The concept of 'human dignity' has become central to politics, law and theology but is little understood. This book presents a wide-ranging collection of edited essays from specialists in law, theology, politics and history and defines the main areas of current debates about the concept in these disciplines.
Human dignity: social movements invoke it, several national constitutions enshrine it, and it features prominently in international human rights documents. But what is human dignity, why is it important, and what is its relationship to human rights? This book offers a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of human rights. First, it clarifies the network of concepts associated with dignity. Paramount within this network is a core notion of human dignity as an inherent, non-instrumental, egalitarian, and high-priority normative status of human persons. People have this status in virtue of their valuable human capacities rather than as a result of their national origin and other conventional features. Second, it shows how human dignity gives rise to an inspiring ideal of solidaristic empowerment, which calls us to support people's pursuit of a flourishing life by affirming both negative duties not to block or destroy, and positive duties to protect and facilitate, the development and exercise of the valuable capacities at the basis of their dignity. The most urgent of these duties are correlative to human rights. Third, this book illustrates how the proposed dignitarian approach allows us to articulate the content, justification, and feasible implementation of specific human rights, including contested ones, such as the rights to democratic political participation and to decent labour conditions. Finally, this book's dignitarian approach helps illuminate the arc of humanist justice, identifying both the difference and the continuity between the basic requirements of human rights and more expansive requirements of social justice such as those defended by liberal egalitarians and democratic socialists. Human dignity is indeed the moral heart of human rights. Understanding it enables us to defend human rights as the urgent ethical and political project that puts humanity first.
Although deeply contested in many ways, the concept of human dignity has emerged as a key idea in fields such as bioethics and human rights. It has been largely absent, however, from literature on development studies. The essays contained in The Practice of Human Development and Dignity fill this gap by showing the implications of human dignity for international development theory, policy, and practice. Pushing against ideas of development that privilege the efficiency of systems that accelerate economic growth at the expense of human persons and their agency, the essays in this volume show how development work that lacks sensitivity to human dignity is blind. Instead, genuine development must advance human flourishing and not merely promote economic betterment. At the same time, the essays in this book also demonstrate that human dignity must be assessed in the context of real human experiences and practices. This volume therefore considers the meaning of human dignity inductively in light of development practice, rather than simply providing a theory or philosophy of human dignity in the abstract. It asks not only “what is dignity” but also “how can dignity be done?” Through a unique multidisciplinary dialogue, The Practice of Human Development and Dignity offers a dialectical and systematic examination of human dignity that moves beyond the current impasse in thinking about the theory and practice of human dignity. It will appeal to scholars in the social sciences, philosophy, and legal and development theory, and also to those who work in development around the globe. Contributors: Paolo G. Carozza, Clemens Sedmak, Séverine Deneulin, Simona Beretta, Dominic Burbidge, Matt Bloom, Deirdre Guthrie, Robert A. Dowd, Bruce Wydick, Travis J. Lybbert, Paul Perrin, Martin Schlag, Luigino Bruni, Lorenza Violini, Giada Ragone, Steve Reifenberg, Elizabeth Hlabse, Catherine E. Bolten, Ilaria Schnyder von Wartensee, Tania Groppi, Maria Sophia Aguirre, and Martha Cruz-Zuniga
In recent years, there has been an explosion of writing on the topic of human dignity across a plethora of different academic disciplines. Despite this explosion of interest, there is one group – critical legal scholars – that has devoted little if any attention to human dignity. This book argues that these scholars should attend to human dignity, a concept rich enough to support a whole range of progressive ambitions, particularly in the field of international law. It synthesizes certain liberal arguments about the good of self-authorship with the critical legal philosophy of Roberto Unger and the capabilities approach to agency of Amartya Sen, to formulate a unique conception of human dignity. The author argues how human dignity flows from an individual’s capacity for self-authorship as defined by the set of expressive capabilities s/he possesses, and the book demonstrates how this conception can enrich our understanding of international human rights law by making the amplification of human dignity its fundamental orientation.
Focused at the theoretical level, this volume seeks to clarify our understanding of various historical and contemporary concepts of human dignity. It examines the various meanings of the term ‘dignity’ before looking at the philosophical sources of dignity and both religious and secular attempts to provide a grounding for the notion. It also compares the merits and defects of older and newer concepts of dignity, including extensions of dignity to groups, animals, and machines.
