Archibald Wavells life and career makes a marvelous subject. Not only did he reach the highest rank (Field Marshal) and become an Earl and Viceroy of India but his character was complex. He joined the Black Watch in 1901. He stood out during the Great War, quickly earning the Military Cross but losing an eye. He was at Versailles in 1918 but between the Wars his career advanced with Brigade and General commands notably in Palestine where he spotted Orde Wingate. By the outbreak of war he was GOC-in-C Middle East. Early successes against the Italians turned into costly failures in Greece and Crete and Wavell lost the confidence of Churchill; their temperaments differed completely. Wavell was sent to India as C-in-C. After Pearl Harbor Wavell was made Supreme Allied Commander for the SW Pacific and bore responsibility for the humiliating loss of Singapore (he quickly recognized that it could not be held). Problems in Burma tested Churchills patience and he was removed from command to be Viceroy and Governor General of India. As civil unrest and demands for independence grew, in 1947 Prime Minister Attlee replaced Wavell with Mountbatten who oversaw Partition. Wavell died in 1950, after a life of huge achievement tempered with many reverses, most of which were not of his making.
An analysis of organization and logistics as well as strategy and command, covering the coming of the war, Japanese policy and American strategy before Pearl Harbor, Japanese victories in the first six months of the war, first efforts in New Guinea and the Solomons to stem the Japanese tide, and the limited offensive in the summer of 1943.
CMH Pub. 5-1.United States Army in World War 2. Analyzes organization and logistics as well as strategy and command, covering the coming of World War 2, Japanese policy and American strategy before Pearl Harbor, Japanese victories in the first six months of the war, first efforts in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to stem the Japanese tide, and the limited offensive in the summer of 1943.
On 21 June 1941 Churchill relieved General Archibald Wavell from command in the Middle East. This action followed a series of set-backs in the theatre during which Churchill had direct dealings with Wavell. Given the significant internal conflict within the British High Command during World War I, this action by Churchill was seen as symptomatic of yet another poor political/military relationship. A close examination of the British national command structure shows that while there was certainly inter-personal conflict between Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, they still maintained an effective relationship. Churchill's strong personality, and penchant for becoming involved in military matters, may have reduced the potential effectiveness of this relationship but it still remained effective none-the-less. The relationship between Wavell and the British High Command was similarly effective, despite personal conflict between him and Churchill. The High Command provided Wavell with broad strategic guidance, the resources to implement it, and allowed him a relatively free hand to do so. It was only when he strayed from strategic guidance that he came into conflict with the High Command. Following a brilliant opening series of campaigns in North and East Africa, Wavell lost his broad strategic vision. He allowed part of his limited forces to be dissipated to Greece at a critical time, while under-estimating the implications of German intervention in North Africa. He then failed to appreciate the strategic implications of Axis threats to both Iraq and to Syria, and finally he allowed himself to be pressured into a premature counter offensive in the Western Desert. It is argued that it was these errors which caused Wavell's dismissal, and not a failing in the political/military interface.
'The definitive work on the Desert War.' Manchester Evening News Wavell's Command is the first of the three volumes of The Crucible of War. Volume 1 of The Crucible of War trilogy covers General Wavell's command, a period that began triumphantly with the rout of the Italian Army and ended in catastrophe with the devastating entry of Rommel into the conflict. On 11th June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. From their colony in Libya, the Italians began invading Egypt in an attempt to expand their African Empire. Thus began the Desert War - a battle to secure critical Middle East oil supplies which would last for three years. Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East was General Sir Archibald Wavell. By 1940, and with limited resources, he was responsible for all British land forces in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, as well as the Army formations in British Somaliland, Aden, Iraq and along the shores of the Persian Gulf. The area for which he had accepted military command thus included nine different countries in two continents. In December 1940 in Libya, Wavell's Western Desert Force of 36,000 men attacked the Italians across desolate and inhospitable terrain in order to keep Egypt from falling to the Axis and shield access to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and possibly even India from Hitler. Attack was the only form of defense and under field commander General Richard O'Connor, an immensely successful and exhilarating campaign was carried out against Marshal Graziani's forces. The Italians were pushed back hundreds of miles and 130,000 prisoners were taken. By February 1941 nearly all Axis forces had been expelled from North Africa. It was a remarkable triumph in one of the most dramatic theatres of the Second World War which paved the way for later victories, but not immediately - as Rommel's Afrika Korps meant Wavell, with a now weakened Western Desert Force, was ordered to send men to Greece, despite his conviction that victory was close. The tide of war was about to turn once more. PRAISE FOR THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR TRILOGY: 'A magnificent book, Barrie Pitt has almost a novelist's skill and perception of character.' Daily Telegraph 'Totally readable, Mr Pitt's study depicts equally well the broad outlines of strategy, the confusions and hazards of the battlefield and the personalities of the generals or private soldiers fighting there.' Oxford Times Barrie Pitt (1918-2006) was well known as a military historian and editor of Purnell's History of the Second World War and History of the First World War. His publications include Coronel and Falkland, Churchill and the Generals and The Crucible of War, a trilogy covering the North African campaign of the Second World War. He was born in Galway and later lived near Ilminster in Somerset.
