This paper analyses the evolution of Chile's trade between 1990 and 2007, studying in particular the impact of trade liberalization in addition to traditional price and demand determinants. The results show that export and import flows are mainly responsive to external and domestic demand, and less so to relative prices, although there is a small impact on imports. In addition, the analysis suggests that trade liberalization may have played a role in increasing exports and imports. Estimations of trade elasticities for other countries in Latin America tend to confirm the results found for Chile.
Examines the net economic benefits and government revenue implications for Chile of forming a free trade area with MERCOSUR as an associate member, forming a free trade area with NAFTA, and reducing its external tariff multilaterally and unilaterally.
Chile has become a model for reforming economies throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political and economic circumstances surrounding Chile's unilateral trade liberalization during five stages (covering the period 1974-1990s), each being characterized by different combinations of compensation schemes that were used to raise support and reduce opposition to the reforms. In less than 4 years (1975-1979) Chile eliminated all quantitative restrictions and exchange controls and reduced import tariffs from an average in excess of 100% to a uniform 10% tariff. Later the tariff was temporarily raised to 35% in the aftermath of a severe economic crisis (1983-1984), but was then reduced to 11% by 1991. This liberalization was implemented simultaneously with other reforms, including an effort to eliminate a stubborn inflationary process, financial reforms that ended decades of financial repression, and a massive privatization program. We investigate the role played by ideas, interests and institutions. More specifically, we examine the role played by the 'reform team' investigate some of the distributive consequences of the reforms, and analyze the ways the government used to maintain a minimum level of support for the liberalization process. A recurrent question is whether authoritarian governments are sensitive to political considerations when implementing major policy changes. We also present econometric results obtained by using household-level survey data to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on Chile's unemployment. We conclude that during the 1970s and afterwards the Chilean authorities relied heavily on coalition building and on compensation mechanisms in order to increase the political support for the reforms
The world economy has witnessed a sudden increase in free trade agreements, generating a renewed debate on their economic impact. In Expanding NAFTA Carmen Zechner focuses on the economic effects on Chile of the potential free trade agreement with the United States. The author creates a framework for analyzing the impact of economic integration between a developed and a developing country from the developing country's perspective. This book goes beyond earlier analyses of the static gains from free trade to examine the dynamic and more intangible effects that are critical to the welfare evaluation of trade agreements. Expanding NAFTA is an important contribution to the research on preferential trade liberalization and to understanding developing countries' trade policy choices. This book will be indispensable to anyone interested in trade policy making and the Chilean economy.
How do international negotiations affect domestic politics? Starting in the 1990s, countries throughout Latin America embarked on many and simultaneous negotiations. On the shifting ground of widening and deepening trade agendas and diverse arenas, what factors determined trade politics? This book examines the domestic political dynamics triggered by South-South, North-South and multilateral agendas in Argentina and Chile between 1990 and 2005. Using a much-needed cross-negotiation and cross-country comparative perspectives, and through detailed empirical analyses of several key negotiations, it proposes an explanation that emphasizes the interplay between international negotiations and domestic trade politics, taken as the result of the complex and dynamic interdependencies and interrelations between state and society. Informed by interviews with public officials, businesses and civil society, the analysis reveals that variation in the depth of agendas, the distributional effects and the uncertainty of political outcomes all have important consequences for domestic preference formation, collective action strategies and types of relationships. Given this, the variety of negotiations, when considered separately and comparatively, show that South-South, North-South and multilateral processes promote different patterns of trade politics. In sum, although national specificities and historical legacies are important, the book argues that trade policy comes first in creating domestic politics in Latin America.
June 1997 Welfare in Chile would be improved by moving toward uniformity in the value-added tax and lowering the Chilean tariff to between 6 and 8 percent. Chile is currently evaluating a wide range of possible trade policies. Using a global computable general equilibrium model, Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr examine a range of trade policy and complementary tax policy options for Chile. They focus on Chile's principal preferential trade policy options: a free-trade area with MERCOSUR, a customs union with MERCOSUR, and a free trade area with NAFTA. They also examine such options as complementary tariff reduction with nonpartner countries in combination with implementing the free trade area options; unilateral or global trade liberalization; and the optimum unilateral tariff. Their principal policy conclusions: * Lowering Chile's tariffs preferentially or multilaterally leads to only small gains as Chile starts with a rather efficient external trade regime, uniform tariffs of 11 percent. * Largely because of its efficient uniform tariff, preferential tariff reduction will reduce Chilean welfare through trade diversion, unless Chile can improve its access in the markets of partner countries. * NAFTA offers enough access to benefit Chile; MERCOSUR does not, once the trade diversion costs of MERCOSUR are taken into account. * Under their preferred-elasticity scenario, Chile can convert the MERCOSUR agreement from a loss to a gain if it lowers its external tariff to between 6 and 8 percent. Doing so will also increase the gains from a potential agreement with NAFTA. * Chile's current value-added tax imposes distortionary costs because collection rates are not uniform. Chile will gain if it can collect the VAT more uniformly. * Tariff reductions from trade reform will require an increase in domestic taxes, so greater uniformity in domestic taxes (less distortion in replacement taxes) will maximize the benefits from trade reform. Welfare will be improved by moving toward uniformity in the VAT and lowering the Chilean tariff to between 6 and 8 percent. This model ignores dynamic gains from trade liberalization, the result of importing either a greater variety of products or more technologically advanced products. This paper - a product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the impact of regional trade integration in developing countries.
