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This is Volume II of six in a collection on Epistemology. Originally published in 1972, the central concern of this book is the understanding of the nature of the universe. Its field is thus that which until the eighteenth century had been known as philosophia naturalis, the philosophy of nature. The aim of the book is to elucidate and examine the fundamental concepts in terms of which the universe is understood.
This provocative new book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as "How is it that an object can survive change?" and "How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed?" To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a completely new theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author calls "hunks," four dimensional objects extending across time and space. This is a major new contribution to ontological debate and will be essential reading for all philosophers concerned with metaphysics.
In accordance with the purpose as an introduction for students, the scope of the book is frankly positive and constructive. It attempts to build up an understanding of the matter of ontology in a logical manner, using simple language, illustrating the subjects with copious examples, and extracting the contents of each chapter into compact summaries. Some of the more abstruse problems of ontology, such as the problem of essence and existence, have been omitted; it was felt that the average student would derive little benefit from a lengthy discussion of problems which have taxed the ingenuity and acumen of the most profound intellects. Such problems may be attacked after the student has become acquainted with the ideas and subjects which form the foundation of the science of metaphysics. After all, the student cannot be expected to be a professional philosopher; it should be sufficient if he acquires a thorough grounding in fundamentals, so that he can deepen his knowledge through subsequent reading and study. In a general way we may define metaphysics as the science of the ultimate principles and properties of real beings.
An annual publication, Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the George Santayana Society includes scholarly articles on George Santayana as well as announcements of publications and meetings pertaining to Santayana Scholarship.
Who Am I? Why Am I Here? What Is Reality Really All About? Throughout mankind's history, our perceptive reality has led us to question who, what, and why we are here. What is this universe we perceive around us? These questions have been the driving force of our survival and have contributed to the evolution and proliferation of man's existence. While there have been many disciplines of thought which have attempted to answer these questions, the truth seems to elude us, thereby indicating a lack of satisfactory answers from all our religions, philosophies, mythologies, and sciences. Ironically, we do in fact have enough knowledge, experience, and information to discover, define, and comprehend the true nature of our existence, as well as our individual roles in it. To realize this requires the willingness to see things at their most basic level, and recognize that what we find there provides us the evidence to understand the foundation of all that exists. For thousands of years, theologians, philosophers, and scientists have monopolized the question of "what is reality?" Now it's a topic for the rest of us. Anyone sufficiently motivated to ask themselves questions such as "Who am I? Why am I here? What is this existence really all about?" already has the inherent ability and the direct evidence to find the answers. It is often said that truth can be stranger then fiction. No where is this more true then in the pages of this eBook.
Kant and Popper. The affmity between the philosophy of Kant and the philosophy of Karl Popper has often been noted, and most decisively in Popper's own reflections on his thought. But in this work before us, Sergio Fernandes has given a cogent, comprehensive, and challenging investigation of Kant which differs from what we may call Popper's Kant while nevertheless showing Kant as very much a precursor of Popper. The investigation is directly conceptual, although Fernandes has also contributed to a novel historical understanding of Kant in his reinterpretation; the novelty is the genuine result of meticulous study of texts and commentators, characterized by the author's thorough command of the epistemological issues in the philosophy of science in the 20th century as much as by his mastery of the Kantian themes of the 18th. Naturally, we may wish to understand whether Kant is relevant to Popper's philosophy of knowledge, how Popper has understood Kant, and to what extent the Popperian Kant has systematically or historically been of influence on later philosophy of science, as seen by Popper or not.
Years ago, prompted by Grize, Apostel and Papert, we undertook the study of functions, but until now we did not properly understand the relations between functions and operations, and their increasing interactions at the level of 'constituted functions'. By contrast, certain recent studies on 'constitutive functions', or preoperatory functional schemes, have convinced us of the existence of a sort of logic of functions (springing from the schemes of actions) which is prior to the logic of operations (drawn from the general and reversible coordinations between actions). This preoperatory 'logic' accounts for the very general, and until now unexplained, primacy of order relations between 4 and 7 years of age, which is natural since functions are ordered dependences and result from oriented 'applications'. And while this 'logic' ends up in a positive manner in formalizable structures, it has gaps or limitations. Psychologically, we are interested in understanding the systemƯ atic errors due to this primacy of order, such ·as the undifferentiation of 'longer' and 'farther', or the non-conservations caused by ordinal estimations (of levels, etc.), as opposed to extensive or metric evaluations. In a sense which is psychologically very real, this preoperatory logic of constitutive functions represents only the first half of operatory logic, if this can be said, and it is reversibility which allows the construction of the other half by completing the initial one-way structures.
WHAT IS SCIENCE? Science is a domain of inquiry. The organized knowledge with inquiry, logical reasoning and experimentation as its central themes, that we call science. NATURE OF SCIENCE Nature of science is defined by certain characteristics which distinguish it from other spheres of human endeavor. These are discussed below Science is a particular way of looking at nature A morning walker looks at the rising sun, pays obeisance to the sun-god, for bestowing the earth with light and energy. Another walker with a scientific bent of mind or scientific attitude tries to understand the process of energy generation
