State-of-the-art overview of the current thinking on parietal lobe functions. Covers specific areas of anatomy and the contributions of the parietal lobes to eye movements, reaching and grasping, attention and perception, and the representation of space.
The function of the parietal lobe has been a topic of great interest, its study stimulated by the profound and intriguing perceptual and motor deficits resulting from parietal lobe lesions in humans. The specific role of the parietal cortex has always been a matter of great controversy, with different laboratories emphasizing seemingly exclusive interpretations of parietal lobe functions arranged around a line separating sensory input and motor output, both possibly modulated by attention. Recent work based on awake, behaving monkeys and the study of patients with parietal lobe lesions have unmasked the sensory versus motor dichotomy of parietal lobe function as being both arbitrary and simplistic. The present book conveys the current view of parietal lobe functions, centering around the idea that parietal lobe areas act as true sensorimotor interfaces contributing to the sensory guidance of movement and to the perception of space by offering non-sensory, mental representations of space suited to the needs of the specific task. It is largely based on a conference on parietal lobe functions held in Tiibingen, Germany, in the early summer of 1995. The major goal of this meeting was to further the exchange between neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists interested in this part of the brain. This book aims to cast the productive discussions of this conference into a state-of-the-art overview of present thinking on the role of the parietal lobes and their specific contributions to eye movements, reaching and grasping, attention, perception, and the representation of space.
The relationships between perception and imagery, imagery and spatial processes, memory and action: these are the main themes of this text. The interest in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience on imagery and spatial cognition has remarkably increased in the last decades. Different areas of research contribute to the clarification of the multiple cognitive processes subserving spatial perception and exploration, and to the definition of the neurophysiological mechanisms underpinning these cognitive functions. The aim of this book is to provide the reader (post-graduate students as well as experts) with a complete overview of this field of research. It illustrates how brain, behaviour and cognition interact in normal and pathological subjects in perceiving, representing and exploring space.(Series B)
Updated fully, this accessible and comprehensive text highlights the most important theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. Written by two experienced teachers, the consistent narrative ensures that students link concepts across chapters, and the careful selection of topics enables them to grasp the big picture without getting distracted by details. Clinical applications such as developmental disorders, brain injuries and dementias are highlighted. In addition, analogies and examples within the text, opening case studies, and 'In Focus' boxes engage students and demonstrate the relevance of the material to real-world concerns. Students are encouraged to develop the critical thinking skills that will enable them to evaluate future developments in this fast-moving field. A new chapter on Neuroscience and Society considers how cognitive neuroscience issues relate to the law, education, and ethics, highlighting the clinical and real-world relevance. An expanded online package includes a test bank.
The philosophy of perception is a microcosm of the metaphysics of mind. Its central problems—What is perception? What is the nature of perceptual consciousness? How can one fit an account of perceptual experience into a broader account of the nature of the mind and the world?—are at the heart of metaphysics. Rather than try to cover all of the many strands in the philosophy of perception, this book focuses on a particular orthodoxy about the nature of visual perception. The central problem for visual science has been to explain how the brain bridges the gap between what is given to the visual system and what is actually experienced by the perceiver. The orthodox view of perception is that it is a process whereby the brain, or a dedicated subsystem of the brain, builds up representations of relevant figures of the environment on the basis of information encoded by the sensory receptors. Most adherents of the orthodox view also believe that for every conscious perceptual state of the subject, there is a particular set of neurons whose activities are sufficient for the occurrence of that state. Some of the essays in this book defend the orthodoxy; most criticize it; and some propose alternatives to it. Many of the essays are classics. Contributors G.E.M. Anscombe, Dana Ballard, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, H.P. Grice, David Marr, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Zenon Pylyshyn, Paul Snowdon, and P.F. Strawson
The perception-action cycle is the circular flow of information that takes place between the organism and its environment in the course of a sensory-guided sequence of behaviour towards a goal. Each action causes changes in the environment that are analyzed bottom-up through the perceptual hierarchy and lead to the processing of further action, top-down through the executive hierarchy, toward motor effectors. These actions cause new changes that are analyzed and lead to new action, and so the cycle continues. The Perception-action cycle: Models, architectures and hardware book provides focused and easily accessible reviews of various aspects of the perception-action cycle. It is an unparalleled resource of information that will be an invaluable companion to anyone in constructing and developing models, algorithms and hardware implementations of autonomous machines empowered with cognitive capabilities. The book is divided into three main parts. In the first part, leading computational neuroscientists present brain-inspired models of perception, attention, cognitive control, decision making, conflict resolution and monitoring, knowledge representation and reasoning, learning and memory, planning and action, and consciousness grounded on experimental data. In the second part, architectures, algorithms, and systems with cognitive capabilities and minimal guidance from the brain, are discussed. These architectures, algorithms, and systems are inspired from the areas of cognitive science, computer vision, robotics, information theory, machine learning, computer agents and artificial intelligence. In the third part, the analysis, design and implementation of hardware systems with robust cognitive abilities from the areas of mechatronics, sensing technology, sensor fusion, smart sensor networks, control rules, controllability, stability, model/knowledge representation, and reasoning are discussed.
