Cost Implications of Transferring Strategic Airlift C-141s to the Air Reserve Forces
Cost Implications of Transferring Strategic Airlift C-141s to the Air Reserve Forces

Author: A. A. Barbour

Publisher:

Published: 1985

Total Pages: 68

ISBN-13:

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The Military Aircraft Command's (MAC) C-141 fleet presently is operated under an arrangement whereby each squadron is manned by both active duty and reserve personnel on an approximately 55% active to 45% reservist basis. This Note compares the cost of operating these C-141 squadrons under the present arrangement with the cost of a wholly reservist operation. It was found that when the costs of the present combined operation are calculated with the usual cost factors for C-141 squadrons there appears to be a potential to save one-third of the annual cost per squadron by transferring the C-141s to the Air Reserve Forces (ARF). However, the relatively high cost of the present C-141 operation, which stems largely from its high peacetime flying rate, would not be reduced by a transfer to the ARF. As a result, the potential savings of a transfer shrinks to 15%, and become negligible when the cost of providing peacetime airlift service by other means is added back in. The author emphasizes that when another cargo aircraft is acquired that can adopt the peacetime missions of the C-141s at comparable cost, these side-effects of the C-141 active/ARF comparison will disappear. Additional keyword: Cost analysis.

Air Reserve Forces
Air Reserve Forces

Author: U S Government Accountability Office (G

Publisher: BiblioGov

Published: 2013-07

Total Pages: 26

ISBN-13: 9781289230845

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GAO evaluated the Air Force's actions and plans in transferring C-5 and C-141 aircraft from the active Air Force to the Air Reserve Forces (ARF) to determine how the Air Force was managing costs associated with such transfer. GAO found that the conference committee for the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 1984 appropriations act directed the Air Force to plan for transferring 36 C-141 aircraft to ARF. The Air Force recommended transferring C-5, as well as C-141 aircraft, to ARF because of the higher operational costs of the C-5 and the large peacetime role of the C-141 aircraft. GAO believes that ARF bases receiving new aircraft must acquire sufficient spare parts to preclude excessive grounding of aircraft; however, excessive spares will increase costs of storage and transportation and result in unnecessary or premature acquisitions. GAO found that the Air Force planned to establish a jet engine intermediate maintenance facility at Kelly Air Force Base (AFB) as part of the transfer of C-5 aircraft to three ARF units. The Air Force estimated the cost of facilities and support equipment at over $7 million. GAO also found that the Air Force plans to transfer an additional 64 C-141 aircraft to ARF in the 1990's. The Air Force estimated that the military construction cost for the transfer of the 16 C-141 and 44 C-5 aircraft will be $223.5 million, and the cost for ground support equipment will be $46.4 million. GAO believes that the Air Force needs to focus greater attention on the costs involved to ensure that such transfers are completed in the most cost-effective manner.

National Defense
National Defense

Author: U S Government Accountability Office (G

Publisher: BiblioGov

Published: 2013-06

Total Pages: 38

ISBN-13: 9781289013134

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Maintaining more crews than necessary to fly the C-5 and C-141 strategic airlift planes is costly and unjustified. The Air Force has determined that it needs four crews for each of these aircraft, but due to efforts to preserve the service life of the C-5 by limiting the flying hours of the fleet, only 3.25 aircrews are presently authorized for each C-5. The Air Force has developed and uses a computer model simulating the operations of the strategic airlift system under wartime conditions to determine crew needs. However, a number of factors the Air Force uses are unrealistic and tend to overstate crew needs. GAO analyzed model simulations made by the Air Force and noted that during the first 45 days of an emergency, the period of highest demand, the utilization rate attained with a crew ratio of 3 to 1, with no flying hour limits imposed, was comparable to the rate attained with a 4 to 1 crew ratio with flying hour limits imposed. Where no flying hour limits were imposed, certain aircrews exceeded the 125 hours within 30 days limit. This indicated that a reduced crew ratio warrants serious consideration. A reduction of the aircrew ratio on from the currently authorized 3.25:1 to 3:1 for the C-5, and from 4:1 to 3:1 for the C-141, would lower the Air Force's annual funding requirement by as much as $105 million for the strategic airlift operational fleet if only active duty personnel were reduced. The Air Force omitted the effects of aircraft attrition in estimating required crews. At least three extra crews become available when each plane is lost. The Air Force indicates the extent of fatigue varies among aircrew positions; does not consider ground times at home stations to perform aircraft maintenance in its latest model simulations; assumes that all required crewmembers are fully qualified, onboard, and available for flying duties; and assumes, in its computer model, that crews must perform staff duties as well as flying airlift missions.

Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift: Executive summary
Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift: Executive summary

Author: J. R. Gebman

Publisher: RAND Corporation

Published: 1994

Total Pages: 84

ISBN-13:

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Intertheater airlift provides the Department of Defense with the ability to deliver combat forces or humanitarian relief rapidly anywhere in the world and to respond quickly to changing circumstances. But the national security strategy is being adapted to fit a changing world, and budget constraints are increasing. Military airlift is more costly than civil airlift, but military airlift has advantages that civil airlift cannot provide. Given the various advantages and disadvantages of different military and civil aircraft, what combination would most cost effectively meet the intertheater airlift needs of today's Air Force? To maintain necessary capacity, there is a need for some shift in the mix toward the civil-style transport. To maintain necessary flexibility, there is a need to limit the amount of that shift and, at least initially, a need for the Air Force to be the operator of any civil-style transports that might replace retiring C-141s. Another important dimension, however, is to use the chosen mix to its fullest potential. The study and its findings are summarized in Volume 1 and are discussed more fully in Volume 2; this volume provides supporting appendixes.

Estimating the Costs of Changes in the Active/Reserve Balance
Estimating the Costs of Changes in the Active/Reserve Balance

Author: Glenn A. Gotz

Publisher:

Published: 1990

Total Pages: 70

ISBN-13:

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Management of the total military force requires a determination of the proper role of the Selected Reserve. Both the executive and legislative branches of the government have increasingly looked to an expansion of the reserves as a potentially cost-effective way of maintaining the capability requirements of the total force. This trend has created the need for a cost methodology capable of supporting active/reserve force-mix decisions. This report presents a methodology for assessing the cost consequences of changing the mix of active and reserve units in the total force. The authors argue that the key to the usefulness of active/reserve force structure cost studies lies in a proper specification of the problem. Toward that end, they developed a structured accounting methodology for identifying and costing the resource, activity, and mission consequences of force structure change.