Brings together 12 scholars of US foreign relations. Each contributor provides a concise summary of an important theme in US affairs since the Spanish-American War. US policy process, economic interests, relations with the Third World, and the nuclear arms race have been highlighted.
This 1989 book is the sequel to Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (1986), in which the same editorial team continues the historical exploration of a vital but often misconstrued commercial phenomenon. The contributory essays, each written by an authority in the field, raise further questions on the idea of the firm, on periodisation and on research and development, and examine the international financial operations of worldwide corporate business. With the aid of trans-industrial and transnational comparisons, the range of policies pursued by business and government is fully discussed. Above all, this discussion is extended to include the production of mass-consumer goods and the areas of China, Japan and Latin America. All the contributions are based on original historical research undertaken in national and private bank and business archives in Europe, the USA and Japan. In their critical assessments and interpretations the authors are also able to combine economic theory with history.
In 1973, the United States and other western countries were shocked by the Arab oil embargo. Lines formed at gasoline pumps; fuel stations ran out of supply; prices skyrocketed; and the nation realized its vulnerability to decisions made by leaders of countries half a world away. In response, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which was signed into law by President Gerald Ford in 1975, has become the nation?s primary tool of energy policy. Following its first major use during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, officials and policy makers at the highest levels increasingly turned to the SPR to stave off shortages and mitigate rising energy prices. Author and historian Bruce A. Beaubouef examines, for the first time, the interactions that have shaped the development of the SPR. He argues that the SPR has survived because it is a passive regulatory tool that serves to protect energy consumers and petroleum consumption and does not compete with the American oil industry. Indeed, by the late twentieth century, as American import dependency reached new heights, refiners and transporters increasingly relied upon the SPR as a ready resource to help maintain feedstock when supplies were tight or disrupted. In a time of continued vulnerability, this definitive work will be of interest to those concerned with the history, economy, and politics of the oil and gas industry, as well as to historians and practitioners of oil and energy policy.
In 1951 prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh seized British oil holdings in Iran. The move set in motion four years of bitter political and strategic battles between a United Kingdom desperate for an economic rebound and an increasingly anti-Western regime in Teheran. The Eisenhower administration tried to broker a settlement, but Mossadegh was overthrown by an Anglo-American operation and replaced by the Shah. In this book, Mary Ann Heiss provides a detailed account of this turning point in cold war history. Drawing on a range of British and American documents, she provides an incisive political, economic, and cultural analysis of the first British and American effort to contain communism and radical Third World nationalism; the first American effort to bolster a crumbling British Empire; and the first effort by the CIA to overthrow a popular nationalist regime. This book is the full story not only of the shift from British to American dominance in the oil economies of the Middle East but also of the rise of nationalism in the context of the cold war.
First Published in 1990. Viewed from the perspective of Whitehall, Persia was a crossroads where Britain’s European and Indian interests met. Control of Persia by any European power was bound to jeopardize the security of British India. At first London and India hesitantly experimented with the policy of bringing Persia into the British sphere of influence either by contracting an alliance with her or by turning her into a protectorate. Persia’s crushing defeat in the war with Russia put an end to these experiments. The Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828 firmly established Russian influence at Tehran. For the rest of the nineteenth century, the basic thrust of British policy was to prevent Russia from taking control of Persia and, at the same time, to avoid a serious dispute with her over Persia. So Persia had to be preserved as a buffer state. This volume charts the history of Persian Polices from 1918 to 1925.
In this lucid and theoretically sophisticated book, G. John Ikenberry focuses on the oil price shocks of 1973–74 and 1979, which placed extraordinary new burdens on governments worldwide and particularly on that of the United States. Reasons of State examines the response of the United States to these and other challenges and identifies both the capacities of the American state to deal with rapid international political and economic change and the limitations that constrain national policy.