At the core of the "Psychology of Reasoning" is a vigorous discussion that incorporates various illustrations--some of them humorous, all of them fascinating--of the use of reason under a wide variety of different conditions. Particular emphasis is placed on the difficulties involved in dealing with negatively marked information that must be combined and used with other information for reaching conclusions. Thorough treatment is given as well to the search for plausible contexts that will render anomalous or ambiguous statements "sensible."
This collection brings together a set of specially commissioned chapters from leading international researchers in the psychology of reasoning. Its purpose is to explore the historical, philosophical and theoretical implications of the development of this field. Taking the unusual approach of engaging not only with empirical data but also with the ideas and concepts underpinning the psychology of reasoning, this volume has important implications both for psychologists and other students of cognition, including philosophers. Sub-fields covered include mental logic, mental models, rational analysis, social judgement theory, game theory and evolutionary theory. There are also specific chapters dedicated to the history of syllogistic reasoning, the psychology of reasoning as it operates in scientific theory and practice, Brunswickian approaches to reasoning and task environments, and the implications of Popper's philosophy for models of behaviour testing. This cross-disciplinary dialogue and the range of material covered makes this an invaluable reference for students and researchers into the psychology and philosophy of reasoning.
Lance Rips describes a unified theory of natural deductive reasoning and fashions a working model of deduction, with strong experimental support, that is capable of playing a central role in mental life.
How do we define thinking? Is it simply memory, perception and motor activity or perhaps something more complex such as reasoning and decision making? This book argues that thinking is an intricate mix of all these things and a very specific coordination of cognitive resources. Divided into three key sections, there are chapters on the organization of human thought, general reasoning and thinking and behavioural outcomes of thinking. These three overarching themes provide a broad theoretical framework with which to explore wider issues in cognition and cognitive psychology and there are chapters on motivation and language plus a strong focus on problem solving, reasoning and decision making – all of which are central to a solid understanding of this field. The book also explores the cognitive processes behind perception and memory, how we might differentiate expertise from skilled, competent performance and the interaction between language, culture and thought.
In recent years the psychology of reasoning has undergone radical change, which can only be seen as a Kuhn-style scientific revolution. This shift has been dubbed ‘New Paradigm’. For years, psychologists of reasoning focused on binary truth values and regarded the influence of belief as a bias. In contrast to this, the new paradigm puts probabilities, and subjective degrees of belief, centre stage. It also emphasises subjective psychological value, or utility; the way we reason within our own social environment (‘social pragmatics’); and the crucial role of dual process theories. Such theories distinguish between fast, intuitive processes, and effortful processes which enable hypothetical thinking. The new paradigm aims to integrate the psychology of reasoning with the study of judgement and decision making, leading to a much more unified field of higher mental processing. This collection showcases these recent developments, with chapters on topics such as the difference between deduction and induction, a Bayesian formulation of faint praise, the role of emotion in reasoning, and the relevance of psychology of reasoning to moral judgement. This book was originally published as a special issue of Thinking & Reasoning.
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning brings together the contributions of many of the leading researchers in thinking and reasoning to create the most comprehensive overview of research on thinking and reasoning that has ever been available. Each chapter includes a bit of historical perspective on the topic, and concludes with some thoughts about where the field seems to be heading.
Originally published in 1982, this was an extensive and up-to-date review of research into the psychology of deductive reasoning, Jonathan Evans presents an alternative theoretical framework to the rationalist approach which had dominated much of the published work in this field at the time. The review falls into three sections. The first is concerned with elementary reasoning tasks, in which response latency is the prime measure of interest. The second and third sections are concerned with syllogistic and propositional reasoning respectively, in which interest has focused on the explanation of frequently observed logical errors. In an extended discussion it is argued that reasoning processes are content specific, and give little indication of the operation of any underlying system of logical competence. Finally, a dual process theory of reasoning, with broad implications and connections with other fields of psychology, is elaborated and assessed in the light of recent evidence.
This book addresses an apparent paradox in the psychology of thinking. On the one hand, human beings are a highly successful species. On the other, intelligent adults are known to exhibit numerous errors and biases in laboratory studies of reasoning and decision making. There has been much debate among both philosophers and psychologists about the implications of such studies for human rationality. The authors argue that this debate is marked by a confusion between two distinct notions: (a) personal rationality (rationality1 Evans and Over argue that people have a high degree of rationality1 but only a limited capacity for rationality2. The book re-interprets the psychological literature on reasoning and decision making, showing that many normative errors, by abstract standards, reflect the operation of processes that would normally help to achieve ordinary goals. Topics discussed include relevance effects in reasoning and decision making, the influence of prior beliefs on thinking, and the argument that apparently non-logical reasoning can reflect efficient decision making. The authors also discuss the problem of deductive competence - whether people have it, and what mechanism can account for it. As the book progresses, increasing emphasis is given to the authors' dual process theory of thinking, in which a distinction between tacit and explicit cognitive systems is developed. It is argued that much of human capacity for rationality1 is invested in tacit cognitive processes, which reflect both innate mechanisms and biologically constrained learning. However, the authors go on to argue that human beings also possess an explicit thinking system, which underlies their unique - if limited - capacity to be rational.
This volume presents detailed reviews and will be of use to anyone interested in the strengths and weaknesses of human reason. This volume will also be of use to both proponents and skeptics of dual-process theory as it represents a strong case for the wide theoretical significance of the distinction between intuition and reflection. The empirical evidence indicates that analytic thinking plays a significant role in everyday life. Reason does, in fact, matter.
The authors offer cogent reviews of the literature pertaining to the formation and maintenance of delusions, but the most substantial parts of the monograph expound the empirical inquiries which they and their colleagues have carried out in recent years. Most of the research has been published elsewhere, but such is the relevance of the experiments cited to the whole schema that the monograph has unique value. It is a synthesis which portrays the contribution to date of cognitive science to the biology and psychopathology of delusional thinking, and convincingly demonstrates that this way of looking at things has a considerable future. There are important implications for therapy as well as for hypothesis formulation. The monograph is attractively written, and the authors present their claims with exemplary modesty. The whole tenor of their approach gives weight to the conviction that here we have a story that must be taken seriously. It is a significant book, and I warmly commend it to all those with an interest in the future of psychopathology, and especially to psychiatrists who wish to advance their understanding of mental states and avoid stagnating with outworn dogma." - Robert Cawley, University of London in British Journal of Psychiatry Delusions are a key symptom of psychosis and yet there is no single book which considers delusions from a psychological perspective. In part this is because the syndrome of schizophrenia has captured the attention of many workers, and in part because delusions, as private mental phenomena, are not well suited to purely behavioural or observational methods of enquiry. For the past two decades, however, cognitive psychology has been in its ascendancy and delusions, as beliefs, are particularly amenable to investigation applying cognitive concepts and methods. Within this framework, it is possible to consider continuities between delusional and ordinary beliefs, as well as to seek to identify differences. This book, therefore, uniquely presents a psychological model of delusions, employing the neglected strategy of single symptom research and the tools of cognitive psychology
