This book is concerned with `the problem of existence in mathematics'. It develops a mathematical system in which there are no existence assertions but only assertions of the constructibility of certain sorts of things. It explores the philosophical implications of such an approach in an examination of the writings of Field, Burgess, Maddy, Kitcher, and others.
Concerned with the problem of existence in mathematics, this volume develops a mathematical system in which there are no existence assertions but only assertions of constructibility. It explores the philosophical implications of such an approach in the writings of Field, Burgess, Maddy and Kitcher.
This book is intended to give a fairly comprehensive account of the theory of constructible sets at an advanced level. The intended reader is a graduate mathe matician with some knowledge of mathematical logic. In particular, we assume familiarity with the notions of formal languages, axiomatic theories in formal languages, logical deductions in such theories, and the interpretation oflanguages in structures. Practically any introductory text on mathematical logic will supply the necessary material. We also assume some familiarity with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory up to the development or ordinal and cardinal numbers. Any number of texts would suffice here, for instance Devlin (1979) or Levy (1979). The book is not intended to provide a complete coverage of the many and diverse applications of the methods of constructibility theory, rather the theory itself. Such applications as are given are there to motivate and to exemplify the theory. The book is divided into two parts. Part A ("Elementary Theory") deals with the classical definition of the La-hierarchy of constructible sets. With some prun ing, this part could be used as the basis of a graduate course on constructibility theory. Part B ("Advanced Theory") deals with the fa-hierarchy and the Jensen "fine-structure theory".
Charles Chihara's new book develops and defends a structural view of the nature of mathematics, and uses it to explain a number of striking features of mathematics that have puzzled philosophers for centuries. The view is used to show that, in order to understand how mathematical systems are applied in science and everyday life, it is not necessary to assume that its theorems either presuppose mathematical objects or are even true. Chihara builds upon his previous work, in which he presented a new system of mathematics, the constructibility theory, which did not make reference to, or presuppose, mathematical objects. Now he develops the project further by analysing mathematical systems currently used by scientists to show how such systems are compatible with this nominalistic outlook. He advances several new ways of undermining the heavily discussed indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects made famous by Willard Quine and Hilary Putnam. And Chihara presents a rationale for the nominalistic outlook that is quite different from those generally put forward, which he maintains have led to serious misunderstandings. A Structural Account of Mathematics will be required reading for anyone working in this field.
Charles Chihara's new book develops and defends a structural view of the nature of mathematics, and uses it to explain a number of striking features of mathematics that have puzzled philosophers for centuries. The view is used to show that, in order to understand how mathematical systems areapplied in science and everyday life, it is not necessary to assume that its theorems either presuppose mathematical objects or are even true.Chihara builds upon his previous work, in which he presented a new system of mathematics, the constructibility theory, which did not make reference to, or presuppose, mathematical objects. Now he develops the project further by analysing mathematical systems currently used by scientists to show howsuch systems are compatible with this nominalistic outlook. He advances several new ways of undermining the heavily discussed indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects made famous by Willard Quine and Hilary Putnam. And Chihara presents a rationale for the nominalisticoutlook that is quite different from those generally put forward, which he maintains have led to serious misunderstandings.A Structural Account of Mathematics will be required reading for anyone working in this field.
This book is an exploration and defense of the coherence of classical theism’s doctrine of divine aseity in the face of the challenge posed by Platonism with respect to abstract objects. A synoptic work in analytic philosophy of religion, the book engages discussions in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaontology. It addresses absolute creationism, non-Platonic realism, fictionalism, neutralism, and alternative logics and semantics, among other topics. The book offers a helpful taxonomy of the wide range of options available to the classical theist for dealing with the challenge of Platonism. It probes in detail the diverse views on the reality of abstract objects and their compatibility with classical theism. It contains a most thorough discussion, rooted in careful exegesis, of the biblical and patristic basis of the doctrine of divine aseity. Finally, it challenges the influential Quinean metaontological theses concerning the way in which we make ontological commitments.