Exchange- rate- based stabilization programs supported by a sustained fiscal adjustment generally reduced long- term inflation. Success was not easy, however, because rigid adherence to the exchange rate rule many times resulted in strong overvaluation of the currency and balance- of- payments problems before stabilization was finally secured.
Contents : Wage Inequality and Regional Unemployment Persistence: U.S. vs. Europe, Guiseppe BErtola and Andreas Ichino. Capital Utilization and Returns to Scale, Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. Banks and Derivatives, Gary Gorton and Richard Rosen. Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilizations: Theory and Evidence, Sergio Rebelo and Carlos Vegh. Inflation Indicators and Inflation Policy, Stephen Cecchetti. Recent Central Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy, Carl Walsh. Is Central Bank Independence (and Low Inflation) the Result of Effective Financial Opposition to Inflation?, Adam Posen. The Unending Quest for Monetary Salvation, Stanley Fischer.
This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.
This paper provides a brief historical journey of central banking in Latin America to shed light on the debate about monetary policy in the post-global financial crisis period. The paper distinguishes three periods in Latin America’s central bank history: the early years, when central banks endorsed the gold standard and coped with the collapse of this monetary system; a second period, in which central banks turned into development banks under the aegis of governments at the expense of increasing inflation; and the “golden years,” when central banks succeeded in preserving price stability in an environment of political independence. The paper concludes by cautioning against overburdening central banks in Latin America with multiple mandates as this could end up undermining their hard-won monetary policy credibility.
The "Argentine disappointment"—why Argentina persistently failed to achieve sustained economic stability during the twentieth century—is an issue that has mystified scholars for decades. In Straining the Anchor, Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor provide many of the missing links that help explain this important historical episode. Written chronologically, this book follows the various fluctuations of the Argentine economy from its postrevolutionary volatility to a period of unprecedented prosperity to a dramatic decline from which the country has never fully recovered. The authors examine in depth the solutions that Argentina has tried to implement such as the Caja de Conversión, the nation's first currency board which favored a strict gold-standard monetary regime, the forerunner of the convertibility plan the nation has recently adopted. With many countries now using—or seriously contemplating—monetary arrangements similar to Argentina's, this important and persuasive study maps out one of history's most interesting monetary experiments to show what works and what doesn't.
Do exchange-rate-based stabilizations generate distinctive economic dynamics? To address this question, this paper identifies stabilization episodes using criteria that differ from those in previous empirical studies of exchange-rate-based stabilizations. We find that, while some differences can be detected between exchange-rate-based stabilizations and stabilizations where the exchange rate is not the anchor, the behavior of important variables does not appear to differ—especially output growth, which is good in both cases. There is also no evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by adopting an exchange-rate anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the success records of stabilizations that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and those that do not.
Disinflation programs in chronic inflation countries do not normally follow the usual Phillips curve tradeoff in the medium run. Instead of having a sharp recession in the early stage of stabilization, there often is an initial expansion of output followed by a recession and balance of payments difficulties. This pattern is related to programs that use the exchange rate as an instrument of disinflation.
In high inflation economies exchange- rate- based stabilizations typically start with a boom, with the recession coming later. In contrast, in similar programs in the moderate inflation European economies, the recession generally appears upfront. When such programs result in a boom, it is driven by different forces than in the high inflation economies.
This paper presents a rule for foreign exchange interventions (FXI), designed to preserve financial stability in floating exchange rate arrangements. The FXI rule addresses a market failure: the absence of hedging solution for tail exchange rate risk in the market (i.e. high volatility). Market impairment or overshoot of exchange rate between two equilibria could generate high volatility and threaten financial stability due to unhedged exposure to exchange rate risk in the economy. The rule uses the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to define FXI triggers. While it provides to the market a hedge against tail risk, the rule allows the exchange rate to smoothly adjust to new equilibria. In addition, the rule is budget neutral over the medium term, encourages a prudent risk management in the market, and is more resilient to speculative attacks than other rules, such as fixed-volatility rules. The empirical methodology is backtested on Banco Mexico’s FXIs data between 2008 and 2016.