In everything from philosophical ethics to legal argument to public activism, it has become commonplace to appeal to the idea of human dignity. In such contexts, the concept of dignity typically signifies something like the fundamental moral status belonging to all humans. Remarkably, however, it is only in the last century that this meaning of the term has become standardized. Before this, dignity was instead a concept associated with social status. Unfortunately, this transformation remains something of a mystery in existing scholarship. Exactly when and why did "dignity" change its meaning? And before this change, was it truly the case that we lacked a conception of human worth akin to the one that "dignity" now represents? In this volume, leading scholars across a range of disciplines attempt to answer such questions by clarifying the presently murky history of "dignity," from classical Greek thought through the Middle Ages and Enlightenment to the present day.
We often speak of the dignity owed to a person. And dignity is a word that regularly appears in political speeches. Charters are promulgated in its name, and appeals to it are made when people all over the world struggle to achieve their rights. But what exactly is dignity? When one person physically assaults another, we feel the wrong demands immediate condemnation and legal sanction. Whereas when one person humiliates or thoughtlessly makes use of another, we recognize the wrong and hope for a remedy, but the social response is less clear. The injury itself may be hard to quantify. Given our concern with human dignity, it is odd that it has received comparatively little scrutiny. Here, George Kateb asks what human dignity is and why it matters for the claim to rights. He proposes that dignity is an “existential” value that pertains to the identity of a person as a human being. To injure or even to try to efface someone’s dignity is to treat that person as not human or less than human—as a thing or instrument or subhuman creature. Kateb does not limit the notion of dignity to individuals but extends it to the human species. The dignity of the human species rests on our uniqueness among all other species. In the book’s concluding section, he argues that despite the ravages we have inflicted on it, nature would be worse off without humanity. The supremely fitting task of humanity can be seen as a “stewardship” of nature. This secular defense of human dignity—the first book-length attempt of its kind—crowns the career of a distinguished political thinker.
(Book 1 in the Determination Trilogy) He wants it back… My name is Kevin Markos, former anchor for Full News Broadcasting. I say former, because an exhaustion- and frustration-fueled emotional on-air meltdown of apocalyptic proportions means my previously dignified reputation and successful career as a highly respected conservative TV news host and commentator lay in smoking, irreparable ruins. Only one person will hire me now, and it's the last person I want to work for—Democratic Senator ShaeLynn Samuels, who's determined to be the next president of the United States. My reluctance isn't because of her, but because of who's working for her: Christopher Bruunt, the head of her Secret Service detail. A college spring break trip I thought was safely hidden forever in my past, even if it never strayed far from my thoughts, now comes back to haunt me. But if I take this job and succeed, it could resurrect my career and put me at the right hand of the most powerful person in the United States. But how much am I personally willing to sacrifice to claw my way back to the top? Because Christopher never forgot that spring break, either. And he has a few agendas of his own. This MMF contemporary political romance features older main characters, second-chance love, an Alpha Secret Service agent, power exchange, pining, frenemies to lovers, a secret workplace romance at the highest levels of our nation's government, political intrigue, and a satisfying HEA. Book 1 of the Determination Trilogy, a standalone spin-off trilogy set in the world of the Governor Trilogy, the Devastation Trilogy, and others.
Dignity is humanitys most prized possession. We experience the loss of dignity as a terrible humiliation: when we lose our dignity we feel deprived of something without which life no longer seems worth living. But what exactly is this trait that we value so highly? In this important new book, distinguished philosopher Peter Bieri looks afresh at the notion of human dignity. In contrast to most traditional views, he argues that dignity is not an innate quality of human beings or a right that we possess by virtue of being human. Rather, dignity is a certain way to lead ones life. It is a pattern of thought, experience and action in other words, a way of living. In Bieris account, there are three key dimensions to dignity as a way of living. The first is the way I am treated by others: they can treat me in a way that leaves my dignity intact or they can destroy my dignity. The second dimension concerns the way that I treat other people: do I treat them in a way that allows me to live a dignified life? The third dimension concerns the view that I have of myself: which ways of seeing and treating myself allow me to maintain a sense of dignity? In the actual flow of day-to-day life these three dimensions of dignity are often interwoven, and this accounts in part for the complexity of the situations and experiences in which our dignity is at stake. So, why did we invent dignity and what role does it play in our lives? As thinking and acting beings, our lives are fragile and constantly under threat. A dignified way of living, argues Bieri, is humanitys way of coping with this threat. In our constantly endangered lives, it is important to stand our ground with confidence. Thus a dignified way of living is not any way of living: it is a particular way of responding to the existential experience of being under threat. It is also a particular way of answering the question: What kind of life do we wish to live? This beautifully written reflection on our most cherished human value will be of interest to a wide readership.