The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance
The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance

Author: Simon Gächter

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts. -- principal-agent games ; gift-exchange experiments ; incomplete contracts ; explicit incentives ; implicit incentives ; repeated games ; separability ; experiments

Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?
Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?

Author: Ernst Fehr

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 46

ISBN-13:

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In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. This suggests that explicit incentives may have costly side effects that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the undermining effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Buyers, who are in the role of principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them to appropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them. The undermining of voluntary cooperation through incentives is, in principle, consistent with models of inequity aversion and reciprocity. Additional experiments show, however, that the reduction of voluntary cooperation through incentives is partly due to a framing effect. If the incentive is framed as a price deduction the reduction of voluntary cooperation is much stronger compared to a situation where the incentive is framed as a bonus paid on top of a base price.

The Moral Economy
The Moral Economy

Author: Samuel Bowles

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 2016-05-28

Total Pages: 283

ISBN-13: 0300221088

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Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

Why People Cooperate
Why People Cooperate

Author: Tom R. Tyler

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2013-02-24

Total Pages: 228

ISBN-13: 0691158002

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Any organization's success depends upon the voluntary cooperation of its members. But what motivates people to cooperate? In Why People Cooperate, Tom Tyler challenges the decades-old notion that individuals within groups are primarily motivated by their self-interest. Instead, he demonstrates that human behaviors are influenced by shared attitudes, values, and identities that reflect social connections rather than material interests. Tyler examines employee cooperation in work organizations, resident cooperation with legal authorities responsible for social order in neighborhoods, and citizen cooperation with governmental authorities in political communities. He demonstrates that the main factors for achieving cooperation are socially driven, rather than instrumentally based on incentives or sanctions. Because of this, social motivations are critical when authorities attempt to secure voluntary cooperation from group members. Tyler also explains that two related aspects of group practices--the use of fair procedures when exercising authority and the belief by group members that authorities are benevolent and sincere--are crucial to the development of the attitudes, values, and identities that underlie cooperation. With widespread implications for the management of organizations, community regulation, and governance, Why People Cooperate illustrates the vital role that voluntary cooperation plays in the long-standing viability of groups.

Handbooks of Management Accounting Research 3-Volume Set
Handbooks of Management Accounting Research 3-Volume Set

Author: Christopher S. Chapman

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2009-01-30

Total Pages: 1584

ISBN-13: 0080879306

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Winner of the Management Accounting section of the American Accounting Association notable contribution to Management Accounting Literature AwardVolume One of the Handbook of Management Accounting Research series sets the context for the Handbooks, with three chapters outlining the historical development of management accounting as a discipline and as a practice in three broad geographic settings.Volume Two provides insights into research on different management accounting practices. Volume Three features contributions from some of the most influential researchers in various areas of management accounting research, consolidates the content of volumes one and two, and concludes with examples of management accounting research from around the world.Volumes 1, 2 and 3 are also available as individual product. * ISBN Volume 1: 978-0-08-044564-9* ISBN Volume 2: 978-0-08-044754-4* ISBN Volume 3: 978-0-08-055450-1 Three volumes of the popular Handbooks of Management Accounting Research series now available in one complete set Examines particular management accounting practices and specific organizational contexts Adopts a global perspective of management accounting practice Award: "Winner of the Management Accounting section of the American Accounting Association notable contribution to Management Accounting Literature Award."

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics

Author: Francesco Parisi

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2017-04-13

Total Pages: 626

ISBN-13: 0191507210

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Covering over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from Law and Neuroeconomics to European Union Law and Economics to Feminist Theory and Law and Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics is the definitive work in the field of law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. Edited by Francisco Parisi, the Handbook looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law and economics, and looks to the future of the field and its continued development by examining a cornucopia of fields touched by work in law and economics. The uniqueness of its breadth, depth, and convenience make the volume essential to scholars, students, and contributors in the field of law and economics.