Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion expounds and analyses the argument of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough . It details the reasons for Wittgenstein's rejection of the intellectualist theory of religion, and suggests a new interpretation of his rival view of ritual. Denying that Wittgenstein's account is straightforwardly expressivist, the author builds his own interpretation on Wittgenstein's claim that magic is akin to metaphysics. In the course of the book, the author considers such matters as expressivism, 'perspicuous representation', the nature of human sacrifice, and Wittgenstein's cultural pessimism.
Once upon a time, anthropology had something to offer philosophy. It was a time when Continential thinkers drew on anthropology's theoretical terms—mana, taboo, potlatch—in order to reflect on the limits of human belief and imagination. Among these philosophic dialogues with anthropology, we find Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on Sir James Frazer's magnum opus, The Golden Bough. Now, Hau Books brings you the first translation by an anthropology—Stephan Palmié—of this masterpiece. Wittgenstein's remarks on ritual, magic, religion, belief, ceremony, and Frazer's own logical presuppositions are as lucid and thought-provoking now as they were over half-a-century ago. Anthropologists find themselves repeating many of Wittgenstein's same questions and confronting similar doubts today: Is metaphysics a kind of magic? What do we call “ritual”? Are humans simply “ceremonial animals”? This book is not only a fresh translation, but a fresh set of engagements with Wittgenstein's ideas from some of the world's most brilliant anthropologists. Contributors include: David Graeber, Veena Das, Michael Lambek, Heonik Kwon, Carlo Severi, Michael Taussig, Wendy James, Giovanni da Col, and Michael Puett. Here is a unique and well-overdue discussion of the mythologies in our language. Taking interdisciplinarity seriously, this volume returns to the ethnographic imagination that made great thinkers like Sigmund Freud, Jean-Paul Sartre, and indeed Ludwig Wittgenstein take heed—and returns the favor to the philosophical tradition that found wonder and pause for thought in the anthropological canon.
Provides a new understanding of Wittgenstein's discourse as an edifyng philosophy of culture, pursued through self-reflection. Investigates the conceptual underpinnings of culture, revealing them as shared expressive spiritual forms of life.
This book explores Wittgenstein's conception of ethics, religion and philosophy. It aims at providing us with the tools necessary for assessing to what extent the Austrian philosopher can be considered an anti-Enlightenment thinker. The articles collected in this volume explore the relationship between Wittgenstein's thought and that of several authors who were, in various ways, key to the counter-enlightenement, authors such as Hume, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, James and Pierce. One of the central issues examined here is Wittgenstein's opposition to the Cartesian method of doubt – a cornerstone of the enlightened movement against prejudice and superstition.
This volume is dedicated to Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough and represents a collaboration of scholars within philosophy and the study of religion. For the first time, specialized investigations of the philological and philosophical aspects Wittgenstein's manuscripts are combined with the outlook of philosophical anthropology and ritual studies. In the first section of the book Wittgenstein's remarks are presented and discussed in light of his Nachlass and relevant lecture-notes by G.E. Moore, reproduced in this book as facsimiles. The second section deals with the cultural and philosophical background of the early remarks, while the third section focuses specifically on the general problem of understanding as being a main issue of these remarks. The fourth section concentrates on the philosophical development characteristic of the later remarks. Finally, the fifth section reviews Wittgenstein's opposition to Frazer, and the ramifications of his remarks, in light of ritual studies. The book is intended for scholars in philosophy and religious studies, as well as for the general reader with an academic interest in philosophy and the philosophy of religion.
Wittgenstein was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. In this collection, distinguished Wittgenstein scholars examine his legacy for the philosophy of religion by examining key areas of his work: Wittgenstein's Tractatus; Frazer's 'Golden Bough'; and the implications of his later philosophy for the understanding of religion. Assessments are also provided of the philosophical and theological reception of his work. The collection provides an invaluable resource for graduate and undergraduate teaching of Wittgenstein in relation to religion.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was by any reckoning one of the major modern philosophers. Raised as a Catholic in late-19th century Vienna, he later gave up practicing his religion; yet, as journal notes and many anecdotes attest, he remained deeply if ambivalently interested in religion throughout his life. Students of the philosophy of religion are familiar with his lectures on religious belief. For the rest, however, in the vast collection of commentary and criticism that has accumulated over the years, little attention has been paid to his religious interests. In consideration of how far Wittgenstein's Catholic background may have influenced his philosophical reflections on the soul, preeminent author Fergus Kerr explores aspects of Wittgenstein's personal and professional life. Kerr examines many of Wittgenstein's writings and lectures, including his last set of lectures in the mid-1940s at the University of Cambridge on philosophical psychology. Beginning with a largely biographical study of Wittgenstein, Kerr argues that Wittgenstein's philosophy was partly prompted by his strong reaction against what he regarded as an excessively rationalistic type of Catholic apologetics that he was taught in his early school years. His serious interest as a student at Cambridge in experimental psychology and in the works of Freud is documented. In the second half of the book, Kerr expounds Wittgenstein's famous "Private Language Argument"--his mockery of the idea that one could have thoughts that are in principle incommunicable. He then discusses three philosophers, John Wisdom, Stanley Cavell, and Richard Eldrige, who have developed Wittgenstein's ideas on self-understanding in ways that should interest students with a desire to rethink psychology in the context of an integrally humanist anthropology of the human person. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Fergus Kerr, O.P., is an honorary senior lecturer in theology and religious studies at the University of Edinburgh and past head of Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford. He is the editor of New Blackfriars and the renowned author of numerous works, including Theology after Wittgenstein, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, and most recently Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism. PRAISE FOR THE BOOK: " A] fresh and fascinating, impressively lucid study of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and of his attitude to religion." -- Nicholas Lash, Modern Theology
"Intended primarily to introduce Wittgenstein to students of theology, but aimed also at philosophers interested in religion, the book focuses on those of Wittgenstein's writings (primarily in the Philosophical investigations) that relate to theological issues such as the inner life, the immortality of the soul and the relationship of the believer to church and tradtion. By taking up the main points raised by reviewers of the first edition, the author responds in his new material to a wide range of recent literature and other interpretations of Wittengenstein's -- often seemingly ambiguous -- religious positions, and in so doing paints an absorbing picture, for a fresh set of readers, of how theology might look 'after Wittgenstein'."--Last page of cover.
Wittgenstein criticised prevailing attitudes toward the sciences. The target of his criticisms was ‘scientism’: what he described as ‘the overestimation of science’. This collection is the first study of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism - a theme in his work that is clearly central to his thought yet strikingly neglected by the existing literature. The book explores the philosophical basis of Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism; how this anti-scientism helps us understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims; and how this underlies his later conception of philosophy and the kind of philosophy he attacked. An outstanding team of international contributors articulate and critically assess Wittgenstein’s views on scientism and anti-scientism, making Wittgenstein and Scientism essential reading for students and scholars of Wittgenstein’s work, on topics as varied as the philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophical practice, the nature of religious belief, and the place of science in modern culture. Contributors: Jonathan Beale, William Child, Annalisa Coliva, David E. Cooper, Ian James Kidd, James C. Klagge, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Rupert Read, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Severin Schroeder, Benedict Smith, and Chon Tejedor.
