Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783
Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783

Author: Arthur R Bowler

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2015-03-08

Total Pages: 304

ISBN-13: 140086741X

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The myth of the eighteenth-century British "war machine" persists, perplexing those who search for the reasons why Britain lost the Revolutionary War. In this book, R. Arthur Bowler argues that although recent and traditional studies have pointed out many problems of the British forces in America, they have failed to appreciate a major weakness—logistics. The author draws on the remarkably complete records of British government offices concerned with logistics during the Revolutionary War and army service departments such as commissary, quartermaster and barrack-master generals to provide a full account of the everyday life of the British army and an accurate record of how logistical and administrative problems in America affected the course of the war. His study makes it clear that the British army in America depended almost entirely on Britain for supplies, and that for six years inadequate and sometimes corrupt administration seriously affected the course of operations and the morale of the troops. An organization capable of supplying the army was not developed until 1781, too late to change the outcome of the war. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Redcoat ResupplyZ Strategic Logistics and Operational Indecision in the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783
Redcoat ResupplyZ Strategic Logistics and Operational Indecision in the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 51

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

When war erupted in the American colonies in 1775 at Lexington and Concord, the British Empire was logistically unprepared. Neither the army nor the supporting administration in Great Britain could comprehend the nature of their opponent or the duration of the conflict. British generals eventually came to the conclusion that the system of resupply to the forces in the colonies would have to be reengineered. However, the ability of the British military leadership to convince the entrenched civilian bureaucracy that conditions in the colonies were deteriorating was never truly effective. As a result, British commanders almost always felt constrained by the lack of sufficient supplies and they continue to carry a reputation of having been over-cautious and indecisive. This study examines the logistical and administrative system that was established to support the army of the British Empire in the American colonies. Furthermore, it explores the impact that strategic deficiencies in that system had upon British military operations in the American Revolution. The Saratoga Campaign, in particular, provides and illuminating example of how weaknesses in the British supply system led to the defeat of the Empire. The U.S. military currently operates in a rapidly changing security environment and is expected to perform non-traditional roles in addition to its conventional warfighting focus. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military increasingly employs a strategy of force projection that is similar in many respects to the circumstances faced by the British in the 18th Century. Although improvements in technology have made the modern battlefield literally unrecognizable when compared to that of 1775, there are logistical tenets and lessons from the American Revolution that are still applicable to strategists and logisticians.

The British Army in North America, 1775-1783
The British Army in North America, 1775-1783

Author: Robin May

Publisher: Osprey Publishing (UK)

Published: 1974

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13: 9780850451955

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

"This book ... is not an account of the war and its strategy, but offers a short examination of the organization of the British Army in America and Britain at the time of the Revolution, with particular emphasis on the redcoat and his war"--Introduction.

The British Army in North America 1775–83
The British Army in North America 1775–83

Author: Robin May

Publisher: Osprey Publishing

Published: 1998-01-13

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781855327351

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

For sheer guts, the Redcoats' behavior at Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and other bloody encounters has rarely been surpassed. The Americans won, but only just, and then thanks to foreign intervention and a small number of dedicated and valiant patriots who were continually let down by their own people. Robin May's splendid work looks at the British Army that fought in the American Revolution from 1775 to 1783. It details the soldiers who faced the difficulties of campaigning in North America along with the gross inefficiency and corruption at home which, along with their generals' often blundering conduct, were as deadly enemies as the Americans.

Redcoat Resupply! Strategic Logistics and Operational Indecision in the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783
Redcoat Resupply! Strategic Logistics and Operational Indecision in the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 51

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

When war erupted in the American colonies in 1775 at Lexington and Concord, the British Empire was logistically unprepared. Neither the army nor the supporting administration in Great Britain could comprehend the nature of their opponent or the duration of the conflict. British generals eventually came to the conclusion that the system of resupply to the forces in the colonies would have to be reengineered. However, the ability of the British military leadership to convince the entrenched civilian bureaucracy that conditions in the colonies were deteriorating was never truly effective. As a result, British commanders almost always felt constrained by the lack of sufficient supplies and they continue to carry a reputation of having been over-cautious and indecisive. This study examines the logistical and administrative system that was established to support the army of the British Empire in the American colonies. Furthermore, it explores the impact that strategic deficiencies in that system had upon British military operations in the American Revolution. The Saratoga Campaign, in particular, provides and illuminating example of how weaknesses in the British supply system led to the defeat of the Empire. The U.S. military currently operates in a rapidly changing security environment and is expected to perform non-traditional roles in addition to its conventional warfighting focus. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military increasingly employs a strategy of force projection that is similar in many respects to the circumstances faced by the British in the 18th Century. Although improvements in technology have made the modern battlefield literally unrecognizable when compared to that of 1775, there are logistical tenets and lessons from the American Revolution that are still applicable to strategists and logisticians.

Failure Of British Strategy During The Southern Campaign Of The American Revolutionary War
Failure Of British Strategy During The Southern Campaign Of The American Revolutionary War

Author: Major Jesse T. Pearson

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 148

ISBN-13: 1786252201

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to 1781. Following France’s entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain’s strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene’s campaign against British forces.