Nuclear Safety provides the methods and data needed to evaluate and manage the safety of nuclear facilities and related processes using risk-based safety analysis, and provides readers with the techniques to assess the consequences of radioactive releases. The book covers relevant international and regional safety criteria (US, IAEA, EUR, PUN, URD, INI). The contents deal with each of the critical components of a nuclear plant, and provide an analysis of the risks arising from a variety of sources, including earthquakes, tornadoes, external impact and human factors. It also deals with the safety of underground nuclear testing and the handling of radioactive waste. - Covers all plant components and potential sources of risk including human, technical and natural factors. - Brings together information on nuclear safety for which the reader would previously have to consult many different and expensive sources. - Provides international design and safety criteria and an overview of regulatory regimes.
La 4e de couverture indique : Organizes and presents all the latest thought on LWR nuclear safety in one consolidated volume, provided by the top experts in the field, ensuring high-quality, credible and easily accessible information.
"This IAEA Nuclear Security Series publication provides nuclear security fundamentals, recommendations, and supporting guidance for Member States to assist them in implementing new nuclear security regimes, or in reviewing and if necessary strengthening existing ones. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series also serves as guidance for Member States with respect to their activities in relation to binding and non-binding international instruments. The Nuclear Security Fundamentals are the primary publication in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, and set out the objective of an effective national nuclear security regime and essential elements of such a regime. They are aimed at national policy makers, legislative bodies, competent authorities, institutions, and individuals involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance or sustainability of a State's nuclear security regime."--Provided by publisher.
This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on how to meet the requirements established in Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-2/1 and in General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 4 for the identification of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety in nuclear power plants and for their classification on the basis of their function and safety significance. This Safety Guide is intended primarily for use by organizations involved in the design of nuclear power plants, as well as by regulatory bodies and their technical support organizations. The Safety Guide can also be applied to other nuclear installations subject to appropriate adjustments relevant to the specific design of the type of the facility being considered.
The book has been developed in conjunction with NERS 462, a course offered every year to seniors and graduate students in the University of Michigan NERS program. The first half of the book covers the principles of risk analysis, the techniques used to develop and update a reliability data base, the reliability of multi-component systems, Markov methods used to analyze the unavailability of systems with repairs, fault trees and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), and failure modes of systems. All of this material is general enough that it could be used in non-nuclear applications, although there is an emphasis placed on the analysis of nuclear systems. The second half of the book covers the safety analysis of nuclear energy systems, an analysis of major accidents and incidents that occurred in commercial nuclear plants, applications of PRA techniques to the safety analysis of nuclear power plants (focusing on a major PRA study for five nuclear power plants), practical PRA examples, and emerging techniques in the structure of dynamic event trees and fault trees that can provide a more realistic representation of complex sequences of events. The book concludes with a discussion on passive safety features of advanced nuclear energy systems under development and approaches taken for risk-informed regulations for nuclear plants.
This handbook is a practical aid to legislative drafting that brings together, for the first time, model texts of provisions covering all aspects of nuclear law in a consolidated form. Organized along the same lines as the Handbook on Nuclear Law, published by the IAEA in 2003, and containing updated material on new legal developments, this publication represents an important companion resource for the development of new or revised nuclear legislation, as well as for instruction in the fundamentals of nuclear law. It will be particularly useful for those Member States embarking on new or expanding existing nuclear programmes.
On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.
Unforgettable congressional hearings in 1978 revealed that fallout from American nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s had overexposed hundreds of soldiers and other citizens to radiation. Faith in governmental integrity was shaken, and many people have assumed that such overexposure caused great damage. Yet important questions remain--the most controversial being: did the radiation overexposure in fact cause the cancers and birth defects for which it has been blamed? Elements of Controversy is the result of a decade of exhaustive research in AEC documentary records and the full clinical and epidemiological literature on radiation effects. More concerned with uncovering the historical story than with assigning blame, Barton Hacker concludes that every precaution was taken by the AEC to avoid harming test participants or bystanders. And, he points out, the biomedical literature suggests that these precautions worked. Yet top officials in Washington--for whom the success of nuclear weapons was of overriding importance--had asserted that testing involved no risks at all. Discrepancies between unverifiable government claims and the revelations that some actual risk was present explain the origins and angry persistence of the controversies, Hacker argues. The Department of Energy delayed publication of Hacker's study for five years, and while his controversial book is sure to draw objections from both sides of the radiation-hazard debates, it will provide a much-needed guide to understanding their polemics. Unforgettable congressional hearings in 1978 revealed that fallout from American nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s had overexposed hundreds of soldiers and other citizens to radiation. Faith in governmental integrity was shaken, and many people have assumed that such overexposure caused great damage. Yet important questions remain--the most controversial being: did the radiation overexposure in fact cause the cancers and birth defects for which it has been blamed? Elements of Controversy is the result of a decade of exhaustive research in AEC documentary records and the full clinical and epidemiological literature on radiation effects. More concerned with uncovering the historical story than with assigning blame, Barton Hacker concludes that every precaution was taken by the AEC to avoid harming test participants or bystanders. And, he points out, the biomedical literature suggests that these precautions worked. Yet top officials in Washington--for whom the success of nuclear weapons was of overriding importance--had asserted that testing involved no risks at all. Discrepancies between unverifiable government claims and the revelations that some actual risk was present explain the origins and angry persistence of the controversies, Hacker argues. The Department of Energy delayed publication of Hacker's study for five years, and while his controversial book is sure to draw objections from both sides of the radiation-hazard debates, it will provide a much-needed guide to understanding their polemics.
Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants
The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.
This publication identifies the fundamental safety objective and associated safety principles that underpin the IAEA's safety standards and its related safety programme. They provide the basis for requirements and measures for the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including, in particular, nuclear installations and uses of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.
