Models of “contagion” rely on market imperfections to explain why adverse shocks in one asset market might be associated with asset sales in many unrelated markets. This paper demonstrates that contagion can be explained with basic portfolio theory without recourse to market imperfections. It also demonstrates that “Value-at-Risk” portfolio management rules do not have significantly different consequences for portfolio rebalancing and contagion than other rules. The paper’s main conclusion is that portfolio diversification and leverage may be sufficient to explain why investors would find it optimal to sell many higher-risk assets when a shock to one asset occurs.
Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: In recent years academics and policy makers have become more and more interested in the phenomenon of contagion, a concept involving the transmission of a financial crisis from one country to one or more other countries. During the 1990s world capital markets witnessed a number of financial crises. In 1992 the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis hit the European continent. Several countries in Latin America have been rocked during the 1994-95 Tequila crisis, and the Asian Flu spread through East Asian countries in 1997-98 with dramatic social implications. Later in 1998 the famous hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) had to file for bankruptcy and the Russian debt failure shocked international capital markets and increased volatility on a global scale. The crisis spread to as far as Brazil in early 1999 and developed markets have become victims as well. The question asked by academics and policy makers is how countries should behave in order to avoid contagion. To answer this question it is necessary to understand the different channels of contagion in greater detail and how a crisis can be transmitted from one country to another. The objective of this paper is to highlight those channels and to present a number of models and theories of contagion, which have recently been developed by academics. In general, there are several strands of theories in the literature that try to explain the transmission of crises. During the mid and late 1990s fundamental-based contagion and spillovers became popular among researchers and policy makers. Furthermore, financial linkages have been known to contribute to contagion. In contrast, in recent years, portfolio flows of international investors moved into the focus of academics. The advocates of fundamental-based contagion and spillovers argue that trade linkages between countries are responsible for contagion. For instance, a devaluation of a country's currency may lead to a negative change in fundamentals of its trading partners. On the other hand, contagion due to financial linkages is mainly explained by the fact that countries share the same banks and therefore have common creditors. A crisis in one country then leads to a deteriorating balance sheet of those common creditors. This in turn may force banks to withdraw money out of other countries in order to avoid further losses, a fact that leads to contagious sellouts. The role of international portfolio flows, which is [...]
No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.
This paper analyzes portfolio diversification, leverage, and financial contagion. It studies the extent to which basic principles of portfolio diversification explain “contagious selling” of financial assets when there are purely local shocks. The paper demonstrates that the elementary portfolio theory offers key insights into “contagion.” Most important, portfolio diversification and leverage are sufficient to explain why an investor will find it optimal to significantly reduce all risky asset positions when an adverse shock impacts just one asset.
One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countries is through the effect of past gains and losses on investors` risk aversion. We first present a simple model on how heterogeneous changes in investors` risk aversion affect portfolio decisions and stock prices. Second, we empirically show that, when funds` returns are below average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In other words, they tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were quot;overweight,quot; increasing their exposure to countries in which they were quot;underweight.quot; Based on this insight, we construct a matrix of financial interdependence reflecting the extent to which countries share overexposed funds. This index can improve predictions about which countries are likely to be affected by contagion from crisis centers.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
This paper presents a novel approach to investigate and model the network of euro area banks’ large exposures within the global banking system. Drawing on a unique dataset, the paper documents the degree of interconnectedness and systemic risk of the euro area banking system based on bilateral linkages. We develop a Contagion Mapping model fully calibrated with bank-level data to study the contagion potential of an exogenous shock via credit and funding risks. We find that tipping points shifting the euro area banking system from a less vulnerable state to a highly vulnerable state are a non-linear function of the combination of network structures and bank-specific characteristics.
