States increasingly delegate regulatory and police functions to internet intermediaries. This may lead to interference with the right to freedom of expression. In a time when these issues are of particular relevance, Intermediary liability and freedom of expression in the EU provides the reader with a framework to protect the freedom of expression in an online world.
This book provides a comprehensive, authoritative, and state-of-the-art discussion of fundamental legal issues in intermediary liability online, while also describing advancement in intermediary liability theory and identifying recent policy trends.
Internet intermediaries play a unique role in linking authors of content and audiences. They may either protect or jeopardize end user rights to free expression, given their role in capturing, storing, searching, sharing, transferring and processing large amount of information, data and user-generated content. This research aims to identify principles for good practices and processes that are consistent with international standards for free expression that Internet intermediaries may follow in order to protect the human rights of end users online.
European Convention on Human Rights – Article 10 – Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In the context of an effective democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but it also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention. Without a broad guarantee of the right to freedom of expression protected by independent and impartial courts, there is no free country, there is no democracy. This general proposition is undeniable. This handbook is a practical tool for legal professionals from Council of Europe member states who wish to strengthen their skills in applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in their daily work.
In step with its rapid progress to the centre of modern social, political, and economic life, the internet has proven a convenient vehicle for the commission of unprecedented levels of copyright infringement. Given the virtually insurmountable obstacles to successful pursuit of actual perpetrators, it has become common for intermediaries –providers of internet-related infrastructure and services – to face liability as accessories. Despite advances in policy at the European level, the law in this area remains far from consistently applicable. This is the first book to locate and clarify the substantive rules of European intermediary accessory liability in copyright and to formulate harmonised European norms to govern this complicated topic. With a detailed comparative analysis of relevant regimes in three major Member State jurisdictions – England, France, and Germany – the author elucidates the relationship between these rules and the demands of EU law on fundamental rights and the principles of European tort law. She clearly presents the interrelations between such areas as the following: - accessory liability in tort; - joint tortfeasance; - European fault-based liability: fault, causation, defences; - negligence; - negligence balancing: rights-based or utility-based?; - Germany’s “disturbance liability” (Störerhaftung); - fair balance in human rights; - end-users’ fundamental rights; - The European Commission’s 2015 Communication on a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe; - The E-Commerce Directive and other relevant provisions; - Safe harbours: mere conduit, caching, hosting; - Intermediary actions: monitoring, filtering, blocking, removal of infringing content; and - application of remedies: damages and injunctions. The strong points of each national system are highlighted, as are the commonalities between them, and the author uses these to build a proposed harmonised European framework for intermediary liability for copyright infringement. She concludes with suggestions for the future possible integration of the proposed framework into EU law. The issue of the liability of internet intermediaries for third party copyright infringement has entered into the political agenda across the globe, giving rise to one of the most complex, contentious, and fascinating debates in modern copyright law. This book offers an opportunity for a re-conceptualisation and rationalisation of the applicable law, in a way which additionally better accounts for the cross-border nature of the internet. It will be of inestimable value to many interested parties – lawyers, internet intermediaries, NGOs, policymakers, universities, libraries, researchers, lobbyists – in matters regarding the information society.
The Nordic countries are well known globally for their high human rights standards and, at the same time, high degree of internet freedom. This edited collection reveals how the Nordic countries have succeeded in the task of protecting freedom of expression in the new media. It contains an overview of public policy choices and best practices of domestic online companies, which have the aspiration of finding global acceptance. Reviewing the topic of freedom of expression in new media within Nordic and Baltic countries, this book incorporates both general themes and interesting country-specific themes that will provide wider knowledge on the development of freedom of expression and media law in the online media era. A comprehensive analysis of regulation of online media, both at the level of legislation and application of law in courts and other authorities, are included. This book will contribute to the ongoing discussion as to whether there is a need to modify prevailing interpretation of freedom of expression. Human Rights Law and Regulating Freedom of Expression in New Media focuses on the multi-layered and complicated relationship between internet and human rights law. It contributes to the ongoing discussion regarding the protection of freedom of expression on the internet in the context of various doctrines of constitutional law, including the proliferation of constitutional adjudication. It will be of interest to researchers, academics, policymakers, and students in the fields of human rights law, internet law, political science, sociology, cultural studies, media and communications studies and technology.
Firmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers.
This book presents a comprehensive view of Internet intermediaries, their economic and social function, development and prospects, benefits and costs, and roles and responsibilities.
This book focuses on regulatory challenges of creating and sustaining freedom of speech and freedom of information two decades after the fall of the Berlin wall, in global, comparative context. Some chapters overview, others address specific issues, or describe country case studies. Instead of trying to provide an exhaustive assessment which in one volume might not reach deeper analyzes of contextual details, this book will shed light on and help better understanding of general challenges for freedom of speech and information through varying comparative examples and highlighting important regulatory questions.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter have become important venues for users to exercise free speech rights protected under the First Amendment. Commentators and legislators, however, have questioned whether these social media platforms are living up to their reputation as digital public forums. Some have expressed concern that these sites are not doing enough to counter violent or false speech. At the same time, many argue that the platforms are unfairly banning and restricting access to potentially valuable speech. Currently, federal law does not offer much recourse for social media users who seek to challenge a social media provider's decision about whether and how to present a user's content. Lawsuits predicated on these sites' decisions to host or remove content have been largely unsuccessful, facing at least two significant barriers under existing federal law. First, while individuals have sometimes alleged that these companies violated their free speech rights by discriminating against users' content, courts have held that the First Amendment, which provides protection against state action, is not implicated by the actions of these private companies. Second, courts have concluded that many non-constitutional claims are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which provides immunity to providers of interactive computer services, including social media providers, both for certain decisions to host content created by others and for actions taken "voluntarily" and "in good faith" to restrict access to "objectionable" material. Some have argued that Congress should step in to regulate social media sites. Government action regulating internet content would constitute state action that may implicate the First Amendment. In particular, social media providers may argue that government regulations impermissibly infringe on the providers' own constitutional free speech rights. Legal commentators have argued that when social media platforms decide whether and how to post users' content, these publication decisions are themselves protected under the First Amendment. There are few court decisions evaluating whether a social media site, by virtue of publishing, organizing, or even editing protected speech, is itself exercising free speech rights. Consequently, commentators have largely analyzed the question of whether the First Amendment protects a social media site's publication decisions by analogy to other types of First Amendment cases. There are at least three possible frameworks for analyzing governmental restrictions on social media sites' ability to moderate user content. Which of these three frameworks applies will depend largely on the particular action being regulated. Under existing law, social media platforms may be more likely to receive First Amendment protection when they exercise more editorial discretion in presenting user-generated content, rather than if they neutrally transmit all such content. In addition, certain types of speech receive less protection under the First Amendment. Courts may be more likely to uphold regulations targeting certain disfavored categories of speech such as obscenity or speech inciting violence. Finally, if a law targets a social media site's conduct rather than speech, it may not trigger the protections of the First Amendment at all.
