At a time of unprecedented turmoil in the transatlantic relationship, as America asserts its right to act unilaterally to defend itself against terrorism and Europeans are increasingly aggressive in promoting a multilateralist approach to security issues, this book examines the post-9/11 and Iraqi war security environment, especially the impact on NATO and transatlantic relations as the European Union seeks to build a unified foreign and defence policy that will enable Europeans to play a fuller role in the international system.
Iraq can be considered the 'perfect storm' which brought out the stark differences between the US and Europe. The disagreement over the role of the United Nations continues and the bitterness in the United States against its betrayal by allies like France is not diminishing. Meanwhile, the standing of the United States among the European public has plummeted. Within Europe, political tensions between what US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld euphemistically called the 'Old' Europe and the 'New' Europe continue to divide. To fully comprehend these rifts, this volume takes a specific look at the core security priorities of each European state and whether these interests are best served through closer security collaboration with the US or with emerging European structures such as the European Rapid Reaction Force. It analyzes the contribution each state would make to transatlantic security, the role they envisage for existing security structures such as NATO, and the role the US would play in transatlantic security.
Much scholarly attention has been paid to the United States' response to the events of 9/11. This timely volume broadens our understanding of the impact of the attacks by instead considering their consequences for European security and for the relationship between the US and leading European states. Bringing together an impressive collection of experts this work will be an excellent resource for courses on international security, European politics and international relations.
European Security after Iraqdeals with the key questions about the effect of the Iraq war, from the invasion of 2003 onwards, on relations within the European region and between Europe and the wider world. It is concerned with both immediate impacts and longer term trends in intra-European and transatlantic relations. Formerly published as a special issue of 'Perspectives on European Politics and Society', Volume 5, No. 3, 2004.
The post-September 11th security policies of Poland, the UK, France, the US and Germany presented in this new book illustrate how and why the Atlantic community ruptured over Iraq, a result in part, it is argued, of the existence of particular national strategic cultures. Whilst the longer term effects of Iraq for the transatlantic security agenda have yet to fully transpire, what is certain is that the EU's ambitions to become a credible security actor have been seriously questioned, as has the notion of multilateralism as an international norm, as has the function of international law. The book addresses these issues by considering the evolution of the EU's role in the world and the development of American perspectives on the transatlantic security agenda. This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal European Security.
This book analyses the genesis and process through which transatlantic strategic dissonance now defines a divided West. It contends that constructive strategic dissonance has the potential to best manage a complex and pressing global security agenda. Reflects on the bitter disputes that have crystallized across the Atlantic after 9/11 and the rise of terrorist, WMD and failed state threats. Structured around the concepts of ‘Atlantic’, ‘Core’, ‘New’ ‘Non-aligned’ and ‘Periphery’ Europe that have emerged in the wake of these disputes. Identifies the trends and factors that have driven and could further propel the Euro-Atlantic security community towards different futures. Analyses the security policy implications of each scenario for states within this region.
This new Handbook provides readers with the tools to understand the evolution of transatlantic security from the Cold War era to the early 21st century. After World War II, the US retained a strong presence as the dominant member of NATO throughout the Cold War. Former enemies, such as Germany, became close allies, while even countries that often criticized the United States made no serious attempt to break with Washington. This pattern of security co-operation continued after the end of the Cold War, with NATO expansion eastwards extending US influence. Despite the Iraq war prompting a seemingly irreparable transatlantic confrontation, the last years of the Bush administration witnessed a warming of US-European relations, expected to continue with the Obama administration. The contributors address the following key questions arising from the history of transatlantic security relations: What lies behind the growing and continuing European dependency on security policy on the United States and what are the political consequences of this? Is this dependency likely to continue or will an independent European Common Foreign and Security Policy eventually emerge? What has been the impact of 'out-of-area' issues on transatlantic security cooperation? The essays in this Handbook cover a broad range of historical and contemporary themes, including the founding of NATO; the impact of the Korean War; the role of nuclear (non-)proliferation; perspectives of individual countries (especially France and Germany); the impact of culture, identity and representation in shaping post-Cold War transatlantic relations; institutional issues, particularly EU-NATO relations; the Middle East; and the legacy of the Cold War, notably tensions with Russia. This Handbook will be of much interest to students of transatlantic security, NATO, Cold War Studies, foreign policy and IR in general.
American foreign policy toward Europe is merrily rolling along the path of least resistance, in the belief that there is nothing really amiss with the European-American relationship that multilateralism will not fix. Not true, argues Kashmeri. The alliance is dead, cannot be fixed, and must be renegotiated. It has not grown to accommodate Europe's emergence as a major power. A kind of United States of Europe, with foreign priorities different from those of the United States, has arrived at America's doorstep. But America is still forging foreign policy for Europe using Cold War realities; both Democrats and Republicans expect the European Union to fall into step, and report for service as needed—under American leadership. Europe, however, has other plans, and as it becomes more powerful on the world stage, competing visions of European leadership have emerged. The Iraq War has brought them into stark relief. For example, as Kashmeri points out, the Atlantic divide over Iraq was more about French-British competition for leadership of Europe than it was about a division between American goals and European goals. He portrays British foreign policy as out of touch with reality, as a policy that has done a disservice to the United States as a result of the Blair government's exaggerated and self-serving view of the British-American special relationship. Kashmeri concludes with prescriptions for forging a new alliance based on a special relationship with the European Union. This agenda is inspired by the thoughts of the leaders who spoke to the author specifically for this book, among them former president George H. W. Bush, former British prime minister John Major, James A. Baker III, Wesley K. Clark, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Volcker, U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel, and Caspar W. Weinberger.
The US decision not to work through NATO after 9/11 left many European members of the alliance feeling deflated. This decision reflected not only the unilateralism of the Bush Administration, but also the belief that US operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered during NATO’s two Balkans interventions. This book examines US attitudes to, and perspectives on, the transatlantic alliance, with a particular focus on US-NATO relations since 9/11. It demonstrates that, following the decision to bypass NATO after 9/11, the Bush Administration’s perceptions of the alliance shifted due to a belated recognition that NATO did indeed have much to offer the US. Hallams explores NATO’s contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and argues that the events of 9/11 galvanised NATO into undertaking an accelerated program of transformation that has done much to reinvigorate the alliance. This book offers an optimistic assessment of the transatlantic alliance, counter-balanced by realistic reflections on the problems it faces. Drawing on interviews with US and NATO officials, it argues that NATO is far from irrelevant and that prospects for the alliance remain fundamentally positive; it will be of interest to students and scholars of US Foreign Policy, American politics, international relations, security studies and transatlantic studies.
