European Economic and Monetary Union does not envisage creating a central fiscal authority. Monetary and exchange rate policies will be centralized, but fiscal policy will remain a national responsibility, in line with the subsidiarity principle. This paper argues that monetary union will generate pressures for closer economic integration than currently envisaged. Although not a necessity, a more active central role could then be justified on the grounds of allocative efficiency, redistribution, and stabilization. While in the short term enhanced policy coordination may address those pressures satisfactorily, as economic integration proceeds, the case for a central fiscal authority may become stronger.
European Economic and Monetary Union does not envisage creating a central fiscal authority. Monetary and exchange rate policies will be centralized, but fiscal policy will remain a national responsibility, in line with the subsidiarity principle. This paper argues that monetary union will generate pressures for closer economic integration than currently envisaged. Although not a necessity, a more active central role could then be justified on the grounds of allocative efficiency, redistribution, and stabilization. While in the short term enhanced policy coordination may address those pressures satisfactorily, as economic integration proceeds, the case for a central fiscal authority may become stronger.
This paper examines the interest spending and taxation channels through which EMU could affect the public finances. It provides a framework for examining different views on a further narrowing of interest rate differentials. A model of Blanchard and Fischer is amended to analyze the two channels, and empirical evidence on the tax harmonization process is presented. The paper argues that “high-debt” and “high-tax” countries pursuing prudent fiscal policies could benefit the most from EMU: if monetary and widespread fiscal discipline are jointly established, interest rates could decline rapidly, while tax harmonization is likely to be gradual.
Purpose - The aim of the paper is to evaluate fiscal adjustments that have occurred in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries in the last 35 years, and their consequences on the economic growth process by using the mean group (MG) estimators.Design/methodology/approach - Our emphasis is on the effects of different composition of fiscal stimuli and consolidations. We compare the effects on the economic growth rate of different compositions of major fiscal changes. We use a cyclically adjusted value of the fiscal variables to leave aside variations of the fiscal variables induced by business cycle fluctuations.Findings - Our empirical research of the effects of large changes in fiscal policy, both in case of a fiscal consolidation and of fiscal stimulus in the 18EMUcountries from 1980 to 2015, shows that adjustments by cutting current expenditures, rather than by tax increases are more likely to boost economic growth. It also shows that cuts of investment expenditures may reduce GDP growth. During fiscal stimulus episodes, tax cuts and public investments are more likely to increase growth than current public expenditure.Originality/value - This is the first study devoted to the EMU countries. It should be underlined that the results obtained as for EMU countries are not necessarily applicable to other countries, as the different government size as well as different market institutions may influence the results.
EMU started with eleven member countries as scheduled on January 1, 1999. The paper shows that the primacy of politics over economics in this decision could have serious consequences concerning the stability of EMU in the transition phase. Speculative attacks against currencies which are in economic distress due to asymmetric shocks can still happen. A speculative attack as such cannot force a country out of EMU. However, the country concerned might voluntarily decide to leave the system as the costs of staying inside EMU, e.g., due to further rising unemployment, become too large to bear.
The book has many merits, and represents an important contribution to the controversial topic of European fiscal policy. I appreciated in particular the high quality and rigor of the analysis and the fact that the pros and cons of the contending opinions are presented in a fair way. It is a rewarding reading. EAEPE Newsletter Buti and Franco present a series of interesting analytical information which should be read by as broad an audience as possible. . . the book is a good buy. László Csaba, Acta Oeconomica This book explores the origins, rationale, problems and prospects of the European fiscal policy framework. It provides the reader with a roadmap to EMU s budgetary framework by exploring its theoretical and empirical foundations, uncovering its historical roots and emphasising its supranational nature. The authors, who have been at the forefront of the academic and policy debate on economic policy in Europe, argue that fiscal policy has always been at the core of the EMU debate. The Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact are the most contentious building blocks of EMU s institutional architecture: they have aroused heated controversies between academics and policymakers ever since their adoption. As EMU s budgetary rules undergo their first severe shock, Europe is still searching for its fiscal soul. The book s basic premise is that one cannot fully understand EMU s fiscal framework and the recent debate on its reform without placing them in a historical and institutional perspective and abstracting from the uniqueness of EMU, where sovereign countries retain a large degree of fiscal independence, and monetary policy is entrusted to an independent central bank with the overriding mission of maintaining price stability. Analysing all aspects of EMU s fiscal rules and institutions, this book will strongly appeal to students, academics and researchers of macroeconomic policy and European integration. Policymakers and fiscal policy experts at both national and international levels will also find the book to be of great interest.
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The focus is on the size of fiscal multipliers, and on the possibility that multipliers can turn negative (i.e., that fiscal contractions can be expansionary). The paper concludes that fiscal multipliers are overwhelmingly positive but small. However, there is some evidence of negative fiscal multipliers.
With the advent of the third and final phase of European and Monetary Union (EMU), the debate over European monetary unification is at the top of the political and economic agenda. Much has been written over the past five years about whether EMU is justified given the various expected benefitsand prospective costs, but there has been little detailed material on how EMU will work and what the practical implications of it will be for Europe as a whole. Economic Policy in EMU is a comprehensive look at the mechanisms involved, likely effects on monetary and budgetary policy, and the ways in which monetary union will deal with and affect business cycles and regional differences. It combines rigorous analysis of how the European economy works withan insider view of how this will change after 1999: as such, it is vital reading for all involved in the most important topic facing Europe today.
Europe is on the road to monetary union (EMU) even if there may be delays and diversions on the way. The focal point of EMU will be its single currency, valid throughout all participating countries, and replacing the national currencies. There will be considerable transitional pain and stress, most of all for member states with very high public debts. For the rest, the road ahead will not be smooth, but should be assisted by easier monetary policy in Germany since 1993. For some countries at least, the pain will be aggravated unnecessarily by design defects in the transitional rules for entry - which there is still time to remedy. The author - no admirer of a federal Europe - describes how EMU could actually work better in a confederal Europe with no federal chief executive and with a relatively weak Parliament. The independent Eurofed would be responsible for managing economic policy on an EC-wide basis, while national governments could use fiscal policies to mitigate local deviations. Weak regions and poor peripheral countries would require more flexible assistance from EC resources, however.