This masterly study of generalship covers two years of intense operational activity during which Field Marshal Wavell, as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was at one point conducting no fewer than five campaigns simultaneously. Two of those campaigns will stand in history as truly great victories, and one—the campaign in Greece in 1941—as a source of endless controversy. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., has drawn upon previously unavailable official documents and interviewed or corresponded with a wide range of soldiers who served under Wavell. Raugh shows how Wavell’s early experience as a soldier and budding commander were reflected in his later decision making and shrewd military vision. Although Wavell’s charismatic personality endeared him to all who served under him and earned him the profound respect of his fellows, and even of the enemy, his natural taciturnity brought him into conflict with his political masters. In spite of his enormous military achievements at one of the most critical periods in his country’s history, Wavell has been undeservedly relegated to obscurity—a historical oversight that Raugh corrects with this richly detailed book.
From 1942–1945 the Allies’ war in the Southwest Pacific was effectively a bilateral coalition between the United States and Australia under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. By charting the evolution of the military effectiveness of the US-Australian alliance, MacArthur’s Coalition puts the relationship between the United States and Australia at the center of the war against Japan. Drawing on new primary source material, Peter J. Dean has written the first substantial book-length treatment of the coalition as a combined military force. This expansive and ambitious book provides a fresh perspective on the Pacific War by providing a close-up, in-depth account of operations in the Southwest Pacific from the Kokoda Trail campaign to the reconquest of the Philippines and Borneo. Dean’s work takes the reader deep into the key military headquarters in the Southwest Pacific and reveals the discussions, debates, and arguments between key commanders and staff officers during the course of planning and waging a monumental conflict. Drawing upon archival records across three continents, Dean brings the qualities of these senior officers to life by exploring the critical importance of personalities and leadership in overcoming cultural, doctrinal, and organizational divides in the largely unequal alliance. Set against the practicalities of fighting a fanatical enemy in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the war, his book shows how, despite these divides and MacArthur’s difficult personality, the US-Australian coalition was able to forge a highly effective and ultimately triumphant fighting machine. With its unprecedented view of the joint nature of operations in the Southwest Pacific and its focus on frontline commanders and units in forging a successful fighting force, MacArthur’s Coalition illuminates a critical aspect of the Allied victory in World War II.
In the mountains and jungles of occupied Burma during World War II, British special forces launched a series of secret operations, assisted by parts of the Burmese population. The men of the SOE, trained in sabotage and guerrilla warfare, worked in the jungle, deep behind enemy lines, to frustrate the puppet Burmese government of Ba Maw and continue the fight against Hirohito's Japan in a theatre starved of resources. Here, Richard Duckett uses newly declassified documents from the National Archives to reveal for the first time the extent of British special forces' involvement - from the 1941 operations until beyond Burma's independence from the British Empire in 1948. Duckett argues convincingly that `Operation Character' and `Operation Billet' - large SOE missions launched in support of General Slim's XIV Army offensive to liberate Burma - rank among the most militarily significant of the SOE's secret missions. Featuring a wealth of photographs and accompanying material never before published, including direct testimony recorded by veterans of the campaign and maps from the SOE files, The SOE in Burma tells a compelling story of courage and struggle in during World War II
