Russell's first strictly philosophical work, this study remains one of the most important studies of Leibniz every published. It established an approach to studying philosophers of the past that emphasises the philosophical rather than the historical.
The writings of German mathematician and philosopher GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ (1646-1716) have had an incalculable impact on modern science and technology, from physics and computers to law and psychology. But not everyone is a fervent fan. At the turn of the 20th century, the great British thinker Bertrand Russell uncovered what he believed was the hypocritical secret to Leibniz's philosophy: a hidden devotion to a logic he did not reveal in his writings. Here, Russell explores Leibniz's work from this perspective, examining the premises of Leibniz's work, the questions raised by his arguments, the validity of Leibniz's proofs, problems with his "philosophy of matter," and much more. First published in 1900, this is a replica of the 1937 second edition, and is complete with the original, extensive appendix of relevant extracts from Leibniz's work, essential for understanding Russell's critique. British philosopher and mathematician BERTRAND ARTHUR WILLIAM RUSSELL (1872-1970) won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Among his many works are Why I Am Not a Christian (1927), Power: A New Social Analysis (1938), and My Philosophical Development (1959).
New Essays on Human Understanding is a chapter-by-chapter rebuttal by Gottfried Leibniz of John Locke's major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It was finished in 1704 but Locke's death was the cause alleged by Leibniz to withhold its publication. The book appeared some sixty years later. Like many philosophical works of the time, it is written in dialogue form. The two speakers in the book are Theophilus, who represents the views of Leibniz, and Philalethes, who represents those of Locke. The famous rebuttal to the empiricist thesis about the provenance of ideas appears at the beginning of Book II: "Nothing is in the mind without being first in the senses, except for the mind itself". All of Locke's major arguments against innate ideas are criticized at length by Leibniz, who defends an extreme view of innate cognition, according to which all thoughts and actions of the soul are innate. In addition to his discussion of innate ideas, Leibniz offers penetrating critiques of Locke's views on personal identity, free will, mind-body dualism, language, necessary truth, and Locke's attempted proof of the existence of God.
The selections contained in these volumes from the papers and letters of Leibniz are intended to serve the student in two ways: first, by providing a more adequate and balanced conception of the full range and penetration of Leibniz's creative intellectual powers; second, by inviting a fresher approach to his intellectual growth and a clearer perception of the internal strains in his thinking, through a chronological arrangement. Much confusion has arisen in the past through a neglect of the develop ment of Leibniz's ideas, and Couturat's impressive plea, in his edition of the Opuscu/es et fragments (p. xii), for such an arrangement is valid even for incomplete editions. The beginning student will do well, however, to read the maturer writings of Parts II, III, and IV first, leaving Part I, from a period too largely neglected by Leibniz criticism, for a later study of the still obscure sources and motives of his thought. The Introduction aims primarily to provide cultural orientation and an exposition of the structure and the underlying assumptions of the philosophical system rather than a critical evaluation. I hope that together with the notes and the Index, it will provide those aids to the understanding which the originality of Leibniz's scientific, ethical, and metaphysical efforts deserve.