This book is a defence of the philosophy of common sense in the spirit of Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, drawing on the work of Aristotle, evolutionary biology and psychology, and historical studies on the origins of early modern philosophy. It defines and explores common sense beliefs, and defends them from challenges from prominent philosophers.
What might common sense be? Is it a mental capacity? Or does it consist of just truisms and precepts? If the latter is the case, is this knowledge innate or empirical? Or is it like “human nature”-a term that has played its role in rhetoric, but that does not appear to have a definite, agreed-upon meaning? Indeed we can learn a great deal about some of the most influential modern philosophers, from the Enlightenment to Ludwig Wittgenstein and W.V.O. Quine, by examining what they have to say about common sense, whilst the anthropologist Clifford Geertz observed that common sense “has become a central category, almost the central category, in a wide range of modern philosophical systems.” This book investigates the nature of common sense through a selection of key writings on epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, meta-ethics and the philosophy of economics and political philosophy. The authors included are representative of the Scottish School, such as David Hume, the Ordinary Language School, and members of the Analytic tradition, including Karl Popper, but they also incorporate thinkers like John Dewey from the American pragmatist tradition, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, recent popular writers on economics, and even pamphleteers, from Thomas Paine to contemporary engaged journalists. This is the first reader to provide such a comprehensive overview of the central writings on common sense. It features review questions and further reading lists at the end of each section.
Common sense is the endless frontier in the development of artificial intelligence, but what exactly is common sense, can we replicate it in algorithmic form, and if we can – should we? Bauer, Schiele and their contributors from a range of disciplines analyse the nature of common sense, and the consequent challenges of incorporating into artificial intelligence models. They look at different ways we might understand common sense and which of these ways are simulated within computer algorithms. These include sensory integration, self-evident truths, rhetorical common places, and mutuality and intentionality of actors within a moral community. How far are these possible features within and of machines? Approaching from a range of perspectives including Sociology, Political Science, Media and Culture, Psychology and Computer Science, the contributors lay out key questions, practical challenges and "common sense" concerns underlying the incorporation of common sense within machine learning algorithms for simulating intelligence, socialising robots, self-driving vehicles, personnel selection, reading, automatic text analysis, and text production. A valuable resource for students and scholars of Science–Technology–Society Studies, Sociologists, Psychologists, Media and Culture Studies, human–computer interaction with an interest in the post-human, and programmers tackling the contextual questions of machine learning.
An original interpretation of Hume's philosophy as centered on the relationship between theory and practice. The author argues that Hume's Essays and History represent a humanist practical philosophy derived from the speculative philosophy of A Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries .
This volume treats the topic of rationality developing a perspective that integrates elements of philosophy of language, phenomenology, pragmatism, and philosophy of life. The two reference authors, Wittgenstein and Ortega, are contemporaries but come from different philosophical traditions. Wittgenstein's early work was influenced by logical positivism. Later he developed an influential approach to philosophy of language. Ortega was influenced by Neo-Kantianism, perspectivism, life philosophy, and phenomenology. On this basis, he developed an independent approach that has become known as ratiovitalism. Astonishing affinities between their respective reflections on rationality motivated the experiment of bringing the different approaches into a synergetic relation. Both investigate the structures and limits of rationality, emphasize the importance of basic beliefs, and criticize the restriction of rationality concepts to the intellectual sphere. The contributions of the volume focus on: dynamics of belief and knowledge, implicit and explicit knowledge, the concept of “vital reason”, the role of world-pictures and forms of life, questions regarding certainty, ignorance, doubt, and madness, as well as matters of pluralism and relativism.
What does it mean when a judge in a court of law uses the phrase “common sense”? Is it a type of evidence or a mode of reasoning? In a world characterized by material and political inequalities, whose common sense should inform the law? Common Sense and Legal Judgment explores this rhetorically powerful phrase, arguing that common sense, when invoked in political and legal discourses without adequate reflection, poses a threat to the quality and legitimacy of legal judgment. Often operating in the service of conservatism, populism, or majoritarianism, common sense can harbour stereotypes, reproduce unjust power relations, and silence marginalized people. Nevertheless, drawing the works of theorists such as Thomas Reid, Antonio Gramsci, and Hannah Arendt into conversation with rulings by the Supreme Court of Canada, Patricia Cochran demonstrates that with careful attention, the democratic, egalitarian, and community-sustaining aspects of common sense can be brought to light. A call for critical self-reflection and the close scrutiny of power relationships and social contexts, this book is a direct response to social justice predicaments and their confounding relationships to law. Creative and interdisciplinary, Common Sense and Legal Judgment reinvigorates feminist and anti-poverty understandings of judgment, knowledge, justice, and accountability.
“The heresy of heresies was common sense.” —George Orwell, 1984. This book is a defense of common-sense realism, which is the greatest heresy of our time. Following common-sense philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, Dallas Willard, and J. P. Moreland, this book defends a common-sense vision of reality within the Christian tradition. Mosteller shows how common-sense realism is more reasonable than the materialist, idealist, pragmatist, existentialist, and relativist spirits of our age. It maintains that we can know the nature of reality through common-sense experience and that this knowledge has profound implication for living the good life and being a good person.
At the root of everything we do is the knowledge we possess. We begin to acquire knowledge in infancy and never stop for the rest of our lives. Without knowledge we would be helpless and vulnerable. But how do we acquire knowledge? Where does it come from, and how do we know if it is true or not? These questions have troubled philosophers since antiquity and gradually over millennia we have discovered the mechanisms necessary to acquire knowledge and to verify it. This book surveys these methods, starting with our most basic functions of common sense and intuition and moving on to more complex cognitive activity such as deductive and inductive inference and causality. Later, the scientific method, statistics, and probability are discussed. The book concludes with newer contributions to the field, including decision analysis, game theory, computers and artificial intelligence. Written for a lay audience, it surveys the field of epistemology in an approachable and engaging way.
Providing a unique interpretation of Kant's theory of judgement as integral to his overall project, Claudia Brodsky explores his continued relevance to contemporary theoretical concerns. The Linguistic Condition traces how Kant combined sensus communis, or common sense with the communicative nature of judgement to reveal that, for him, acts of judgement are dependent on their linguistic articulation, so that in Kantian philosophy language and judgement are inextricably linked. In this first in-depth analysis of language in the Critique of Judgement, Brodsky forms creative connections between literature and philosophy.
