yield unreasonable results and prove to suffer from econometric flaws that also lead to a disappearance of the results when corrected, in those cases where data were obtained and the results replicated. Many studies that have been cited are not relevant to the United States because they reflect wage bargaining approaches and unions have virtually disappeared from the private sector in the United States. Overall, the evidence suggests that the tax is largely borne by capital. Similarly, claims that high U.S. tax rates will create problems for the United States in a global economy suffer from a misrepresentation of the U.S. tax rate compared with other countries and are less important when capital is imperfectly mobile, as it appears to be. Although these new arguments appear to rely on questionable methods, the traditional concerns about the corporate tax appear valid. While an argument may be made that the tax is still needed as a backstop to individual tax collections, it does result in some economic distortions. These economic distortions, however, have declined substantially over time as corporate rates and shares of output have fallen. Moreover, it is difficult to lower the corporate tax without creating a way of sheltering individual income given the low tax rates on dividends and capital gains. A number of revenue-neutral changes are available that could reduce these distortions, allow for a lower corporate statutory tax rate, and lead to a more efficient corporate tax system. These changes include base broadening, reducing the benefits of debt finance through inflation indexing, taxing large pass-through firms as corporations, and reducing the tax at the firm level offset by an increase at the individual level. Nevertheless, the scope for reducing the tax rate in a revenue-neutral way may be limited.
The Tax Foundation's State Business Tax Climate Index enables business leaders, government policymakers, and taxpayers to gauge how their states' tax systems compare. While there are many ways to show how much is collected in taxes by state governments, the Index is designed to show how well states structure their tax systems, and provides a roadmap to improving these structures.