The Aegis BMD program gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY 2010 to 38 at the end of FY 2015. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles; Aegis BMD Flight Tests; Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program; (3) Issues for Congress: Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships; Demands for Aegis Ships in General; Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors; SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.
2019 Missile Defense Review - January 2019 According to a senior administration official, a number of new technologies are highlighted in the report. The review looks at "the comprehensive environment the United States faces, and our allies and partners face. It does posture forces to be prepared for capabilities that currently exist and that we anticipate in the future." The report calls for major investments from both new technologies and existing systems. This is a very important and insightful report because many of the cost assessments for these technologies in the past, which concluded they were too expensive, are no longer applicable. Why buy a book you can download for free? We print this book so you don't have to. First you gotta find a good clean (legible) copy and make sure it's the latest version (not always easy). Some documents found on the web are missing some pages or the image quality is so poor, they are difficult to read. We look over each document carefully and replace poor quality images by going back to the original source document. We proof each document to make sure it's all there - including all changes. If you find a good copy, you could print it using a network printer you share with 100 other people (typically its either out of paper or toner). If it's just a 10-page document, no problem, but if it's 250-pages, you will need to punch 3 holes in all those pages and put it in a 3-ring binder. Takes at least an hour. It's much more cost-effective to just order the latest version from Amazon.com This book includes original commentary which is copyright material. Note that government documents are in the public domain. We print these large documents as a service so you don't have to. The books are compact, tightly-bound, full-size (8 1/2 by 11 inches), with large text and glossy covers. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a HUBZONE SDVOSB. https: //usgovpub.com
China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D, has reached the equivalent of Initial Operational Capability. Although it probably has been deployed in small numbers, additional challenges and tests remain. This study examines the ASBM’s capability and history, showing how the DF-21D meets multiple priorities in Chinese defense modernization and in the national security bureaucracy, as well its implications for the United States. The ASBM’s physical threat to U.S. Navy ships will be determined by the development of associated systems and organizations, which currently limit data fusion and coordination in the complex task of identifying a U.S. aircraft carrier in the open ocean. Still, the ASBM poses a direct threat to the foundations of U.S. power project in Asia and will undermine the U.S. position, unless efforts to counter its political-military effects are taken.
Spurred by a perceived growing ballistic missile threat from within the Asia-Pacific region and requests from the United States to support research and development on components of a missile defense system, the Japanese government decided in late 1998 and early 1999 to move forward with joint research and development with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD). But the decisions taken thus far commit Japan only to limited participation with the U.S. government on collaborative research and prototype production of theater missile defense (TMD) components. To date, Japan has undertaken no effort to develop or acquire a dedicated BMD system, nor has it assessed the larger political and strategic implications of a Japanese BMD system in any thorough or systematic manner. More important, no consensus has yet emerged in favor of the development or deployment of a full-fledged BMD system in Japan. Finally, Japan and the United States have not clarified: (1) how essential it is for Japan to participate in a more extensive program of joint research and development; (2) the extent of system interoperability that is desirable and achievable; or (3) the impact of a decision to deploy on the strategic environment in Asia.
This book is devoted to one of the central issues in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations—ballistic missile defense. Drawing on more than 2,000 primary sources, interviews with Russian and NATO officials, and a variety of Russian and Western publications, this book offers an unparalleled, in-depth analysis of the reasons behind Russia’s policy towards the construction of a U.S ballistic missile defense in Europe. It provides a critical assessment of the decision-making mechanisms that shape Russia’s position on ballistic missile defense, as well as Russia’s strategic relations with the United States and Russia’s interaction with European and non-European powers. Lilly argues that contrary to Moscow’s official claims during the Putin era, Russian objections to the construction of ballistic missile defense in Europe have not been wholly dictated by security concerns. To Russia, missile defense is not purely an issue in and of itself, but rather a symbol and instrument of broader political considerations. At the international level, the factors that have shaped Russia’s response include Moscow’s perception of the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the Kremlin’s capacity to project influence and power abroad, and NATO’s behavior in the post-Soviet space. Domestically, the issue of missile defense has been a facilitating instrument for strengthening Putin’s regime and justifying military modernization. Taken together, these instrumental considerations and their fluctuating intensity in different periods prompt the Russian leadership to pursue contradictory policy approaches simultaneously. On the one hand, the Kremlin seeks U.S. cooperation, while on the other hand, it threatens retaliation and reinforces Russian offensive capabilities. The result is Moscow’s incoherence, inconsistency, and double-speak over the issue of missile defense.
The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.