The USSR is often regarded as the world's first propaganda state. Particularly under Stalin, politically charged rhetoric and imagery dominated the press, schools, and cultural forums from literature and cinema to the fine arts. Yet party propagandists were repeatedly frustrated in their efforts to promote a coherent sense of "Soviet" identity during the interwar years. This book investigates this failure to mobilize society along communist lines by probing the secrets of the party's ideological establishment and indoctrinational system. An exposé of systemic failure within Stalin's ideological establishment, Propaganda State in Crisis ultimately rewrites the history of Soviet indoctrination and mass mobilization between 1927 and 1941.
Hillel Ticktin has been one of the most controversial figures in Soviet studies for 25 years. His assertions that the Soviet economy was hopelessly inefficient, that the ruble was a sham, and that the elite was desperate once sounded outrageous. Ticktin consistently argued that perestroika would fail. In his view the USSR was and remained inherently Stalinist. It might lurch back and forth between reformist and reactionary leadership factions but, the system could not evolve, nor could it be restructured. Ultimately, it could only disintegrate, and when it did, the workers would hold the balance. This collection of essays offers a thorough sample of his views.
In the 30 years since the emergence of the post-Soviet conflicts things have both changed and remained the same – continuities and changes in post-Soviet conflicts are the primary themes of this volume – it addresses all major wars, civil wars, and rebellions in the former Soviet Union. The volume focuses on factors that have contributed or may contribute to the resolution of the post-Soviet conflicts, most of which have represented rather long and damaging crises. In all conflict cases Moscow has been guided by Russian state interests – some have been instigated or fueled, others driven to a frozen state, and still a couple of others have been constructively resolved due to Moscow’s intervention. Russia has used a long-term strategy for the resolution of those conflicts that have taken place on its soil, but in regards to the conflicts in other post-Soviet states, there is no long-term solution in sight. As such, the conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Nagorniy Karabakh, remain unresolved involving not only the named states, but Russia as well. They may represent localized national or regional crisis impacting only the states involved, but for the Russian Federation they epitomize one huge post-Soviet crisis with no obvious end.
While the capitalist world was experiencing The Crash and the beginnings of the Depression, a massive investment program initiated the Soviet Union's transformation from a peasant country to an industrial power. Here is a nearly day-by-day account of the establishment of political institutions only now being challenged by Gorbachev's reforms. Complements the two previous volumes, but is designed to stand on its own. Well-printed (in China) on acidic paper. Annotation(c) 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
The profound economic crisis of 1931-33 undermined the process of industrialisation and the stability of the regime. In spite of feverish efforts to achieve the over ambitious first five-year plan, the great industrial projects lagged far behind schedule. These were years of inflation, economic disorder and of terrible famine in 1933. In response to the crisis, policies and systems changed significantly. Greater realism prevailed: more moderate plans, reduced investment, strict monetary controls, and more emphasis on economic incentives and the role of the market. The reforms failed to prevent the terrible famine of 1933, in which millions of peasants died. But the last months of 1933 saw the first signs of an industrial boom, the outcome of the huge investments of previous years. Using the previously secret archives of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, the author shows how during these formative years the economic system acquired the shape which it retained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
For half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union were in conflict. But how and where did the Cold War begin? Jamil Hasanli answers these intriguing questions in At the Dawn of the Cold War. He argues that the intergenerational crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan (1945–1946) was the first event that brought the Soviet Union to a confrontation with the United States and Britain after the period of cooperation between them during World War II. Based on top-secret archive materials from Soviet and Azerbaijani archives as well as documents from American, British, and Iranian sources, the book details Iranian Azerbaijan's independence movement, which was backed by the USSR, the Soviet struggle for oil in Iran, and the American and British reactions to these events. These events were the starting point of the longer historical period of unarmed conflict between the Soviets and the West that is now known as the Cold War. This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the Cold War and international politics following WWII.
After the Cold War, its history must be reassessed as the opening of Soviet archives allows a much fuller understanding of the Russian dimension. These essays on the classic period of the Cold War (1945-53) use Soviet and Western sources to shed new light on Stalin's aims, objectives and actions; on Moscow's relations with both the Soviet Bloc and the West European Communist Parties; and on the diplomatic relations of Britain, France and Italy with the USSR. The contributors are prominent European, Russian and American specialists.
A major study of the collapse of the Soviet Union—showing how Gorbachev’s misguided reforms led to its demise “A deeply informed account of how the Soviet Union fell apart.”—Rodric Braithwaite, Financial Times “[A] masterly analysis.”—Joshua Rubenstein, Wall Street Journal In 1945 the Soviet Union controlled half of Europe and was a founding member of the United Nations. By 1991, it had an army four million strong with five thousand nuclear-tipped missiles and was the second biggest producer of oil in the world. But soon afterward the union sank into an economic crisis and was torn apart by nationalist separatism. Its collapse was one of the seismic shifts of the twentieth century. Thirty years on, Vladislav Zubok offers a major reinterpretation of the final years of the USSR, refuting the notion that the breakup of the Soviet order was inevitable. Instead, Zubok reveals how Gorbachev’s misguided reforms, intended to modernize and democratize the Soviet Union, deprived the government of resources and empowered separatism. Collapse sheds new light on Russian democratic populism, the Baltic struggle for independence, the crisis of Soviet finances—and the fragility of authoritarian state power.