Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices
Author: Ernst Fehr
Publisher:
Published: 1999
Total Pages: 14
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: Ernst Fehr
Publisher:
Published: 1999
Total Pages: 14
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Ernst Fehr
Publisher:
Published: 2001
Total Pages: 56
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Alexandros Karakostas
Publisher:
Published: 2017
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe present a simple principal-agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue-sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue-sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue-sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Suren Basov
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2016-05-20
Total Pages: 181
ISBN-13: 9811010412
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Author: Gregory Klass
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Published: 2014-12-18
Total Pages: 417
ISBN-13: 019102208X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.
Author: Ernst Fehr
Publisher:
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 45
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Yuval Feldman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2018-06-07
Total Pages: 592
ISBN-13: 110865634X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKCurrently, the dominant enforcement paradigm is based on the idea that states deal with 'bad people' - or those pursuing their own self-interests - with laws that exact a price for misbehavior through sanctions and punishment. At the same time, by contrast, behavioral ethics posits that 'good people' are guided by cognitive processes and biases that enable them to bend the laws within the confines of their conscience. In this illuminating book, Yuval Feldman analyzes these paradigms and provides a broad theoretical and empirical comparison of traditional and non-traditional enforcement mechanisms to advance our understanding of how states can better deal with misdeeds committed by normative citizens blinded by cognitive biases regarding their own ethicality. By bridging the gap between new findings of behavioral ethics and traditional methods used to modify behavior, Feldman proposes a 'law of good people' that should be read by scholars and policymakers around the world.
Author: Orley Ashenfelter
Publisher: Elsevier
Published: 2010-12-09
Total Pages: 863
ISBN-13: 0444534504
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA guide to the continually evolving field of labour economics.
Author: Günter Bamberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 538
ISBN-13: 3642750605
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAgency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.