Nowadays, philosophy and methodology of science appear as a combination of novelty and continuity. This blend is clear both in the general approaches to science (those thought of as any science) and in the specific perspectives on every science, either formal or empirical. There are new topics for philosophical reflection, such as key issues in philosophy of medicine and central problems raised by neuroscience. Thus, new contents have brought attention to aspects that previously went almost unnoticed. In addition, there are new angles for philosophical study, such as the repercussion of society on scientific activity (in aims, processes, and results). But the background of the main philosophical and methodological trends of the twentieth century is, in many ways, still in place.
The book gives up-to-date, multi-aspect exposition of contemporary studies in philosophy and methodology of information, and related areas. It presents the most recent achievements, ideas and opinions of leading researchers in this domain, as well as from physicists, biologists and social scientists. Collaboration of researchers from different areas and fields opens new perspectives for the innovative development of science technology and society.
For some time now the philosophy of science has been undergoing a major transfor mation. It began when the 'received view' of scientific knowledge -that developed by logical positivists and their intellectual descendants - was challenged as bearing little resemblance to and having little relevance for the understanding of real science. Subsequently, an overwhelming amount of criticism has been added. One would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would support the 'received view' today. Yet, in the search for a new analysis of scientific knowledge, this view continues to exert influence over the tenor of much of present-day philosophy of science; in particular, over its problems and its methods of analysis. There has, however, emerged an area within the discipline - called by some the 'new philosophy of science' - that has been engaged in transforming the problems and methods of philosophy of science. While there is far from a consensus of beliefs in this area, most of the following contentions would be affirmed by those working in it: - that science is an open-ended, on-going activity, whose character has changed significantly during its history - that science is not a monolithic enterprise - that good science can lead to false theories - that science has its roots in everyday circumstances, needs, methods, concepts, etc.
Scientists use concepts and principles that are partly specific for their subject matter, but they also share part of them with colleagues working in different fields. Compare the biological notion of a 'natural kind' with the general notion of 'confirmation' of a hypothesis by certain evidence. Or compare the physical principle of the 'conservation of energy' and the general principle of 'the unity of science'. Scientists agree that all such notions and principles aren't as crystal clear as one might wish. An important task of the philosophy of the special sciences, such as philosophy of physics, of biology and of economics, to mention only a few of the many flourishing examples, is the clarification of such subject specific concepts and principles. Similarly, an important task of 'general' philosophy of science is the clarification of concepts like 'confirmation' and principles like 'the unity of science'. It is evident that clarfication of concepts and principles only makes sense if one tries to do justice, as much as possible, to the actual use of these notions by scientists, without however following this use slavishly. That is, occasionally a philosopher may have good reasons for suggesting to scientists that they should deviate from a standard use. Frequently, this amounts to a plea for differentiation in order to stop debates at cross-purposes due to the conflation of different meanings. While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific discipline, this general volume deals with focal issues of a general nature. After an editorial introduction about the dominant method of clarifying concepts and principles in philosophy of science, called explication, the first five chapters deal with the following subjects. Laws, theories, and research programs as units of empirical knowledge (Theo Kuipers), various past and contemporary perspectives on explanation (Stathis Psillos), the evaluation of theories in terms of their virtues (Ilkka Niiniluto), and the role of experiments in the natural sciences, notably physics and biology (Allan Franklin), and their role in the social sciences, notably economics (Wenceslao Gonzalez). In the subsequent three chapters there is even more attention to various positions and methods that philosophers of science and scientists may favor: ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions (James Ladyman), reduction, integration, and the unity of science as aims in the sciences and the humanities (William Bechtel and Andrew Hamilton), and logical, historical and computational approaches to the philosophy of science (Atocha Aliseda and Donald Gillies).The volume concludes with the much debated question of demarcating science from nonscience (Martin Mahner) and the rich European-American history of the philosophy of science in the 20th century (Friedrich Stadler). Comprehensive coverage of the philosophy of science written by leading philosophers in this field Clear style of writing for an interdisciplinary audience No specific pre-knowledge required
Unlike the bulk majority of publications on philosophy of science and research ethics, which are authored by professional philosophers and intended for philosophers, this book has been written by a research practitioner and intended for research practitioners. It is distinctive by its integrative approach to methodological and ethical issues related to research practice, with special emphasis of mathematical modelling and measurement, as well as by attempted application of engineering design methodology to moral decision making. It is also distinctive by more than 200 real-world examples drawn from various domains of science and technology. It is neither a philosophical treaty nor a quick-reference guide. It is intended to encourage young researchers, especially Ph.D. students, to deeper philosophical reflection over research practice. They are not expected to have any philosophical background, but encouraged to consult indicated sources of primary information and academic textbooks containing syntheses of information from primary sources. This book can be a teaching aid for students attending classes aimed at identification of methodological and ethical issues related to technoscientific research, followed by introduction to the methodology of analysing dilemmas arising in this context.
This book seeks to provide new perspectives, to broaden the field of philosophy of science, or to renew themes that have had a great impact on the profession. Thus, after an initial chapter to situate the current trends in philosophy of science and the prospective of the near future, it offers contributions in five thematic blocks: I) Philosophy of Medicine and Climate Change; II) Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; III) New Analyses of Probability and the Use of Mathematics in Practice; IV) Scientific Progress Revisited; and V) Scientific Realism and the Instrumentalist Alternative. Within this framework, the volume addresses such relevant issues as the methodological validity of medical evidence or decision making in situations of uncertainty; recent advances in Artificial Intelligence and the future of the Internet; current forms of empirically based methodological pluralism and new ways of understanding mathematics with scientific practice; and the revision of the approaches to scientific progress based on the experiences accumulated in recent decades.
This book helps you provide a well-rounded doctoral curriculum. The philosophy of science is essential to the core of doctoral study in nursing. This text presents historical and contemporary thinking on this significant subject. Readers will find a wealth of information from a variety of philosophers and conceptualizers of Western science. The text's approach stimulates analysis and reflection for enhanced learning. Coverage straddles the balance between nurse and non-nurse philosophers with discussion and reflective questions, and includes thoughts about nursing as a science and an art. Students will learn to recognize the connection between an understanding of philosophic inquiry and scientific investigation -- or research -- in nursing. Compatibility: BlackBerry® OS 4.1 or Higher / iPhone/iPod Touch 2.0 or Higher /Palm OS 3.5 or higher / Palm Pre Classic / Symbian S60, 3rd edition (Nokia) / Windows Mobile™ Pocket PC (all versions) / Windows Mobile Smartphone / Windows 98SE/2000/ME/XP/Vista/Tablet PC
Contemporary philosophy of science analyzes psychology as a science with special features, because this discipline includes some specific philosophical problems – descriptive and normative, structural and dynamic. Some of these are particularly relevant both theoretically (casual explanation) and practically (the configuration of the psychological subject and its relations with psychiatry). Two central aspects in this book are the role of causality, especially conceived as intervention or manipulation, and the characterization of the psychological subject. This requires a clarification of scientific explanations in terms of causality in psychology, because characterizations of causality are quite different in epistemological and ontological terms. One of the most influential views is James Woodward’s approach to causality as intervention, which entails an analysis of its characteristics, new elements and limits. This means taking into account the structural and dynamic aspects included in causal cognition and psychological explanations. Psychology seen as special science also requires us to consider the scientific status of psychology and the psychological subject, which leads to limits of naturalism in psychology.
