This paper takes stock of the progress made in quota discussions to date, and examines options for adjustments in quotas or voting power outside of a general quota increase. Section II reviews the status of recent quota discussions, while Section III presents the results of updating the data through 2003. Section IV discusses the options for addressing the distribution of quotas and voting power outside of a general increase in quotas. Section V concludes and poses some issues for discussion.
There is now widespread recognition that addressing quota and voice imbalances across the membership is essential for preserving the effectiveness of the Fund and its credibility as a cooperative institution. As noted in the Managing Director’s Report on Implementing the Medium-Term Strategy,2 members’ quotas have become increasingly out of line with countries’ economic weight in the global economy. In addition, the declining role of basic votes since the Fund was established has weakened the voice of smaller developing countries.
The paper revisits the two-pillar framework for assessing the adequacy of Fund resources. Responding to Directors suggestions, the quantitative pillar is updated to include alternative assumptions and to provide a longer-term perspective on likely resource needs. While quantitative estimates are generally somewhat lower after factoring in the alternative assumptions, these reductions are more than outweighed when the analysis is extended through the middle of the next decade, recognizing that the outcome of the 15th Review will likely determine permanent Fund resources through at least the middle of the next decade. The updated qualitative pillar analysis highlights reforms since the global financial crisis and discusses uncertainties in the global environment. It also provides an assessment of the general impact of the various qualitative considerations. Taken together, the two pillars continue to make a case for at least maintaining existing Fund resources. Against this background, the simulations in the paper cover three illustrative sizes for quota increases (50, 75, and 100 percent), centered on broadly maintaining Fund resources, assuming the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) is maintained at its current level and Bilateral Borrowing Agreements (BBAs) expire.
The Executive Board has held three formal meetings on the quota formula review, and discussions have also taken place in other fora including the IMFC Deputies work stream and the G-20 IFA Working Group. Considerable progress has been made in terms of identifying areas of common ground as well as those areas where views differ. At their most recent meeting in late September, Directors reaffirmed their commitment to completing the review by January 2013, and stressed that achieving this goal will require constructive engagement and a spirit of flexibility and compromise from all sides. At its subsequent meeting in Tokyo, the IMFC called on the membership to develop the consensus needed through further engagement of the Executive Board, with input from the IMFC Deputies, to complete the review by January 2013.
An informal Executive Board seminar in December 2006 made an important start in the development of a new quota formula.2 The discussion was wide ranging, raising a number of important issues that need to be considered further in the development of a formula that can achieve the objectives of the quota reform and command the required broad support within the membership. This paper seeks to provide a basis for a second discussion, including by exploring issues raised at the December meeting. The paper also provides further simulations based on a wider range of assumptions regarding possible variables and their weights, as requested by many Directors. As with the last paper, it should be emphasized that this paper does not seek to propose any particular formula and that all the simulations presented should be seen as illustrative and as merely an aid to discussion. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the discussion of this paper will help lay the groundwork for beginning to narrow options and moving toward formulation of a specific proposal in the coming months. The paper does not address the size of the second round ad hoc quota increases. This question, which is closely linked to the magnitude of the increase in basic votes, will be taken up at a later stage once the discussion of the formula is more advanced.
In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund (the “Fund”), and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, the Bank of Slovenia agrees to lend to the Fund an SDR-denominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 280 million, on the terms and conditions set out in this paper.
In July, the Executive Board held its second formal discussion on the quota formula review. Directors agreed on the principles that should guide the review and the importance of meeting the January 2013 deadline, and there were indications of an emerging consensus in a few areas. However, views continued to diverge on several other key issues, and Directors stressed that completing the review will require a spirit of flexibility and compromise on all sides. This paper seeks to provide a basis for the next discussion, taking account of the views expressed in July. It begins by taking stock of the discussions to date. Based on this stock take, it seeks to highlight areas where a relatively broad consensus appears to be emerging. The paper also discusses possible options for addressing concerns raised about the openness variable and provides a range of simulations that seek to illustrate the effects of potential reforms to the formula. The simulations focus on those issues that have garnered the most attention in the discussions to date.
This note provides operational guidance and background information on the use of Fund resources for budgetary financing. It does this in the context of concerns expressed by some Executive Board Directors that, by providing such financing, the Fund might be held accountable for the quality of budgetary spending; that repayment could be subject to country budgetary processes; and that budget financing is the role of other institutions.
