The dramatic growth of international capital flow has provided unprecedented opportunities and risks in emerging markets. This book is the result of a conference exploring this phenomenon, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The issues explored include direct versus portfolio investment; exchange rates and economic growth; and optimal exchange rate policy for stabilizing inflation in developing countries. It concludes with a panel discussion on central bank coordination in the midst of exchange rate instability.
Free capital movements played an important part in the economic integration and globalisation of the nineteenth century. This work analyses historical experience with capital controls, in Britain and elsewhere, and reviews the theory. It concludes that such controls are damaging and that there is no case for reviving them.
This paper borrows the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions from monetary policy literature to ask whether capital controls respond to macroprudential or mercantilist motivations. I explore this question using a novel, weekly dataset on capital control actions in 21 emerging economies from 2001 to 2015. I introduce a new proxy for mercantilist motivations: the weighted appreciation of an emerging-market currency against its top five trade competitors. This proxy Granger causes future net initiations of non-tariff barriers in most countries. Emerging markets systematically respond to both mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. Policymakers respond to trade competitiveness concerns by using both instruments—inflow tightening and outflow easing. They use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. Policy is acyclical to foreign debt; however, high levels of this debt reduces countercyclicality to mercantilist concerns. Higher exchange rate pass-through to export prices, and having an inflation targeting regime with non-freely floating exchange rates, increase responsiveness to mercantilist concerns.
This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.
After the industrial countries established current account convertibility in the late1950s, they began to phase out their capital controls. Their efforts were slow and tentative at first, but built up considerable momentum by the 1980s as market-oriented economic policies gained popularity. This paper describes how national policymakers’ views of capital controls shifted over time, and how these controls have been closely related to regulation in other policy areas, such as banking and financial markets. As developing countries seek to liberalize their capital accounts to obtain the benefits of increased integration with the global economy, what lessons can be drawn from industrial countries’ diverse experiences with capital controls, and how can a country’s liberalization measures be sequenced to minimize disturbances to its exchange rate and monetary policies?
This paper examines country experiences with the use and liberalization of capital controls to develop a deeper understanding of the role of capital controls in coping with volatile capital flows, as well as the issues surrounding their liberalization. Detailed analyses of country cases aim to shed light on the motivations to limit capital flows; the role the controls may have played in coping with particular situations, including in financial crises and in limiting short-term inflows; the nature and design of the controls; and their effectivenes and potential costs. The paper also examines the link between prudential policies and capital controls and illstrates the ways in which better prudential practices and accelerated financial reforms could address the risks in cross-border capital transactions.