"Crawford explains the political dynamics of pivotal deterrence and the conditions under which it is likely to succeed, while examining some of its most impressive feats and failures. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's agile approach to the 1870s Eastern Crisis, which prevented war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, is contrasted with Britain's ambiguous and ill-fated maneuvers to deter Germany and France in July 1914. Shifting to the 1960s Cold War, Crawford explores the successes and setbacks in U.S. efforts to prevent NATO allies Greece and Turkey from fighting over Cyprus and to defuse the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan."--BOOK JACKET.
This volume analyzes the extent of ongoing power shifts among the leading powers, exploring the portents for their future growth, and seeking indicators of their relative commitment to the existing international order.
As the costs of a preemptive foreign policy in Iraq have become clear, strategies such as containment and deterrence have been gaining currency among policy makers. This comprehensive book offers an agenda for the contemporary practice of deterrence—especially as it applies to nuclear weapons—in an increasingly heterogeneous global and political setting. Moving beyond the precepts of traditional deterrence theory, this groundbreaking volume offers insights for the use of deterrence in the modern world, where policy makers may encounter irrational actors, failed states, religious zeal, ambiguous power relationships, and other situations where the traditional rules of statecraft do not apply. A distinguished group of contributors here examines issues such as deterrence among the Great Powers; the problems of regional and nonstate actors; and actors armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Complex Deterrence will be a valuable resource for anyone facing the considerable challenge of fostering security and peace in the twenty-first century.
Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict for control of the mountainous territory of Nagorny Karabakh is the longest-running dispute in post-Soviet Eurasia. Laurence Broers shows how more than 20 years of dynamic territorial politics, shifting power relations, international diffusion and unsuccessful mediation efforts have contributed to the resilience of this stubbornly unresolved dispute. Looking beyond tabloid tropes of 'frozen conflict' or 'Russian land-grab', Broers unpacks the unresolved territorial issues of the 1990s and the strategic rivalry that has built up around them since.
One of the gravest issues facing the global community today is the threat of nuclear war. As a growing number of nations gain nuclear capabilities, the odds of nuclear conflict increase. Yet nuclear deterrence strategies remain rooted in Cold War models that do not take into account regional conflict. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments offers an innovative theory of brokered bargaining to better understand and solve regional crises. As the world has moved away from the binational relationships that defined Cold War conflict while nuclear weapons have continued to proliferate, new types of nuclear threats have arisen. Moeed Yusuf proposes a unique approach to deterrence that takes these changing factors into account. Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. This book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers. Moving beyond debates surrounding the widely accepted rational deterrence model, Yusuf offers an original perspective rooted in thoughtful analysis of recent regional nuclear conflicts. With depth and insight, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments urges the international community to rethink its approach to nuclear deterrence.
This edited volume examines deterrence and the defense efforts of European states neighboring Russia, following the Crimean intervention. Deterrence, after being largely absent from debates among academics and policy-makers for almost a quarter of a century, has made a comeback in Europe. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbass region, eastern and northern European states have revised their assessments of Russia’s policies and intentions. The approach used by Russia in Ukraine has rendered lessons learned from the Cold War deterrence only partially applicable due to the changing security situation in Europe. The emergence of the cyber realm, a smaller emphasis on nuclear deterrence, and the ideological conflict between Russia and the West, are among the key differences between the Cold War and the current security environment. Structured into two parts, the first part discusses conceptual aspects of deterrence, while the second discusses ten country case studies, which include both NATO and non-NATO countries. This allows for an in-depth analysis of the changing character of deterrence and its practical application by Russia’s European neighbours. This volume will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, European politics, Russian foreign policy, security studies and international relations in general.
This book examines the role of the United States in Greek–Turkish relations and fills an important gap in alliance theory regarding the guardian’s dilemma. The strategy of a great power involves not only tackling threats from enemies, but also dealing with problems that arise between allies. Every time Greece and Turkey threatened to go to war against each other, the United States had to effectively restrain its two strategic allies without straining relations with either one of them. This book explores how the United States responded to the guardian’s dilemma in six crises during the Cold War, pursuing a policy of dual restraint to prevent an intra-alliance conflict, mitigate the consequences of each crisis, and maintain effective control of the Rimland Bridge. From a neoclassical-realist standpoint, the book examines how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results. It will be of interest to scholars of foreign policy, security studies, geopolitics, and international relations.
"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a theory of why deterrence failed, catastrophically, in July 1914. . . . Zagare concludes with sage advice on how to avoid even more cataclysmic breakdowns in a nuclear world." ---Steven J. Brams, New York University "Zagare's deft study of the origins of the First World War using his perfect deterrence theory uncovers new insights into that signal event and shows the value of formal theory applied to historical events. A must-read for those interested in security studies." ---James D. Morrow, University of Michigan "Through an exemplary combination of formal theory, careful qualitative analysis, and lucid prose, The Games of July delivers important and interesting answers to key questions concerning the international political causes of World War I. Its well-formed narratives and its sustained engagement with leading works in IR and diplomatic history . . . make it a rewarding read for security scholars in general and a useful teaching tool for international security courses." ---Timothy W. Crawford, Boston College Taking advantage of recent advances in game theory and the latest historiography, Frank C. Zagare offers a new, provocative interpretation of the events that led to the outbreak of World War I. He analyzes key events from Bismarck's surprising decision in 1879 to enter into a strategic alliance with Austria-Hungary to the escalation that culminated in a full-scale global war. Zagare concludes that, while the war was most certainly unintended, it was in no sense accidental or inevitable. The Games of July serves not only as an analytical narrative but also as a work of theoretical assessment. Standard realist and liberal explanations of the Great War are evaluated along with a collection of game-theoretic models known as perfect deterrence theory. Frank C. Zagare is UB Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Cover illustration: Satirical Italian postcard from World War I. Used with permission from The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Libraries.
