The IMF's development of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies and the introduction of safeguards assessments have increased emphasis on transparency of the disclosures made in central bank financial statements. This paper, which updates WP/00/186, looks at the disclosure requirements for central banks under International Financial Reporting Standards and provides practical guidance for those responsible for preparing central bank financial statements.
The IMF's development of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies and the introduction of safeguards assessments have increased emphasis on transparency of the disclosures made in central bank financial statements. This paper, which updates WP/00/186, looks at the disclosure requirements for central banks under International Financial Reporting Standards and provides practical guidance for those responsible for preparing central bank financial statements.
About one-quarter of the world’s central banks apply IFRS with approximately a quarter more looking to IFRS for further guidance where their local standards do not provide enough guidance. Given the varied mandates and types of policy operations undertaken by central banks, there also exists significant variation in practice, style, and the extent of the financial disclosures in both the primary statements and in the note disclosures. By their nature, central banks are unique in their jurisdiction and so do not always have local practices and examples they can follow. Although the major accounting firms have created model disclosures intended for commercial banks, these are often not totally appropriate for a central bank. The application of IFRS across central banks differs based on the mandate of the central bank and the capacity of the accounting profession in the specific jurisdiction. An analysis of international practices, such as those undertaken in preparing these model statements, may help address questions about the structure of the statements themselves as well as the organization of the note disclosures. As a consequence, each central bank following IFRS has largely developed its own disclosures with only limited reference to others. Input from the external auditors has been significant, but some of this has been determined by the approach used by the specific auditor’s style for commercial banks rather than central banks. Auditors do not always fully appreciate the differences between a commercial bank and a central bank, which has a different role and undertakes transactions to meet its policy objectives. This has often led to an over emphasis of items not material in the context of a central bank and insufficient disclosures on operations or accountabilities specific to the functions of the central bank.
About one-quarter of the world’s central banks apply IFRS with approximately a quarter more looking to IFRS for further guidance where their local standards do not provide enough guidance. Given the varied mandates and types of policy operations undertaken by central banks, there also exists significant variation in practice, style, and the extent of the financial disclosures in both the primary statements and in the note disclosures. By their nature, central banks are unique in their jurisdiction and so do not always have local practices and examples they can follow. Although the major accounting firms have created model disclosures intended for commercial banks, these are often not totally appropriate for a central bank. The application of IFRS across central banks differs based on the mandate of the central bank and the capacity of the accounting profession in the specific jurisdiction. An analysis of international practices, such as those undertaken in preparing these model statements, may help address questions about the structure of the statements themselves as well as the organization of the note disclosures. As a consequence, each central bank following IFRS has largely developed its own disclosures with only limited reference to others. Input from the external auditors has been significant, but some of this has been determined by the approach used by the specific auditor’s style for commercial banks rather than central banks. Auditors do not always fully appreciate the differences between a commercial bank and a central bank, which has a different role and undertakes transactions to meet its policy objectives. This has often led to an over emphasis of items not material in the context of a central bank and insufficient disclosures on operations or accountabilities specific to the functions of the central bank.
The Central Bank of Chile (CBC) has implemented broadly advanced transparency practices. This reflects the CBC’s strong public commitment to transparency, which is anchored in the law and has been designated by the CBC as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the CBC the broad trust of its stakeholders and has paid significant dividends for the CBC in terms of safeguarding its autonomy and ensuring its policy effectiveness.
The paper responds to a request made by the Executive Board at the time of the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked staff that the new code remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the Global Financial Crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
The National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM) is implementing advanced transparency practices. The long-standing commitment to transparency noted by a number of stakeholders and forcefully re-affirmed in the recent period is well anchored in the law, and it has been designated by the NBRNM as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the NBRNM noteworthy trust from stakeholders met by the mission, and it has paid significant dividends in terms of anchoring its autonomy and ensuring policy effectiveness.
