The law developed by the ancient Romans remains a powerful legal and political instrument today. In The Roman Law Tradition a general editorial introduction complements a series of more detailed essays by an international team of distinguished legal scholars exploring the various ways in which Roman law has affected and continues to affect patterns of legal decision-making throughout the world.
This unique publication offers a complete history of Roman law, from its early beginnings through to its resurgence in Europe where it was widely applied until the eighteenth century. Besides a detailed overview of the sources of Roman law, the book also includes sections on private and criminal law and procedure, with special attention given to those aspects of Roman law that have particular importance to today's lawyer. The last three chapters of the book offer an overview of the history of Roman law from the early Middle Ages to modern times and illustrate the way in which Roman law furnished the basis of contemporary civil law systems. In this part, special attention is given to the factors that warranted the revival and subsequent reception of Roman law as the ‘common law’ of Continental Europe. Combining the perspectives of legal history with those of social and political history, the book can be profitably read by students and scholars, as well as by general readers with an interest in ancient and early European legal history. The civil law tradition is the oldest legal tradition in the world today, embracing many legal systems currently in force in Continental Europe, Latin America and other parts of the world. Despite the considerable differences in the substantive laws of civil law countries, a fundamental unity exists between them. The most obvious element of unity is the fact that the civil law systems are all derived from the same sources and their legal institutions are classified in accordance with a commonly accepted scheme existing prior to their own development, which they adopted and adapted at some stage in their history. Roman law is both in point of time and range of influence the first catalyst in the evolution of the civil law tradition.
The Romans depicted the civil law as a body of rules crafted through communal deliberation for the purpose of self-government. Yet, as Clifford Ando demonstrates in Law, Language, and Empire in the Roman Tradition, the civil law was also an instrument of empire: many of its most characteristic features developed in response to the challenges posed when the legal system of Rome was deployed to embrace, incorporate, and govern people and cultures far afield. Ando studies the processes through which lawyers at Rome grappled with the legal pluralism resulting from imperial conquests. He focuses primarily on the tools—most prominently analogy and fiction—used to extend the system and enable it to regulate the lives of persons far from the minds of the original legislators, and he traces the central place that philosophy of language came to occupy in Roman legal thought. In the second part of the book Ando examines the relationship between civil, public, and international law. Despite the prominence accorded public and international law in legal theory, it was civil law that provided conceptual resources to those other fields in the Roman tradition. Ultimately it was the civil law's implication in systems of domination outside its own narrow sphere that opened the door to its own subversion. When political turmoil at Rome upended the institutions of political and legislative authority and effectively ended Roman democracy, the concepts and language that the civil law supplied to the project of Republican empire saw their meanings transformed. As a result, forms of domination once exercised by Romans over others were inscribed in the workings of law at Rome, henceforth to be exercised by the Romans over themselves.
Roman Law: An Introduction offers a clear and accessible introduction to Roman law for students of any legal tradition. In the thousand years between the Law of the Twelve Tables and Justinian’s massive Codification, the Romans developed the most sophisticated and comprehensive secular legal system of Antiquity, which remains at the heart of the civil law tradition of Europe, Latin America, and some countries of Asia and Africa. Roman lawyers created new legal concepts, ideas, rules, and mechanisms that most Western legal systems still apply. The study of Roman law thus facilitates understanding among people of different cultures by inspiring a kind of legal common sense and breadth of knowledge. Based on over twenty-five years’ experience teaching Roman law, this volume offers a comprehensive examination of the subject, as well as a historical introduction which contextualizes the Roman legal system for students who have no familiarity with Latin or knowledge of Roman history. More than a compilation of legal facts, the book captures the defining characteristics and principal achievements of Roman legal culture through a millennium of development.
This is a book on “equity in the civil law tradition” from the double perspective of legal history and comparative law. It is intended not only for civil lawyers who want to better understand the role and history of equity in their own legal tradition, but also – and perhaps more saliently – for common lawyers who are curious about why the history of equity has unfolded so differently on the continent of Europe and in Latin America. The author begins with the investigation of the philosophical foundations of the Western notion of equity in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle and of how their ideas affected the works of the great Attic orators (chapter 2). He then addresses the way in which Roman law turned this notion into a legal concept of considerable practical importance (chapter 3) and how it survived the fall of Rome and was later elaborated in the Middle Ages by civilists and canonists (chapter 4). Subsequently, the author analyses how the notion of equity was dealt with in the Modern Era by legal humanists, Protestant and Catholic theologians, scholars of the usus modernus pandectarum and of Roman-Dutch law, and then by legal rationalism and the philosophers of the Enlightenment (chapter 5). He then deals with the history of equity on the continent since the fragmentation of the ius commune and the codifications of the nineteenth century and with its reception in Latin America (chapter 6). Finally, the author offers some closing remarks on the fundamental equivocalness (or relativity, as some scholars put it) of the notion of equity in the civil law tradition today (conclusion).
Comprehensive and accessible, this book offers a concise synthesis of the evolution of the law in Western Europe, from ancient Rome to the beginning of the twentieth century. It situates law in the wider framework of Europe’s political, economic, social and cultural developments.
Provides a comprehensive description of the system of Roman law, discussing slavery, property, contracts, delicts and succession. Also examines the ways in which Roman law influenced later legal systems such as the structure of European legal systems, tort law in the French civil code, differences between contract law in France and Germany, parameters of judicial reasoning, feudal law, and the interests of governments in making and communicating law.
This book is not about the rules or concepts of Roman law, says Alan Watson, but about the values and approaches, explicit and implicit, of those who made the law. The scope of Watson's concerns encompasses the period from the Twelve Tables, around 451 B.C., to the end of the so-called classical period, around A.D. 235. As he discusses the issues and problems that faced the Roman legal intelligentsia, Watson also holds up Roman law as a clear, although admittedly extreme, example of law's enormous impact on society in light of society's limited input into law. Roman private law has been the most admired and imitated system of private law in the world, but it evolved, Watson argues, as a hobby of gentlemen, albeit a hobby that carried social status. The jurists, the private individuals most responsible for legal development, were first and foremost politicians and (in the Empire) bureaucrats; their engagement with the law was primarily to win the esteem of their peers. The exclusively patrician College of Pontiffs was given a monopoly on interpretation of private law in the mid fifth century B.C. Though the College would lose its exclusivity and monopoly, interpretation of law remained one mark of a Roman gentleman. But only interpretation of the law, not conceptualization or systematization or reform, gave prestige, says Watson. Further, the jurists limited themselves to particular modes of reasoning: no arguments to a ruling could be based on morality, justice, economic welfare, or what was approved elsewhere. No praetor (one of the elected officials who controlled the courts) is famous for introducing reforms, Watson points out, and, in contrast with a nonjurist like Cicero, no jurist theorized about the nature of law. A strong characteristic of Roman law is its relative autonomy, and isolation from the rest of life. Paradoxically, this very autonomy was a key factor in the Reception of Roman Law--the assimilation of the learned Roman law as taught at the universities into the law of the individual territories of Western Europe.