The neuroscientist Alain Berthoz experimented on Russian astronauts in space to answer these questions: How does weightlessness affect motion? How are motion and three-dimensional space perceived? In this erudite and witty book, Berthoz describes how human beings on earth perceive and control bodily movement. Reviewing a wealth of research in neurophysiology and experimental psychology, he argues for a rethinking of the traditional separation between action and perception, and for the division of perception into five senses. In Berthoz’s view, perception and cognition are inherently predictive, functioning to allow us to anticipate the consequences of current or potential actions. The brain acts like a simulator that is constantly inventing models to project onto the changing world, models that are corrected by steady, minute feedback from the world. We move in the direction we are looking, anticipate the trajectory of a falling ball, recover when we stumble, and continually update our own physical position, all thanks to this sense of movement. This interpretation of perception and action allows Berthoz, in The Brain’s Sense of Movement, to focus on psychological phenomena largely ignored in standard texts: proprioception and kinaesthesis, the mechanisms that maintain balance and coordinate actions, and basic perceptual and memory processes involved in navigation.
Spatial neglect is a disorder of space-related behaviour. It is characterized by failure to explore the side of space contralateral to a brain lesion, or to react or respond to stimuli or subjects located on this side. Research on spatial neglect and related disorders has developed rapidly in recent years. These advances have been made as a result of neuropsychological studies of patients with brain damage, behavioural studies of animal models, as well as through functional neurophysiological experiments and functional neuroimaging. The Cognitive and Neural Bases of Spatial Neglect provides an overview of this wide-ranging field of scientific endeavour, providing a cohesive synthesis of the most recent observations and results. As well as being a fascinating clinical phenomenon, the study of spatial neglect helps us to understand normal mechanisms of directing and maintaining spatial attention and is relevant to the contemporary search for the cerebral correlates of conscious experience, voluntary action and the nature of personal identity itself. The book is divided into seven sections covering the anatomical and neurophysiological bases of the disorder, frameworks of neglect, perceptual and motor factors, the relation to attention, the cognitive processes involved, and strategies for rehabilitation. Chapters have been written by a team of the leading international experts in this field. This will be essential reading for neuropsychologists, neurologists, neurophysiologists, cognitive neuroscientists and psychologists.
The present volume was assembled in honor of Professor Alan Cowey FRS, and attempts to embrace his wide range of research interests in visual neuroscience. It is divided into four sections. The first contains a group of papers dealing with different fundamental aspects of the visual system, including the control and monitoring of eye movements. The second is concerned with the functional organization of cortical visual areas and their role in visual perception and visually guided action. The third addresses issues concerning color and motion perception, along with broader questions of visual attention; and the effects of selective brain damage on these different aspects of visual experience. The fourth and final section of the volume deals explicitly with questions relating to visual awareness, with particular emphasis on 'blindsight', a topic on which Alan Cowey has worked extensively in recent years, both in humans and in monkeys.
Theoretical and empirical accounts of the interconnectedness between the manual and the mental suggest that the hand can be understood as a cognitive instrument. Cartesian-inspired dualism enforces a theoretical distinction between the motor and the cognitive and locates the mental exclusively in the head. This collection, focusing on the hand, challenges this dichotomy, offering theoretical and empirical perspectives on the interconnectedness and interdependence of the manual and mental. The contributors explore the possibility that the hand, far from being the merely mechanical executor of preconceived mental plans, possesses its own know-how, enabling "enhanded" beings to navigate the natural, social, and cultural world without engaging propositional thought, consciousness, and deliberation. The contributors consider not only broad philosophical questions—ranging from the nature of embodiment, enaction, and the extended mind to the phenomenology of agency—but also such specific issues as touching, grasping, gesturing, sociality, and simulation. They show that the capacities of the hand include perception (on its own and in association with other modalities), action, (extended) cognition, social interaction, and communication. Taken together, their accounts offer a handbook of cutting-edge research exploring the ways that the manual shapes and reshapes the mental and creates conditions for embodied agents to act in the world. Contributors Matteo Baccarini, Andrew J. Bremner, Massimiliano L. Cappuccio, Andy Clark, Jonathan Cole, Dorothy Cowie, Natalie Depraz, Rosalyn Driscoll, Harry Farmer, Shaun Gallagher, Nicholas P. Holmes, Daniel D. Hutto, Angelo Maravita, Filip Mattens, Richard Menary, Jesse J. Prinz, Zdravko Radman, Matthew Ratcliffe, Etiennne B. Roesch, Stephen V. Shepherd, Susan A.J. Stuart, Manos Tsakiris, Michael Wheeler