The Department of Defense (DoD) is acquiring two new tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV): the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The $12.5 billion M-ATV is for use in Afghanistan; JLTV is the future replacement for vehicles like the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). This report assessed: (1) DoD's progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding M-ATVs; (2) JLTV's expected features and cost compared to other TWV; and (3) the extent to which the current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with the services' TWV investment strategies. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find publication.
"The Department of Defense (DOD) is acquiring two new tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV): the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The $12.5 billion M-ATV is for use in Afghanistan; JLTV is the future replacement for vehicles like the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).GAO was asked to assess (1) DOD's progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding M-ATVs, (2) JLTV's expected features and cost compared to other TWV, and (3) the extent to which the current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with the services' TWV investment strategies.GAO reviewed documents and held discussions with key officials to determine program strategies, costs, performance, and anticipated features; and compared M-ATV and JLTV plans with service strategies. "
The Army, which has over 250,000 TWVs, generally categorizes the vehicles as heavy, medium, and light. Heavy TWVs represent about 10 percent of the Army's TWV fleet and include vehicles like the Heavy Equipment Transporter System, which is used to transport main battle tanks and other heavy equipment. Medium TWVs represent about 40 percent of the Army's TWV fleet and include vehicles for hauling cargo and for launch and support platforms? weapon systems such as the High- Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Light TWVs represent about 50 percent of the Army's TWV fleet and currently consist of the HMMWV family of vehicles, which began production in 1983. The Army's HMMWV program also provides vehicles to satisfy Marine Corps and Air Force requirements. The HMMWV has gone through various upgrades during its nearly 30-year history and has served as DOD's primary wheeled vehicle for shelter carriers, command and control systems, light cargo and troop carriers, weapons carriers, and ambulances. This report addresses issues related to light tactical vehicles and the M-ATV. The M-ATV is not considered a light vehicle by its weight, but it is being used for functions typically done by light tactical vehicles. In February 2005, Marine Corps combatant commanders identified an urgent operational need for armored tactical vehicles to increase crew protection and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas against improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire. In response, the Marine Corps identified the solution as the up-armored HMMWV. Over the next 18 months, however, combatant commanders continued to call for more robust mine-protected vehicles. The solution to the requirement was the MRAP family of vehicles.
Congress recently requested a study of the U.S. ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The authors reveal risks in the technologies required to close capability gaps, the business processes used by the U.S. Department of Defense in managing vehicle production and modification initiatives, and the modeling and simulation process supporting research, development, and acquisition, making recommendations for mitigating these risks.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has continuing efforts to modernize its airlift and tanker fleets by investing billions of dollars to modify legacy airlift systems, such as the C-5 and C-130, and procure new aircraft, such as a tanker replacement. Acquisition has been on GAO's list as a high risk area since 1990. Past GAO reports, including two recently issued, raise concerns about the quality of analyses underpinning the programmatic decision-making surrounding DOD's airlift requirements. GAO has reported that elements contributing to a sound business case for an acquisition are missing or incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new capabilities. Those elements include firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Acquisition problems that include failure to limit cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity reductions persist, but fiscal realities will not allow budgets to accommodate these problems any longer. This testimony addresses (1) the analyses supporting the Department of Defense's (DOD) mobility capabilities and requirements and (2) actions that are needed to improve the outcomes of weapon system acquisitions.
Dwight D. Eisenhower once quipped, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Military acquisition and procurement—that is, how a nation manages investments, technologies, programs, and support—is critical to wartime success or failure. When unexpected battlefield problems arise, how do the government, the military, and industry work together to ensure effective solutions? During the American counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq, the improvised explosive device emerged as a disruptive and devastating threat. As Humvees, and their occupants, were ripped apart by IEDs, it was clear that new solutions had to be found. These solutions already existed but had not been procured, highlighting the need for more effective marketing to the military by industry. The ultimate successful response—the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, or MRAP—required years of entrepreneurial marketing by the defense industry. In Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement, James Hasik explores how these vehicles, which the American military mostly rejected despite the great need for them, eventually came to be adopted as the Pentagon’s top procurement priority. Hasik traces the story of the MRAP from the early 1970s to the future of mine-resistant vehicles on the battlefields of tomorrow. An important contribution to the seemingly disparate fields of marketing and defense policy, Securing the MRAP is an eye-opening revelation to defense industrialists, military officers, and government officials who want to understand how to avoid another IED-Humvee debacle.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has continuing efforts to modernize its airlift and tanker fleets by investing billions of dollars to modify legacy airlift systems, such as the C-5 and C-130, and procure new aircraft, such as a tanker replacement. Acquisition has been on GAO's list as a high risk area since 1990. GAO has reported that elements contributing to a sound business case for an acquisition are missing or incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new capabilities. Those elements include firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Acquisition problems that include failure to limit cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity reductions persist, but fiscal realities will not allow budgets to accommodate these problems any longer. Today's testimony addresses (1) the analyses supporting the Department of Defense's (DOD) mobility capabilities and requirements and (2) actions that are needed to improve the outcomes of weapon system acquisitions. For this testimony, GAO drew from
