This research handbook provides a state-of-the-art perspective on how corporate governance differs between countries around the world. It covers highly topical issues including corporate purpose, corporate social responsibility and shareholder activism.
This volume explores corporate governance from three perspectives: a traditional economic, a philosophical, and an integrated business ethics perspective. Corporate governance has enjoyed a long tradition in the English-speaking world of management sciences. Following its traditional understanding it is defined as leadership and control of a firm with the aim of securing the long-term survival and viability of that firm. But recent business scandals and financial crises continue to provide ample cause for concern and have all fuelled interest in the ethical aspects. As a result, corporate governance has been criticized by many social groups. Economic sciences have failed to provide a clear definition of the corporate governance concept. Complexity increases if we embed the economic approach of corporate governance in a philosophical context. This book seeks to define the concept by examining its economic, philosophical and business ethics foundations.
This book presents a thoughtful inquiry into the nature and rationale of corporate governance. The authors address fundamental questions including; What is the balance between ownership and control?; For whose interests should the company be run?; What is the institutional balance between shareholders, directors and other potential stakeholders, including the economy? Professor Dine and Dr Koutsias consider how these issues are dealt with by the jurisprudence of three major and greatly influential jurisdictions; the USA, the UK, and Germany, and also reflect on why and how the current corporate governance context in some states is defined by social, political and historical developments. The authors argue that corporate governance is crucial for the identity of each country. What is revealed in the work is that when national corporate governance is thriving it allows space for democracy to flourish. Corporate governance scholars, policy makers, LLM and LLB students of company law and corporate governance, NGOs involving issues of inequality, poverty and democracy will find this important book an insightful resource.
Corporate governance around the world continues to develop rapidly and this new edition has been extensively rewritten to reflect these changes. The global financial crisis has led to a whole host of changes in corporate governance requirements, which are analysed by Bob Tricker.
Comparative Corporate Governance considers the effects of globalization on corporate governance issues and highlights how, despite these widespread consequences, predictions of legal convergence have not come true. By adopting a comparative legal approach, this book explores the disparity between convergence attempts and the persistence of local models of governance in the US, Europe and Asia.
Corporate Governance is a text which considers the problems surrounding governance and proposes solutions to help restore investor confidence in the corporate world. The book is intended for board members, corporate executives, regulators, auditors, creditors and analysts seeking a concise analysis of the governance issues facing financial and non-financial corporations round the world. The book is fully international in context and includes real-life examples and cases to emphasize the practical nature of governance problems and solutions.
Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms explores a timely topic at the intersection of economics, law, and policy reform. To date, most sophisticated theoretical work on corporate governance has focused on advanced market economies. In post-socialist countries, corporate finance and transition economics scholars have often done little more than convey the received theory to transition policymakers. This volume focuses, for the first time, on the reverse concern: what, if anything, do the reform experiences of transition countries teach about corporate governance theory more generally? To investigate this question, Merritt Fox and Michael Heller have assembled a stellar group of corporate governance theorists. The answers are startling. The principal essays approach the problem from three complementary perspectives that form the organizing themes of the book. The first part refines core corporate theory terms. The second presents important empirical work that explores the channels through which "good corporate governance" may link to the real economy. The final part links corporate governance theory to practical reforms. After fifteen years of experience, practice can now inform theory. Together, these essays present a comprehensive new view on a provocative theme. Written in an accessible style, they will be of interest to a broad range of scholars, commentators, and policymakers.
Generally referring to all forms of social coordination and patterns of rule, the term 'governance' is used in many different contexts. In this Very Short Introduction, Mark Bevir explores the main theories of governance and considers their impact on ideas of governance in the corporate, public, and global arenas.
How effectively can governing mechanisms forged before the surge of activist investment continue to protect shareholders and efficiently order capital markets? This is a pressing question for scholars and practitioners of corporate law, as well as for market participants generally. In order to illuminate the extent to which the growing trend of shareholder activism calls for a new understanding of the kind of shareholder-corporate relations the law should facilitate, this book introduces the concept of shareholder-driven corporate governance. This concept refers to the evident phenomenon of shareholder involvement in corporate governance and offers a normative endorsement of this development. In order to secure the benefits of investors' increasing involvement in corporate affairs, regulatory regimes must grapple with a number of considerations. This book is based on the idea that shareholder corporate governance is a welcome development, but that it does not come without regulatory challenges. For one, it requires rejecting the idea that well-ordered capital markets can be achieved through corporate law which is subservient to private ordering. The mandatory character of, for example, securities regulation is vital to fostering shareholder involvement in corporate affairs. Defenders of shareholder corporate governance must also confront the matter of "wolf packs," or loosely formed bands of investors who defy existing regulatory categories but nonetheless exert collective influence. Regulation that is sensitive to both the inadequacies of past approaches to corporate-shareholder relations and the novel challenges posed by increasing shareholder activism will be able to harness activism, allowing capital markets to flourish.