Muth examines the different paths the United States Army and the German Armed Forces traveled to select, educate, and promote their officers in the crucial time before World War II. He demonstrates that the military education system in Germany represented an organized effort where each school provided the stepping stone for the next. But in the US, there existed no communication about teaching contents among the various schools.
In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.
The IX Corps of the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) achieved a complete tactical surprise of the Turkish defenders with its landing on 6 August 1915. Yet, despite a huge superiority in resources and a ten-to-one advantage in men, the IX Corps failed to obtain its planned objectives. This study examines the extent that the outcome of the British failure was influenced by the prevalent British Army command culture. The British Army command culture of 1916 was directly linked to its past as a colonial police force. Although well suited for that role, it was unable to effectively deal with the changes in warfare and the rapidly expanding sizes of armies in 1916. The British command culture of the time consisted a personalized system that exercised a reliance on a system of seniority, a hands-off method of command at the senior and operational levels, and a restrictive method of control at the tactical level.
Few ideas in Chinese discourse are as ubiquitous as ming, variously understood as "command," "allotted lifespan," "fate," or "life." This volume assembles twelve essays by some of the most eminent scholars currently working in Chinese studies to consider ming's broad web of meanings
This book will advance the understanding of leadership beyond the inherited myths and modalities of command and control. Leadership is separated from ideas and institutional seniority and explained as the collaborative power of one with others. Enabling the intelligent co-participation of all people, the constructive effect of this approach to leadership is in the engagement of people. This is significant when task accomplishment depends not on managerial direction, but on the interaction of people with each other, with technical systems, and with complex regulations which are often across jurisdictional boundaries. Examples and case studies are included.
This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training.
Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day. Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force’s internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC’s mission. In order to prepare SAC’s “warriors” to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world’s most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its “culture” until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.
The book tells the story of the theory and history of the mission command approach (decentralized command) and the attempts by different armies to adopt and reform according to this approach.
"Though the priorities of senior military leaders inevitably change over time, the pressing need for American Service personnel to accommodate the human dimension for success in their ongoing military operations has not diminished. That capability now may be even more important than ever. Almost inevitably, the requirement will reach a critical stage in some future crisis. This book compiles the insights and findings of some of the most determined and resourceful scientists, scholars, and practitioners engaged in the military's culture programs to inculcate the new capabilities in the early twenty-first century. The authors do not gloss over failures and dead ends. Rather, their expectation is that by presenting the bad with the good, they can help future generations engaged in the same task avoid their pitfalls and build on their work. More importantly, the authors hope that their writing might reach those who are still engaged in building cultural capabilities and that they will find encouragement to continue this essential work"--
This is a comparative study of the fighting systems of the British and German armies in The Great War. Taking issue with revisionist historians, Samuels argues that German success in battle can be explained by their superior tactical philosophy. The book provides a fascinating insight into the development of infantry tactics at a seminal point in the history of warfare.
