This is a book about Aristotle's philosophy of language, interpreted in a framework that provides a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and science. The aims of the book are to explicate the description of meaning contained in De Interpretatione and to show the relevance of that theory of meaning to much of the rest of Arisotle's philosophy. In the process Deborah Modrak reveals how that theory of meaning has been much maligned.
This is a book about Aristotle's philosophy of language, interpreted in a framework that provides a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and science. The aims of the book are to explicate the description of meaning contained in De Interpretatione and to show the relevance of that theory of meaning to much of the rest of Arisotle's philosophy. In the process Deborah Modrak reveals how that theory of meaning has been much maligned.
This volume contains a fragment from Aristotle s "Peri Hermeneias" [16a1 17a7], with a translation into English and a commentary. This fragment is crucial to the understanding of Aristotle s thinking about language. It is followed by (translations of) commentaries on Aristotle s text by scholars between 500 and 1750, showing how his text was perceived over time. The commentaries are by Ammonius, Boethius, Abelaerd, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Acquinas, Martinus de Dacia, Johannes a S. Thoma, and James Harris. Each commentary is in turn commented upon by the compiler of this volume.
Christian Pfeiffer explores an important, but neglected topic in Aristotle's theoretical philosophy: the theory of bodies. A body is a three-dimensionally extended and continuous magnitude bounded by surfaces. This notion is distinct from the notion of a perceptible or physical substance. Substances have bodies, that is to say, they are extended, their parts are continuous with each other and they have boundaries, which demarcate them from their surroundings. Pfeiffer argues that body, thus understood, has a pivotal role in Aristotle's natural philosophy. A theory of body is a presupposed in, e.g., Aristotle's account of the infinite, place, or action and passion, because their being bodies explains why things have a location or how they can act upon each other. The notion of body can be ranked among the central concepts for natural science which are discussed in Physics III-IV. The book is the first comprehensive and rigorous account of the features substances have in virtue of being bodies. It provides an analysis of the concept of three-dimensional magnitude and related notions like boundary, extension, contact, continuity, often comparing it to modern conceptions of it. Both the structural features and the ontological status of body is discussed. This makes it significant for scholars working on contemporary metaphysics and mereology because the concept of a material object is intimately tied to its spatial or topological properties.
This book argues that Aristotle offers us a consistent theory of definition, according to which a particular type of definition – one which states the formal cause of a simple item – is fundamental. It begins by considering definitions as indemonstrable first principles in demonstrations, and inquires how such definitions can have the certainty required by that role. Later chapters look to the Metaphysics to understand how the unity of definitions guarantees their certainty, and to the Topics to discover why definitions must be formulated in terms of the genus and differentia(e) of the object defined. This work contributes to our understanding of the connection between the function of definition in demonstration and its character as a statement of essence.
This work examines Aristotle's discussions of definition in his logical works and the "Metaphysics," and argues for the importance of definitions of simple substances, drawing the connection between definitions as first principles of demonstration and as statements of essence.
Philosophers will be richly rewarded by reading John O’Callaghan’s new book, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn. Based on his broad knowledge of Aristotle and Aquinas, O’Callaghan provides not only an excellent treatment of Aquinas’s epistemology but also a superb demonstration of just how Aquinas might contribute to contemporary debates. Traditionally, the camps of realism and idealism fiercely engaged one another in the field of epistemology. Thomists participated in confronting idealism from their unique realist position. Post-Wittgenstein, the conflict has been dominated by a form of epistemology that grounds all knowledge in linguistic practice. Since Thomists work in a textual and historical mode, their response to the technical approach of the analytic philosophy in which most of the linguistic epistemologists write has been slow in coming. O’Callaghan expertly closes that gap by successfully bringing together these fields.
This volume explores the rich history of philosophy of language in the Western tradition, from Plato and Aristotle to the twentieth century. A team of leading experts focus in particular on key metaphysical debates about linguistic content, including questions of ontological status and metaphysical grounding.
Language is what we all share and is our common concern. What is the nature of language? How is language related to the world? How is communication possible via language? What is the impact of language on our reasoning and thinking? Many people are unaware that misunderstandings and conflicts during communication occur as a result of the way we use language. This book introduces the central issues in the history of philosophical investigations about the concept of language. Topics are structured with reference to the world’s foremost philosophers of language. The book will encourage the reader to explore the depths of the concept of language and will raise an awareness of this distinctive human capacity.
