In recent decades Washington has seen an alarming rise in the number of "revolving door lobbyists"—politicians and officials cashing in on their government experience to become influence peddlers on K Street. These lobbyists, popular wisdom suggests, sell access to the highest bidder. Revolving Door Lobbying tells a different, more nuanced story. As an insider interviewed in the book observes, where the general public has the "impression that lobbyists actually get things done, I would say 90 percent of what lobbyists do is prevent harm to their client from the government." Drawing on extensive new data on lobbyists’ biographies and interviews with dozens of experts, authors Timothy M. LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas establish the facts of the revolving door phenomenon—facts that suggest that, contrary to widespread assumptions about insider access, special interests hire these lobbyists as political insurance against an increasingly dysfunctional, unpredictable government. With their insider experience, revolving door lobbyists offer insight into the political process, irrespective of their connections to current policymakers. What they provide to their clients is useful and marketable political risk-reduction. Exploring this claim, LaPira and Thomas present a systematic analysis of who revolving door lobbyists are, how they differ from other lobbyists, what interests they represent, and how they seek to influence public policy. The first book to marshal comprehensive evidence of revolving door lobbying, LaPira and Thomas revise the notion that lobbyists are inherently and institutionally corrupt. Rather, the authors draw a complex and sobering picture of the revolving door as a consequence of the eroding capacity of government to solve the public’s problems.
First proposed in 1994, the Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation employs two specialist peak regulators: one charged with the maintenance of financial system stability, and the other with market conduct and consumer protection. This volume, with contributions from over thirty scholars and senior regulators, provides an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences in the Twin Peaks regimes that have been adopted around the world. Chapters examine the strengths and weaknesses of the model, provide lessons from Australia (the first to adopt the model), and offer a comparative look at the potential suitability of the model in leading non-Twin Peaks jurisdictions. A key resource for central bankers, public policy analysts, lawyers, economists, politicians, academics and students, this work provides readers with a comprehensive understanding of the Twin Peaks model, and a roadmap for countries considering its adoption.